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Yugoslavia

Croatia—TANJUG reports that arms from the former East German army have arrived in Croatia "with Bonn's knowledge," despite a UN arms embargo on all warring sides in Yugoslavia. Commander of the "Croatian Air Force" Milan Macek said recently that Croatia would "in a few days have its own air force." BORBA quotes a German arms dealer saying "Germany has promised" that given renewed conflicts in Yugoslavia "MiG-21 planes of the former East German air force" will be delivered to Croatia.

Interrepublic—Sarajevo radio reports on opposition party criticism of the Titograd Agreement establishing Serbia and Montenegro as the new SFRY. The Democratic Party considers the Titograd document as "an attempt by the present leaderships in Montenegro and Serbia to remain in power for as long as possible." The committee of the Liberal Alliance in Budva thinks that "for the second time this century Montenegro is being offered its own disappearance from the political and historical scene."

Macedonia—TANJUG reports Macedonia's withdrawal from the SFRY Assembly. The Macedonian Assembly adopted this decision in January and gave the SFRY Presidency notice in a written message.

Czechoslovakia

In an interview with the 14 February issue of CESKY DENIK, Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus "sharply criticizes" the United States and West Europe for "preferring to lend money" rather than "opening their markets" to East European goods, according to a report carried by CSTK. Klaus claims that loans offered for "the de facto purchase" of U.S. goods "is not assistance in the real sense of the word." He recalls a statement from the White House "last year" that the United States intended to "facilitate access" for East European countries to its market. This, Klaus says, "has not yet happened." However, CSTK reports that Czechoslovak State Bank President Josef Tosovsky, who is currently visiting the United States, "is satisfied" with the "surprising" U.S. interest in developments in Czechoslovakia.

Czech and Slovak media widely cover reaction to the draft constitutional treaty adopted by a joint Czech-Slovak commission and subsequently rejected by the Slovak National Council. Prague radio reports Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky's comments: "If a treaty on the principles of a constitutional arrangement is not adopted, the breakup of the common Czechoslovak state is possible." Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, responded telling Bratislava radio: "I consider" the draft treaty "a betrayal of the contemporary national movement... Slovak emancipatory efforts are suppressed by this treaty." Slovak National Party Chairman Ivan Kosec in an interview with Bratislava radio's "Radiozurnal" program alleges that "the whole treaty is evidence of the survival of the socialist way of thinking." "The treaty is very reminiscent of conjugal contracts that were concluded in the Middle Ages by parents on behalf of their children." "In my view, it is a piece of scrap paper."

Podkrepa Supports Implementation of SDS Program

AU1202181892 Sofia BTA in English 1618 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 12 (BTA)—The Podkrepa Labour Confederation adopted a softer tone to the government today. In a special resolution the congress declared that it will "firmly support the government in implementing the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) programme but remains firmly committed to a position in favour of a replacement of the cabinet's economic team and a reorganization of the administrative structures inherited from the totalitarian past." Two weeks ago Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of Podkrepa, who was reelected by the congress, bluntly demanded the resignation of Ministers Ivan Kostov of finance and Ivan Pushkarov of industry and trade.

During the debates today some delegates wanted to put direct demands for resignations into the congress resolution but were persuaded by Dr. Trenchev and the confederation vice president, Mr. Oleg Chulev, to adopt a softer formula. Mr. Chulev told the congress that Podkrepa leaders had almost overnight consultations with representatives of the government and of the SDS parliamentary faction.

"We want to give the government a chance to benefit from our analysis and solve its personnel problems on its own rather than under pressure from our trade union," Podkrepa vice president, Oleg Chulev, told BTA. According to Podkrepa, Ministers Kostov and Pushkarov had so far proved incapable of carrying out the structural adjustment part of the economic reform as they absolutized the monetary part. "We believe that a cabinet can reform itself by replacing some persons by other persons and give the new persons a chance to prove their worth," Dr. Trenchev told the press at the end of the congress.

Asked if Podkrepa would take action in case the government ignores their demands, Dr. Trenchev said that it is not the leadership of the confederation but its structures that can call a strike. According to confederation secretary, Radoslav Nenov, strikes are just a matter of the near future.

Furthermore, Podkrepa demands that the government resume the operation of the National Tripartite Commission (government, trade unions, employers). Podkrepa and the government so far differed over the mechanisms of social partnership. Podkrepa urges parliament that the standing committees coordinate the forthcoming changes in labour legislation with the trade union amalgamations.

Observers believe that, among other things, the confederation softened its tone to the government because of the attention which SDS politicians pay to the congress. Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Vasilev attended the congress today, and back on the first day Podkrepa received personal greetings addresses from the chairman of the National Assembly and leader of the Democratic Party, Stefan Savov, the SDS floor leader, Aleksandur Yordanov, and the leader of the Alternative Social-Liberal Party, Nikolay Vasilev. It was originally announced that President Zhelev will visit the congress, but yesterday he only sent greetings. Asked why the president did not respond to the Podkrepa invitation, Dr. Trenchev said that everybody had the right to decide where to go or not to go but added that "a protocol move sometimes has far-reaching implications."

According to information released at the news conference today, Podkrepa now has more than 500,000 members and is one of the few organizations with a ramified nationwide network of structures. Podkrepa was established by seven intellectuals seven years ago and was a founding affiliate of the SDS. The trade union's actions have been decisive on many occasions: Podkrepa called the first general strike which brought down Andrey Lukanov's socialist government.

SDS Chairman Examines Political Situation

AU1202192992 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] At a news conference held by the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] today, Chairman Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov analyzed the political situation in the country.

He declared that an opposition represented by people such as Dertliev, Karakachanov, Simeonov, and others has again appeared on the scene. They are trying to create the delusion of an opposition, but their masks have already dropped, and the scenario can no longer remain concealed.

According to Mr. Yordanov, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is willing to establish relations with this opposition which is its own creation.

Mr. Yordanov referred in particular to Messrs. Karakachanov and Petko Simeonov.

The proposal to hold a referendum on republic versus monarchy is the third element of the same scenario, Mr. Yordanov stated. This is an attempt to introduce a split between the president and the SDS electorate, according to him. The scenario was unsuccessful in 1991. Mr. Yordanov hopes that it will fail again in 1992. The SDS Parliamentary Group intends to exercise a weekly control over the executive power. As many as 30 questions for cabinet members have already been collected for the parliament session on next Friday, 14 February, while 19 of them will be asked by deputies from the SDS.

The SDS Parliamentary Group also intends to apply for a day of political debates on which topical political issues should be discussed. The SDS Parliamentary Group still discusses candidates for the posts of parliamentary commissions' chairmen to replace Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova and Mr. Yordan Vasilev. It was also added at the news

conference that the SDS Parliamentary Group expected the BSP to work as a constructive opposition, and disappointment was expressed that the Socialists are ready to engage in all sorts of bargaining. They have not given up any of their old habits and have not learned from experience.

Nevertheless, there are no longer contact groups and no midnight sessions today. The spirit of the European legislation is prevailing over this National Assembly, Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov pointed out.

Dogan: DPS More Than Human Rights Movement

AU1302102092 Sofia BTA in English 0905 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 13 (BTA)—The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) supports the government and favours unlimited freedom of private enterprise, a restoration of land ownership, creation of conditions for the allocation of land to landless peasants, privatization and restitution, Mr. Ahmed Dogan emphasizes in "DEMOKRATSIYA '91." Yesterday and today the daily carries an extensive interview with the DPS leader who elaborates on the nature of the ethnic Turks' movement and sets forth its view on a number of problems.

As the Constitution bans the activity of religious- and ethnic-based political parties, "DEMOKRATSIYA '91" asked Mr. Dogan whether the DPS was just a human rights organization and whether it is not time for the movement to disband itself and merge with the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS). The DPS leader says the movement is something more than a human rights organization. It is a political organization which prioritizes the principle of tangible protection of human rights. The very existence of the DPS is a guarantee that there will be no relapses with respect to the rights of man and of human communities, he points out.

The preservation of the country's territorial integrity and the guaranteeing of the democratic processes is a central clause in the DPS programme, Mr. Dogan says asked about the allegations of imposing Turkish self-identity on part of the population.

Even though he has personal doubts about some ministers and specifically about Mr. Pushkarov and Mr. Kostov, Mr. Dogan stresses the DPS support for Mr. Filip Dimitrov's government. However, if it turns out that the government is not in a position to work out a programme of action and implement it, the view of the cabinet will change, he says.

Asked whether the DPS intends to introduce a bill outlawing the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the movement's leader answers that this bill has long been ready. Whether it will be introduced or not will depend on the specific situation. It would be wrong to introduce such a bill right now because it would consolidate the BSP, he observes. Referring to the motives for the bill, Mr. Dogan singles out the shared guilt of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the BSP for the national catastrophe to which the party brought the country after 45 years of ruling it. The involvement of the BCP in the forced assimilation of the ethnic Turks is just an isolated case. The DPS does not want to have the BSP outlawed merely for having masterminded and implemented that programme, the DPS leader Mr. Ahmed Dogan emphasizes.

Asked what he thought about the idea of a monarchy, Mr. Dogan says that at this stage monarchy inspires respect as an idea but in terms of specific political content cannot prevail in this country.

Trade Union Explains Strike Alert Decision

AU1202200292 Sofia BTA in English 1915 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 12 (BTA)—"The strike alert the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) declared yesterday is not actually a strike, it is declining the commitment not to go on strike after February 19, the date on which the one hundred days of Mr. Filip Dimitrov's cabinet expire," it was pointed out at a briefing of CITUB today. The strike alert is a continuation of the January 8 warning strike by adding another two demands concerning the government's concept of social partnership. At the time of the one-day warning strike in January the CITUB demanded an increase of wages and pensions, a government programme for coping with unemployment and protection of working people's interests in the process of privatization.

The transition of agriculture from a centrally planned to a market economy is one of the major problems to be discussed at the National Forum on Agricultural Policy and Training which was opened today. The forum is being held as part of the project of the U.S. Agency for International Development which subsidizes training programmes for farmers in Central and Eastern Europe.

The leaders of the Liberals Party stated that a decision on the Bulgarian state system should be made by holding a monarchy-or-republic referendum before the end of this year. Mr. Petko Simeonov, chairman of the Liberals Party, specified that the question is about settling the dispute over the state institution and not about the choice between two personalities—President Zhelyu Zhelev and the Bulgarian King Simeon II who lives in exile in Spain. He disagrees with the opinion on the personality of Boris III, Simeon II's father, expressed by President Zhelev in his interview for the Spanish EL PAIS magazine.

"The UDF [Union of Democratic Forces]-affiliated Green Party is going to change its name identifying itself as an environmentalist, right-wing party and distancing itself from Aleksandur Karakachanov's Green Party," Mr. Khristo Biserov, chairman of the UDF-affiliated Greens, stated at today's briefing.

The leadership of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party told a press conference today that the documents

which the delegates would discuss at the Extraordinary Congress of the party on February 15-16 were ready. The Turnovo Constitution Union today suggested to the Union of Democratic Forces to conclude a political agreement on cooperation and joint action to invigorate the democratic processes in the country. At today's session on the legitimacy of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms the Constitutional Court considered the mechanisms of collecting evidence, but did not evaluate the evidence presented so far.

The Supreme Judicial Council, chaired by the minister of justice, Svetoslav Luchnikov, listened to the report presented by a three-member credentials commission. The Supreme Judicial Council concluded that its members' election is legitimate as it was held in compliance with the Supreme Judicial Council Act. This is the information a BTA reporter received from Mr. Ivan Grigorov, spokesman for the council. He was authorized to announce that "when carrying out the personnel changes in the judiciary the Supreme Judicial Council will reckon with the professional and moral qualities of investigating magistrates, prosecutors and judges, a careful check will be made of each specific case."

Today the Regional Court in Vratsa (northwest Bulgaria) sentenced to death by firing squad 21-year-old Milorad Bozhkov charged with murdering policeman Georgi Georgiev in April 1991. The sentence is appealable. The policeman's colleagues hailed the death sentence. They insist on a lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty.

The businesses set up in the West by Bulgaria's former communist government, cost the Bulgarian state 525 million dollars, according to today's "DIE PRESSE," the journalist Tsvetana Delibaltova reported for the BTA from Vienna. The newspaper said that by now those businesses have piled up debts worth more than 12 million dollars.

President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia today told a Bulgarian radio reported that he was pleased with the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic by the Bulgarian Government, Bulgarian television reported in its main evening newscast. Mr. Gligorov supported the initiative of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mr. Stoyan Ganev on holding a Helsinki-like Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Balkans. The Macedonian president was puzzled by the fact that Bulgaria has not yet sent an ambassador to Macedonia. "Turkey may get there ahead of you," he said.

VOA EUROPE today broadcast its first live programme from Bulgaria.

Ganev Views Country's Policy in Balkans

AU1302142592 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 Feb 91 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev by Elena Urumova; place and date not given: "All-Balkan Charter on European Behavior in Peninsula"]

[Excerpts] [Urumova] How do you assess the Balkan dimensions of the results of your activity as foreign minister during the first 100 days?

[Ganev] Naturally, Bulgaria looks toward Europe. However, we are not forgetting our responsibility in the Balkans. This means that we must strive to implement European policy in the Balkans—an exceptionally complex and important task. This is Bulgaria's historical chance to be one of the stabilizing factors in the Balkans. Therefore, our efforts are directed toward developing a new atmosphere in the peninsula and activating a Balkan Helsinki process.

[Urumova] However, recently misunderstandings with Greece have emerged.

[Ganev] I would not use the word "complications." One must view things from a position of principles. From such a position Bulgaria supports the creation of guarantees. Bulgaria has recognized the existing borders of the Yugoslav Republics and Croatia's prewar borders, which cannot be changed by force. Bulgaria first recognized the four republics and declared that it also recognizes their borders.

[Urumova] You had differences with the cabinet and the president on the issue of the manner and timing of recognizing the republics. Do those differences still exist?

[Ganev] Our position is clear and categorical—this is something that has become clear to all. By recognizing the republics we relinquished all territorial claims, including vis-a-vis Macedonia. If every Balkan country would do the same this would have a great stabilizing influence in the region. In addition to recognizing the republics we also recognized the right of those republics and peoples to self-determination.

Establishing diplomatic relations, which is the next step, is the second phase of recognition. However, this will depend on several prerequisites. One of them is the EC's recognition of the republics.

Bulgaria does not want to and should not be on the sidelines of the European process. Recognition will have a real international legal significance only if it is affected by more than one country. Therefore we propose making the issue of establishing diplomatic relations dependent on the EC's decision and the development of the peace process under UN auspices. This position is agreeable to the EC countries and the United States, where I visited and had talks recently.

The famous difference you talk about was never related to the essence of the issue. My objection was related to the decisionmaking process and the mode of clarifying the position. Recognizing the republics without simultaneously recognizing their borders would have prompted misunderstandings, as was really the case on the evening of 15 January. Therefore, on 16 January the government very clearly explained the essence of its act. Thus, there are no differences between me and the government, or

between the government and the president. We have a uniform position, which is the only realistic and possible position today. [passage omitted]

[Urumova] The socialist opposition maintains that the decision to recognize Macedonia isolated us, something that increases the risks for our national security, that we became Ankara's hostages, and that through Bulgaria Turkey is creating a pan-Turkish belt around the Balkan Christians.

[Ganev] We adhere to the European criteria of thinking and acting—this is the only influence that we accept. If we acted under the influence of a dictate, I am sure that one month after recognizing Macedonia events would have developed in a different manner. One could say and claim anything. However, I am convinced that Turkey's present leadership follows a policy of integration in Europe. If one does not understand this he could not understand Ankara's behavior toward its neighbors. [passage omitted]

[Urumova] It appears that after your talks in Davos and Washington relations with Greece calmed down to a certain degree. Is that so? Do you think that Greece could prevent Bulgaria's integration in Europe, as its foreign minister, Samaras, said?

[Ganev] I think that there is a certain improvement. In Davos we agreed with Minister Samaras that our differences about Macedonia's name should not be an obstacle to developing our relations and that the issue of guarantees on the part of Macedonia also affects Bulgaria. Anyone who wants to create a disturbance can do so. However, I am convinced that this is not Greece's state policy. In addition, it is not in anyone's economic interest to erect obstacles. Mr. Samaras simply reacted very emotionally and I think that now he thinks differently....

[Urumova] Do you envisage contacts with your Macedonian colleagues?

[Ganev] I have already had such contacts in an attempt to clarify positions. However, at the next stage we will need more contacts, not only with Macedonia, but also with the other republics and Serbia. I have an invitation to visit Macedonia and Serbia, but I would like to wait for the time when issues such as relations, relinquishing territorial claims, and minorities that do not exist in other countries are clarified.

Macedonian Party Leader Meets Dimitrov, Others

AU1402085292 Sofia BTA in English 2108 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 13 (BTA)—Mr. Ljupco Georgijevski, leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, is in Sofia at the invitation of the Fatherland Union (a political organization outside parliament). Today Mr. Georgijevski met Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov, floor leader of the parliamentary group of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee.

"We were unanimous on the issue that the replacement of the economic system should be accompanied by the decommunization of Bulgaria and Macedonia, by their freeing from the myths of socialism," Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov told BTA. According to him, Mr. Georgijevski was touched by the fact that at last there was a political force in Bulgaria—the SDS—to express and translate into practice a clear and categorical stand on the recognition of Macedonia. The Bulgarian Government, the government of the SDS, was the first to recognize Macedonia and the three other former Yugoslav republics on January 15.

According to Mr. Georgijevski with this act the Bulgarian Government by far outstripped the views of certain circles in Macedonia itself, Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov said. The recognition of Macedonia had the strongest effect on the ordinary working people in Macedonia.

There are no barriers and obstacles to our communication. The future is in the opening of Bulgaria and Macedonia to each other, in a Balkan policy without axes and blocs based on economic cooperation and the observation of international treaties, Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov summed up.

Today Mr. Stefan Radoslavov, leader of the Bulgarian Democratic Centre (outside parliament) met the delegation. The Bulgarian representatives confirmed their stand on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. The two delegations declared themselves in favour of the promotion of political, economic and cultural contacts between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

Mr. Georgijevski gave a five-minute interview for the central evening newscast of Bulgarian Television. He said that the threat of a repetition of the Croatian scenario in Macedonia will remain until the withdrawal of the Serbian troops from Macedonia. According to him, the Yugoslav crisis will be solved after the establishment of six independent republics. Mr. Georgijevski and the other leaders of the biggest political force in Macedonia met with Mr. Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), and other members of its leadership at the SDS headquarters.

The guests elaborated on the complicated internal situation in Macedonia and the attempts to force the republic into a new state formation, Serboslavia. An agreement was reached to further develop contacts between the SDS and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity.

Klaus Criticizes U.S., West for Not Opening Markets

LD1402110492 Prague CSTK in English 1007 GMT 14 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 14 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus in today's independent daily "CESKY DENIK" sharply criticises the United States and West Europe for preferring lending money to Central and East European countries to opening their markets to these countries' goods. "When advanced countries generously offer us loans, destined de facto for the purchase of their own goods (loans which we will have to repay together with interests, that are not low, and which will burden not only us but also our children), this is not assistance in the real sense of the word," Klaus says.

For Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland an influx of foreign goods is not vitally important, Klaus says. It is true the loan granted to Czechoslovakia by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been necessary to stabilise the Czechoslovak crown's exchange rate, but what the country now urgently needs is opening markets to its goods, Klaus stresses. "We cannot pay off the loans otherwise but on the basis of exports of our goods. If we are not given a real opportunity for them (exports), we cannot accept any new loans," Klaus says.

He mentions strict quotas on Czechoslovak textile and steel exports and says "we are not allowed to export a sole kilogram of butter, dried milk and ice cream, probably not to threaten the (incomparably more productive) American farmers."

Recalling last year's statement by the White House that the United States will facilitate access for Eastern and Central European countries to its market, Klaus says this has not yet happened. "For us this is a much more realistic and tangible lesson on the market and free trade than the lessons by U.S. professors who come to this country to lecture on liberalism and the advantages of the free market and free competition."

"The countries of Western Europe are not so strict as the Americans, neverthless it seems their governments too would rather lend us money than allow a greater flow of East European goods to their markets," Klaus says. He warns that "if sympathetic promises are not followed by concrete deeds, confidence quickly fades away."

Bank President Satisfied With U.S. Interest

LD1302191992 Prague CSTK in English 1902 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] New York Feb 13 (CSTK)—The president of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia, Josef Tosovsky, currently on a visit to the U.S., today told CSTK he is satisfied with the surprising interest of the American side in the latest developments in Czechoslovakia.

"In one day I granted interviews to four most important mass media, and had three meetings with bankers, entrepreneurs and politicians...I can say that there is also interest in (Czechoslovakia) among potential investors...they paricularly praise the fact that our political leaders reliably control the course of the reform (in Czechoslovaki)", he said. Tosovsky left for talks in Paris today.

Carnogursky Asserts Legal Validity of Dam Project

LD1302192492 Prague CSTK in English 1832 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Bratislava Feb 13 (CSTK)—Chairman of the Slovak Government Jan Carnogursky today said that neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary could cancel their 1977 agreement to build the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project because of the large amount of money each country would need to invest in the project. He was speaking to CSTK in reaction to a statement made Friday by a Hungarian Government spokesman that Hungary would have to withdraw from the bilateral agreement to build the project.

"If the Hungarian side cancels the agreement, it would also in a formal sense violate international law and would confirm that (Hungary) has no intention of completing the hydroelectric project", Carnogursky said. Hungary halted work on the project in 1989 citing environmental dangers, but Czechoslovakia has gone forward in construction on its side of the Danube.

Slovakia Plans To Expand Relations With Serbia

LD1302183592 Prague CSTK in English 1345 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bratislava Feb 12 (CSTK)—Pavol Demes, the Slovak minister for international relations, today told journalists that a Slovak savings bank at Bacsky Petrovec, Vojvodina, when transformed into a bank, will facilitate transfer of capital between Slovakia and the Slovaks living in Vojvodina. On February 9-10 Demes paid a two-day visit to Serbia of which Vojvodina is an autonomous region.

Some 66,000 Slovak live in self-contained enclaves in Vojvodina. They have 19 Slovak elementary schools with about 5,000 pupils, the only Slovak grammar school outside Slovakia's territory, a Slovak publishing house, issue a newspaper and broadcast Slovak-language programmes on radio and television. Demes visited Serbia at the invitation of Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

Text of Draft Czech-Slovak Constitution Treaty

AU1302173992 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Feb 92 p 4

["Full text" of the "Draft Treaty on the Principles of the Constitutional Setup of the Common State" adopted by a joint commission of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council in Milovy on 8 February]

[Text]

Preamble

We, the people of the Czech Republic, and we, the people of the Slovak Republic, represented by our representatives in the Czech National Council [CNR] and the Slovak National Council [SNR],

proceeding from the right of nations to self-determination and respecting their right to freely determine the shape of their national and state life,

recognizing the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as an expression of the identity of the Czech and Slovak nations and, at the same time, recognizing the basic rights of the national minorities living in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic,

expressing our will to live in a common state,

appreciating the decades of our common state life while expressing the need to arrange our mutual relationship on more accurately defined foundations,

appreciating all the good aspects and results of the coexistence among our nations, national minorities, and ethnic groups in a common state thus far,

realizing that the new constitution of the common state, after its approval by the CNR and the SNR, will lay the foundations for the continuation of the common state on a new, contractual basis of the will of the republics to coexist in a common state,

have agreed on the following principles of the constitutional setup of the common state:

Chapter One

Basic Provisions

Article 1

(1) The foundation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is the voluntary bond between the national states of the Czech and Slovak nations, based on the right of self-determination of each of them.

(2) The common state is formed by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Both republics have equal position in the common state.

(3) The two republics respect each other's sovereignty and the sovereignty of the common state. Each of the two republics can secede from the common state or divide it by way of consent. This can be done only on the basis of the direct expression of the will of the majority of its citizens in a general vote.

Article 2

(1) The CNR is the representative of the national sovereignty and identity of the Czech nation and the supreme body of state power in the Czech Republic.

(2) The SNR is the representative of the national sovereignty and identity of the Slovak nations and the supreme body of state power in the Slovak Republic.

(3) The national councils' sphere of jurisdiction includes, above all, the passing of constitutions and constitutional and other laws of the republics and dealing with the principal matters of internal policy.

Article 3

(1) The common state is built on the principles of democracy.

(2) The basic rights and freedoms and their guarantees are implemented equally throughout the territory of the common state, in harmony with the Charter of Human Rights and Liberties.

(3) In harmony with the principles of democracy, humanity, and the law-governed state, the common state recognizes the natural rights of national minorities and ethnic groups, guarantees the preservation of their identity, and establishes conditions for their comprehensive national and cultural development.

Article 4

(1) The territory of the common state is the territory of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) The borders of the common state can be changed only by means of a constitutional law of the common state. The borders of the Czech Republic or of the Slovak Republic can be changed only with the consent of that republic.

Article 5

State property is the property of the Czech Republic, the property of the Slovak Republic, and the property of the common state. The division of state property is set by the constitutions and the laws of the republics and the constitution and laws of the common state.

Article 6

(1) The citizen of each republic is at the same time a citizen of the common state.

(2) The citizen of one republic has on the territory of the other republic the same rights and duties as the citizen of that republic.

(3) No one can be deprived of citizenship against his will.

Article 7

(1) The Czech and Slovak languages are used equally and with the same rights in promulgating laws and other generally binding legal regulations of the common state.

(2) The two languages are used equally and with the same rights in the conduct of business of all bodies of public

power of the common state and the two republics, in proceedings before them, and in their other dealings with citizens.

(3) Members of minorities have the right to use their language in official dealings with the authorities under conditions set by the law.

Article 8

The two-member state setup of the common state can be changed into a multi-member setup by means of a constitutional law passed by the legislative body of the common state, for which the consent of the legislative bodies of both republics is needed.

Chapter Two

The Sphere of Jurisdiction of the Common State

Article 9

The economy of the common state is represented by an economic whole based on a single internal market, a single customs territory, a single currency, the free movement of cash and capital, labor, goods, and services, on the observance of adopted international treaties, and on a uniform legal codification of ownership.

Article 10

Items falling within the jurisdiction of the common state in the spheres of legislative and executive power are:

(1) foreign policy, the conclusion of international treaties, the representation of the common state in international relations, and decisions on questions of war and peace.

The right of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic to act in international relations on their own behalf, in harmony with the foreign policy of the common state, is not affected by this. This concerns the right of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic:

(2) to conclude in their own name international treaties in matters that fall within their jurisdiction as defined in the constitution of the common state. The method of ensuring harmony of such treaties with the foreign policy of the common state will be set by a law of the common state,

(3) to conclude with constituent parts of union-type [spolkovy] and federal states cooperation agreements in matters falling within the sphere of jurisdiction of the national republics,

(4) to represent the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic and accept representation abroad in areas that fall within their sphere of jurisdiction; the status of these representations is governed by the legal order that is valid on the territory of the accepting subject,

(5) defense,

(6) protection of compliance with the constitution of the common state,

(7) the fulfillment of duties arising for the common state from international commitments,

(8) currency and money issue, a uniform monetary, credit, interest rate, and foreign exchange policy,

(9) budget rules, the budget of the common state, and the special- purpose funds of the common state,

(10) the uniform principles and regulation of budgetary policy in the common state, and execution in these matters following agreement with the governments of the republics,

(11) administration of property that is in the ownership of the common state, contingency material reserves,

(12) statistics for the needs of the common state,

(13) protection of rights pertaining to invisible [nehmotny] property,

(14) metrology, technical norms, and the state testing system,

(15) control within the common state's sphere of jurisdiction.

The law passed by the parliament of the common state can, with the consent of the legislative bodies of the republics, transfer state administration in the aforementioned areas wholly or partly to the jurisdiction of the republics and determine the modalities of this administration.

Article 11

In the sphere of legislative power, items falling within the common state's jurisdiction are:

(1) the principles and extent of price regulation,

(2) stock exchanges and the capital market,

(3) the production, distribution, and consumption of electricity, gas, and heat,

(4) accounting and the method of financial statements,

(5) foreign economic relations,

(6) travel documents, entry onto the territory of the common state, and the authorization of foreigners' stay,

(7) promulgation of legal regulations,

(8) conditions for the issuance of periodical printed matter, and conditions for the operation of radio and television broadcasting, audiovisual programs, and news agencies.

(9) public funds and corporations of the common state. Radio and television as public corporations of the common state operate only in the sphere of news and current affairs.

(10) protection of economic competition,

(11) data protection.

Laws passed by the parliament of the common state determine in which of the matters listed above the execution of state administration is carried out by the common state and in which by the republics. The passage of these laws requires their adoption by both chambers of the parliament of the common state.

Article 12

Items falling within the jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of legislative power are, furthermore:

(1) labor relations, employment, collective bargaining, conditions for the regulation of wage development, pension and health insurance, and social security and the subsistence minimum,

(2) the principles of acquiring and losing citizenship,

(3) freedom of speech and the right to seek out and spread information, the right of petitioning the bodies of the common state, the right of association, the right to elect federal bodies, the manner of carrying out referendums called by the common state, the rights of national and ethnic minorities, conditions for the state of danger to the state [stav ohrozeni statu] to the extent determined by the constitution of the common state,

(4) the civic code, the family law, the copyright law, international private and procedural law, the commercial law, the economic law, bankruptcy and settlement procedures, securities, ordinances regulating bills of exchange and checks, the criminal code, regulations for serving prison terms and custody pending trial, court proceedings and general procedures before administrative bodies, the status of experts and interpreters, the organization of federal courts, the status of judges and prosecutors, as well as, if and where appropriate, the representation of state interests,

(5) the use of name and surname, vital statistics register, personal identification cards, personal records, and refugee status,

(6) veterinary care and health control in the food production and marketing, the use of ground transport communication routes, and possession of guns and ammunition,

(7) the basic environmental principles,

The laws adopted on the aforementioned issues specify the powers of the common state and the republics regarding the relevant legal regulations.

Article 13

Another item falling within the jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of legislative power is the right to decide on the taxation system and levies collected by the common state, the taxes important for the unity of the market, the minimum basic tax rates and exemption rules.

In the sphere of executive power, the common state has the right to administer taxes derived from foreign relations and collected by the common state bodies.

Article 14

Items falling within the jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of banking are as follows:

(1) the position and legal status of the central bank of the common state, regulations regarding its bodies and relations with commercial banks,

(2) the position and legal status of the commercial banks, financial institutions, and investment companies.

The Czechoslovak State Bank is the central bank of the common state. The Czechoslovak State Bank is independent of the common state and republic executive bodies in the performance of its main tasks. The supreme management body of the Czechoslovak State Bank is the Bank Council. The Bank Council consists of the Czechoslovak State Bank governor, two Czechoslovak State Bank vice governors—one of whom is a citizen of the Czech Republic and the other one of the Slovak Republic—and a vice governor in charge of the Czechoslovak State Bank Center for the Czech Republic and his deputy and a vice governor in charge of the Czechoslovak State Bank Center for the Slovak Republic and his deputy.

The dealings of the Czechoslovak State Bank with the banks based on the territory of the republics will be conducted by the Czechoslovak State Bank Center for the Czech Republic, the Czechoslovak State Bank Center for the Slovak Republic, and the Czechoslovak State Bank Federal Center. The extent of these dealings will be specified in the law of the common state. The rules will be drawn up by the Bank Council.

Article 15

An element within the jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of the protection of the constitutional order of the common state and its security, including criminal police, is the legislative power in the following:

(1) the control of the establishment, status, authority, and other conditions concerning the armed security corps of the common state, and the establishment, status, authority, and other conditions concerning the security services; this does not affect the right of the republics to form their own armed security corps and regulate their status, authority, and other conditions,

(2) obtaining, collecting, and assessing information important for the protection of the constitutional order, defense, and security of the state, determination of crimes against the state security, and execution of their investigation according to the criminal code,

(3) the fight against terrorism,

(4) determination of criminal activities organized internationally, and organized criminal activities related to illegal production, possession, and distribution of narcotics, smuggling, forging and altering currency, stamps, and securities,

(5) maintenance of a nationwide register and statistics, and declaration of nationwide searches,

(6) regulations related to the protection of the state, economic, and official secrets,

(7) protection of common state constitutional officials, representative offices, and facilities of particular importance.

The extent of the execution of state administration in the common state regarding the aforementioned items will be specified in the law of the common state.

Article 16

The jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of state borders, their protection, and border police includes legislation. In the sphere of the executive power, the protection of the state border belongs to the common state; the form of cooperation between the common state and the republic bodies in the protection of state borders will be defined in the law of the common state. The common state also has the power to execute state administration in the sphere of state borders, their determination, maintenance, and record keeping.

Article 17

The jurisdiction of the common state includes the legislative and executive powers in the sphere of customs, setting tariffs, and extra tariff regulations protecting the domestic market, control of the circulation and ban on imports and exports of particular goods. The form of participation of the republics in execution of customs will be specified in the law of the common state.

Article 18

The jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of communications includes the following:

(1) post and telecommunications legislation,

(2) issuance of consistent rules for postal, telephone, and radio communication, standards, and establishment in cooperation with the republics of the communication tariffs,

(3) issue in cooperation with the republics of individual regulation rules;

(4) issuance in cooperation with the republics of stamps and duty stamps,

(5) representation of the interests of the common state in the international organizations and in cooperation with the republics signing international treaties.

The form of dividing the state administration between the republics and the common state in other areas, and the method of cooperation between the republics in items (b), (c), (d), and (e) will be specified in the law of the common state.

Article 19

The jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of transport includes the legislation and related legal regulations if authorized by law.

The jurisdiction of the common state also includes:

(1) the execution of state administration and control on railroads to guarantee the fulfillment of obligations arising from international treaties and defense requirements,

(2) the execution of state administration and control in sea and air transport.

The execution of state administration and control on railroads in the sphere of public service will be specified in the law of the common state.

Article 20

The jurisdiction of the common state in the sphere of nuclear safety includes the legislation and state control over nuclear safety with the exception of preventative measures and accident deterring measures outside nuclear facilities.

Article 21

Items outside the jurisdiction of the common state belong to the jurisdiction of either the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic.

Article 22

The law of the common state parliament may leave the elaboration of the issues in Articles 3 and 4 to the republic legislatures. The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic may propose a transfer by the law of the common state parliament of the state administration in the spheres described in Article 4 completely or partially to the common state.

Article 23

The common state, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic coordinate the operation of state administration bodies in the republics in the event of executing parliamentary laws of the common state regarding the issues listed in Articles 3-12.

Given the approval by the republic governments, the government of the common state may establish coordinating bodies for the purpose of unification of the conduct of the executive bodies in the matters entrusted to the jurisdiction of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, particularly if these concern the rights and freedoms of the citizens, the orientation of the economic, scientific, financial, and budgetary policies, and the fulfillment of international obligations.

Chapter Three

The Supreme State Bodies of the Common State

Article 24

The legislative body of the common state is the Federal Assembly composed of two directly elected chambers:

—a chamber of deputies

—a senate formed on the parity principle

The participation of the senate in the decision-making process relates basically to the issues to which until now the imposition of majority rule has applied.

Article 25

The head of the common state is the president, elected by the legislative body of the common state.

Article 26

The government of the common state is a capitular [kolegiatni] body of executive power of the common state. It is responsible to the legislative body of the common state.

Article 27

The Constitutional Court of the common state is the judicial body guaranteeing compliance with the constitution.

The Constitutional Court decides:

(1) on compatibility of Federal Assembly laws with the constitution of the common state,

(2) on compatibility of the constitutional and other laws of the republics with the constitution of the common state,

(3) in disputes concerning the division of powers between the bodies of the common state and bodies of the republics, and disputes concerning the division of powers between bodies of the two republics,

(4) in other matters regulated by the constitution and constitutional laws of the common state.

The Constitutional Court is composed on the basis of parity.

Article 28

The representative of the judicial power in the common state is the Supreme Court of the common state.

Article 29

In filling the posts in the supreme bodies of the common state, regard is given to equal representation of citizens in both republics.

Chapter Four

Common and Concluding Stipulations

Article 30

A referendum on matters in the jurisdiction of the common state can be called under the conditions specified in the constitutional law of the common state.

Article 31

(1) The principal law of the common state is the constitution adopted by the legislative body of the common state. The constitution of the common state should be based on this treaty. The constitution of the common state will take effect only after approval by the legislative bodies of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) Amendments to the constitution concerning the powers of the common state will take effect only after approval by the legislative bodies of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. This approval replaces the participation of the senate in decisionmaking by the parliament of the common state. (Not discussed)

Article 32

The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council will respect in the constitutions of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic respectively the principles contained in this treaty.

Article 33

Legal regulations issued by the common state bodies will be immediately in effect in both republics.

Article 34

The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council will suggest to the Federal Assembly that it consider the principles contained in this treaty when adopting the new constitution of the common state.

Article 35

This treaty will be adopted through its approval by the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council.

NOTE: The two parties maintain conflicting positions on certain formulations, or these points have not been precisely stated in the legislative form. This concerns Articles 15-(2), 26, and particularly 31-(2).

Reaction to Czech-Slovak Draft Constitution Treaty

Miklosko: 'Acceptable Mechanism' Found

AU1202142992 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 Feb 92 p 3

["First installment" of interview with Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, by Julius Gembicky in Bratislava on 7 February: "Intoxication by Preelection Games"]

[Excerpts] [Gembicky] After initial skepticism, the 5 February evening reports on the Milovy talks [between representatives of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council on the future shape of the common state] filled the air with unexpected optimism. Was the optimism warranted or was it just another of the numerous waves of optimism that break as soon as they encounter the first obstacle?

[Miklosko] Indeed, Wednesday night we noted something incredible—that on the question of division of powers we actually are not very far apart. Let me try to briefly recapitulate the disputed issues. The first was the issue of dividing between the federation and the republics the status of subject under international law. [passage omitted]

[Gembicky] What is the difference between the Czech and Slovak sides in the way they perceive the issue of who is a subject under international law?

[Miklosko] No one challenged the CSFR's status as a subject under international law, which means that international relations with other states and economic treaties of fundamental nature fall within the jurisdiction of the bodies of the common state. The problems concerned mainly those powers that are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the republics, such as culture, education, or health care, for which there actually are not any bodies at the federal level. The question was whether it is possible to establish some sort of relations of partnership in those areas or whether everything needs approval from the federal government, particularly from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Western power sharing models are much more flexible in this regard. The Walloon Ministry of Culture can conclude treaties with any sovereign state in the world, and not just with parts of sovereign states, without having to ask anyone for permission. And it does not have to go through federal bodies as the Czech side insists. Actually, we did not even want to go that far. As a matter of fact, as usual, we were not even unified on this issue. At any rate, we demanded that, as a minimum, the republics should be able to conclude treaties after an agreement. We cited as an example a treaty between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and its counterpart in Hungary. It is self-evident, in our opinion, that the federation need not become involved in this.

[Gembicky] Has an acceptable compromise been found in the end?

[Miklosko] Yes. Solutions have always been sought in some kind of a general formulation, with the proviso that the details would be specified in a law.

[Gembicky] As far as we have been informed, the problem of customs was another hard nut to crack....

[Miklosko] What makes the Slovak side nervous is the fact that the anticipated changes of personnel in the area of customs have not been carried out and certain groups of people continue to be hard to control. But it is not only the existence of small mafias in the area of customs that makes us nervous but the fact that, on top of everything, they are controlled from Prague. Complaints lodged with a customs office in Bratislava or elsewhere [in Slovakia] must be dealt with in a roundabout way, via Prague. The Slovak side therefore demanded that the execution of customs administration remain in the republics. In the end, this demand turned out to be rather illogical.

Minister Jozef Baksay proposed a quite acceptable solution, whereby customs administration would not be run by a single person or body but by a customs council in which the Slovak Republic would have parity representation. There could be two centers of customs administration, in Prague and Bratislava, with the customs council made up of the directors of these two centers and their deputies. This could be the basis for a compromise because, according to experts, there is not a single state in the world in which the execution of customs administration is not controlled from a single center. Division would make the entire customs administration inoperative and would even multiply the mafias' possibilities.

[Gembicky] In other words, you were in a good mood when you went to bed the first day....

[Miklosko] The second day started with tackling the problem of division of powers between the Federal Ministry of Interior and the republic ministries. In contrast to the Czech side, the Slovak side feels threatened by rapid deployment units being established only at federal level. In that case, they would not be available to the republics. In the event of a crisis, these special units occupy strategic facilities such as television and radio stations and become, in fact, instruments of power. The distrust of federal bodies in these matters is part of the genetic code in Slovakia. This distrust concerns these units, as well as the police or criminal service. We do, naturally, realize that protection against international terrorism and drug trafficking, and even links with Interpol, must be ensured centrally. We also disagreed with the Czech side on the question of powers in protecting the state border.

This disagreement was similar to the one concerning the customs administration. The state border is now protected by a single police corps that is controlled, to this day, by the Federal Ministry of Interior in Prague. The

Federal Ministry of Interior wants to retain this control. It is obvious to the majority of us that the problems of terrorism and drug smuggling are an international matter and should be controlled from a single center. One can therefore agree with Federal Minister of Interior Langos that, at the moment of the deployment of special units in the event of a threat, the existence of several centers would diminish their ability to act and impair their interaction. However, the republics, too, ought to participate in the struggle against terrorism and drugs. If we continue to exclude them from this area, we will have to be prepared for growing tension because, often, they are not informed about these matters.

The federal units should not be as overconfident and authoritative as they have been in the past because this provokes an undesirable aversion to them among policemen and criminal investigators at the level of the republics. We managed to come to an agreement. These units will remain under the jurisdiction of the center and will have a unified command. However, their coordination with the republics will be guaranteed by law.

[Gembicky] Another sensitive point concerned the division of powers in the sphere of transportation and communications. There was even the threat of a serious conflict in this sphere—not only between the Czech and Slovak sides, but also between the minister and the movement that had nominated him to that post.

[Miklosko] Despite the existence of certain disproportions [disproporcie] between Federal Minister of Communications Ehrenberger and the Christian Democratic Movement, I believe that he is a highly competent man who subscribes to the logic of a functional federation. During our last meeting in Prague, I recommended that he seek a compromise between the strict demand for a functional federation and a political solution, as otherwise we will not get out of the impasse. In the end we succeeded, relatively fast, in finding a solution that suits both the federation and the republics.

[Gembicky] An open clash was also expected on the dispute over the division of powers in banking. The Slovak side, represented by national currents, wanted to achieve a more transparent representation of the banks of the republics....

[Miklosko] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Vavro, whom I personally hold in great esteem and whose subservience to federal bodies I rule out, argues that, once you accept the idea of a single currency you must have a single center of money issue because these matters have their absolute logic. Nationally oriented parties wanted to get national banks as legal subjects for the republics, cost what it may. However, in the opinion of Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus this would allow the republics to print as much money as they need, which might cause tremendous problems. Here, too, we finally found an acceptable mechanism for dealing with this situation. Naturally, it is acceptable if you accept as the premise that we do not want to divide the common state. [passage omitted]

Carnogursky: State Breakup 'Possible'

LD1302163692 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1430 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] According to remarks made at a press conference in Bratislava by Jan Carnogursky, Christian Democratic Movement chairman and Slovak prime minister, if a treaty on the principles of a constitutional arrangement is not adopted, the breakup of the common Czechoslovak state is possible. Jan Carnogursky regards the text of the draft treaty concluded at the Milovy talks to be progress, because it will stimulate a further shift of powers from the center to the republics. According to the prime minister, the treaty is a compromise which will enable the republics to consolidate and stabilize their internal and external structures in the years to come.

[Prague CSTK in English at 1634 GMT on 13 February in a Bratislava-datelined report on Carnogursky's reaction adds: "The draft treaty would allow either of Czechoslovakia's republics to withdraw from the common state only after a republic-wide referendum." "He said that a refusal by the pro-independence Slovak National Party to accept the treaty could 'endanger the certainties and security of the republics and of citizens.'"]

Civic Democratic Party: Provisions 'Missing'

LD1402095592 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1730 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Excerpt] The club of Civic Democratic Party deputies in the Czech parliament today discussed the text of the draft treaty on the future constitutional arrangement drawn up by the joint commission of the Czech and Slovak National Councils in Milovy. Katerina Kasparova invited Deputy Jiri Payne to speak after the meeting:

[Begin recording] [Kasparova] Did you reach any specific conclusions during your debate?

[Payne] Of course, we subjected to careful analysis the prepared text of the proposal to be submitted to the Presidium. We feel that it needs a certain amount of time to mature and become a dignified political document. For instance, we found that the text lacks a provision that would enable the federation to carry out a policy of subsidies, which would perhaps pose a threat to the market regulation fund. Foreign economic relations were not among the list of the federation's competences, probably indicating that a federal foreign trade ministry could not exist. It also appears that the question of oil was also forgotten where the federation should have the right, at least legislatively, to regulate these matters to ensure that this energy matter was a common affair.

The fact that the provision saying that the federation has the right to regulate basic rights and freedoms has been

omitted is a very serious shortcoming, indicating that a number of powers would be transferred to the republics with approval of this document. It would then be difficult to ensure that human rights are applied harmoniously in both republics. Undoubtedly, there will have to be a change, especially in this provision. Furthermore, we found that the federation's powers to regulate ownership; the federation's legislative powers on institutions of higher learning, geodesy, and cartography; and restitution of damage caused by state authorities—i.e. restitution laws—are missing from the draft. We believe they should have remained among federation powers. Territorial planning and building regulations are also missing from the treaty, as are provisions on state decorations and state holidays, which the president will perhaps mind. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Meciar: 'Betrayal' of Slovak Interests

LD1402111692 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, by reporter Ivan Kosec; date and place not given; from the "Radiozurnal" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Meciar] What has been submitted so far of the draft Czech-Slovak treaty has been prepared by a working commission. It would be a tragedy if the Slovak National Council accepted this proposal. I consider it a betrayal of the contemporary national movement, a betrayal that is the culmination of the evasive tactics of the Democratic Party, part of the Christian Democrats, the Public Against Violence, and the Independent Hungarian Intiative. It is against the interests of Slovakia.

The relations between the parties actually culminate in this act. This treaty not only does not anchor the principle of building a common state from below, but actually denies it. It is an act that retreats from the laws on the division of power adopted in 1990. This treaty denies the existence of the Slovak Republic as a subject. It even avoids calling it anything at all. In essence, this is not a legal document not a political document. What happened was what we expected to happen: To achieve a treaty at any cost, the Slovak side, represented by the above political parties, conceded to agree to stipulations that counter the interests of the Slovak Republic. It is worse than the existing state.

Further, it is necessary to say unambiguously that Slovak emancipatory efforts are suppressed by this treaty. Where constitutional acts were required for any changes in the division of power between the federation and the republics, now ordinary laws suffice. It is really a step toward strengthening central bureaucracy, not a step toward the consolidation of statehood.

The stand of the Czech side reflects a lack of tolerance and understanding. As far as the people on the Slovak side are concerned, they show deep obsequiousness and irresponsibility toward the voter, toward their programs, and toward what the Slovak Republic needs. [passage omitted]

[Kosec] What will be the stand of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia?

[Meciar] If we are to act conscious of our responsibility for the destiny of our country, we must refuse the treaty. We recommend the condemnation of those who drafted this humiliating document.

[Kosec] What further developments do you expect?

[Meciar] That will depend on external responses. Other countries expect the parties to strike a deal, and they are not intrested in the content. They consider the contents to be our internal affair. If this bad treaty is adopted, then it will have international support. We will be forced to observe it. In this sense, no treaty is better than a bad treaty. It would be better not to have any treaty at all. This is why we will recommend that our deputies' club turn down the treaty. We might consider a vote of no confidence in some officials. [passage omitted]

Slovak National Party: Treaty 'Scrap Paper'

LD1402112492 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Interview with Jozef Prokes, chairman of the Slovak National Party, by reporter Ivan Kosec; date and place not given; from the "Radiozurnal" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kosec] Mr. Prokes, what is the response of the Slovak National Party to the draft Czech-Slovak treaty?

[Prokes] The whole draft of the treaty is evidence of the survival of the socialist way of thinking. Somebody is trying to force a treaty on the two republics in the same way in which two companies once were forced to sign a contract not to benefit them in any way, but to justify the existence of the general administration. Today they are supposed to sign the treaty to allow the federal bureaucracy to continue its imperturbable existence.

Moreover, the treaty is very reminiscent of conjugal contracts that were concluded in the Middle Ages by parents on behalf of their children. Two underaged subjects are abstaining in advance from their sovereignity. This is a mockery of democracy, as well as of logic and common sense. [passage omitted]

[Kosec] How will the Slovak National Party respond to this situation?

[Prokes] The party will vote against this treaty because, I repeat, two nonsovereign subjects cannot sign a mutual treaty obliging them in any way. [passage omitted]

[Kosec] Do you feel that the agreement reached in Milovy is a conscession made by Slovak side?

[Prokes] In my view, it is a piece of scrap paper.

Slovak Unification Party Responds

LD1402115292 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] The National Liberals fully support the Slovak Government on the completion of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroproject on the Danube. As Robert Kalinak, a leader of the National Liberal party stressed, the launching of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project will mean an annual turnover of $1 billion for Slovakia. The National Liberals subjected the existing tax policy to sharp criticism.

At a news conference in Bratislava, Jan Veselovsky, chairman of the Party for the National Unification of Slovaks, criticized the outcome of the talks of the joint commission of the republics' parliaments in Milovy. He termed the agreement that the two sides reached as absurd and asked who can actually be considered to be the people.

The Party for the National Unification of Slovaks wants to submit evidence to the municipal prosecutor in Bratislava about the flasification of documents in connection with the privatization of the Atrium community center on Herianska Street and, consequently, voice no confidence in the municipal authority in Ruzinovo [a Bratislava suburb].

The guest at the news conference of the Liberal Social Union in Prague, Federal Assembly Deputy Milos Zeman, called for the creation of a so-called realistic bloc on the Czechoslovak political scene. The bloc should have a crisis prevention program and, in addition to the parties of the Liberal Social Union, include the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party.

Carnogursky Defends Treaty Wording

AU1402120792 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Alena Melicharkova; place and date not given: "Shrewd, But Beneficial"]

[Text] The idea of a state treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was first raised, one year ago, by Jan Carnogursky, the present prime minister of the Slovak Republic. In today's issue we publish the text of the draft treaty between the people of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as agreed upon by the joint commission of the two republics' parliaments at Milovy. In this context we turned to Jan Carnogursky with a few questions:

[Melicharkova] Do you have the feeling that this draft treaty is in accord with your original intention? And, if not, on which points did you back away?

[Carnogursky] The agreed draft of the treaty is in accord with the original idea of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] in that it will be a treaty between the two republics. This is expressed in a somewhat shrewd way. The participation of the republics is expressed by the formula about the people of the Czech Republic and the people of the Slovak Republic in the preamble and by the will of the republics, also expressed in the preamble, to coexist in a common state based on a treaty. This somewhat complicated wording is the result of a compromise between the Slovak position and the Czech position. It happens quite often that treaties are the result of compromises.

[Melicharkova] The preamble speaks about a treaty concluded between one people and another people. Do you know of any treaty anywhere, even in history, that has been concluded between the people?

[Carnogursky] The draft treaty speaks of the people of the Czech Republic and the people of the Slovak Republic represented by the national councils and expressing the will of the republics.

[Melicharkova] Various commentaries on the draft treaty, including comments by some Slovak National Council deputies, have suggested that in some of its provisions the draft trails behind even the currently valid constitution.

[Carnogursky] No, the draft of this treaty is better than the currently valid constitution. KDH Deputy Mr. Simko participated in the Milovy talks and he would be in a position to substantiate this in detail.

[Melicharkova] Some time ago, when there was talk that the treaty would not be binding under international law, I asked you whether you were not afraid that, in that case, the treaty would become a mere scrap of paper. At that time you replied that if it will be a treaty between the republics it will be legally binding and it will not be necessary to declare that it is a treaty valid under international law. How legally binding will this treaty be?

[Carnogursky] The international nature of the treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on the principles of the constitutional setup in the sense of the international law has always been out of the question because, so far, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic do not have the full status of subjects under international law. Neither can they declare this status on their own. No concession has therefore been made from this viewpoint. The legally binding nature of the treaty dwells in the fact that the republics are legal subjects and, when they conclude a treaty between each other, then this treaty has a legally binding nature. Moreover, the legally binding nature of the treaty will be guaranteed, and confirmed, by its ratification in the national councils. And these must proceed from this treaty. If they did not, the national councils would not ratify them. [sentence as published]

[Melicharkova] A simple majority of deputies in the Slovak National Council will suffice to approve the text

of the treaty. Do you think that your opposition counterparts in the parliament, too, will give their consent to this text?

[Carnogursky] I do not know. That is their business. Some of them have been opposing such a treaty for a long time. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, for example, and, I gather, also the Slovak National Party were opposed to the treaty as a matter of principle even prior to the Milovy agreement. They were opposed to it because they do not want to conclude a treaty between the republics as a matter of principle. I see the treaty's merit in that it permits both republics, but let us speak about the Slovak Republic, to conclude, under the patronage of an internationally recognized state (the CSFR), international legal treaties from the viewpoint of the administration of its internal affairs as well as vis-a-vis foreign countries. It can conclude them, for example, with UN member states, to the extent of its powers, which are actually complete, leaving aside defense, foreign policy, and the currency. This means, for the time being, not the full status of a subject under international law but at least a partial such status.

[Melicharkova] Once the treaty is signed, it will be legally binding, as you claim. Does this also mean that it can be unilaterally cancelled?

[Carnogursky] As far as the division of the common state is concerned, the treaty contains a provision, on the basis of which it is possible to divide the common state by a referendum. Naturally, this would have as its consequence also the cancellation of the treaty.

[Melicharkova] Are you not afraid that, given the fact that, apparently, only coalition deputies will approve this text in the Slovak National Council, the treaty will be labeled as, or will receive the attribute of, a treaty between coalition partners?

[Carnogursky] Many legal acts are approved only by coalition partners because they represent the parliamentary majority. The important thing is not what the treaty will be called but whether it benefits the people of the Slovak Republic and the people of the Czech Republic.

Czech, Slovak Parties Comment

AU1302134492 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Feb 92 p 2

[CSTK and "FM" report: "Milovy, and Much More"]

[Excerpt] Bratislava, Prague— The results of the joint meeting of the Czech and the Slovak National Councils in Milovy was the main item on the agenda of news conferences with politicians yesterday.

Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence:

They Elected the Chief of the Campaign

The Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence has its chief of the election campaign: Slovak National Council Deputy Vladimir Cecetka. He and his colleague from parliament, P. Tatar, issued their stands on the Milovy treaty. Running through all these stands was a veiled threat to those parties that had not taken a clear stand on the constitutional setup. The draft treaty speaks unequivocally of a common state, and those members of the opposition who have a different opinion are against the common state and the treaty. When asked who should, in fact, conclude the treaty in the name of both republics, P. Tatar said authoritatively: the national councils. However, this is not that unequivocal.

The Democratic Party: No Mass Departure of the Members

I. Brndiar, member of the Slovak National Council Presidium, participated in the Milovy meeting as a member of the Democratic Party. He and the executive deputy chairman of the party, P. Missik, expressed satisfaction with the agreement. Despite this, I. Brndiar expressed his concern about the stands that will be adopted by other Christian Democratic Movement deputies and other opposition parties and movements. He said that for the treaty to be passed, 39 votes will be sufficient if 76 deputies out of 150 are present. This is what the coalition is able to manage. P. Missik denied rumors that members are leaving the Democratic Party en masse—members who could follow the example of former democrats, O. Keltosova, S. Novak, and M. Vaskora, and strengthen the ranks of the For a Democratic Slovakia Movement. According to him, only one member in Nove Zamky and one in Kosice have left the party.

Green Party in Slovakia: Objections

Despite the fact that it will be the Club of Deputies of the Green Party in Slovakia that adopts the final stand, Deputy J. Pokorny, as a participant in the Milovy meeting, said that he "missed the logic" of the preamble to the draft treaty and that of sections 1 and 2, since it is not clear "who is in fact concluding the treaty." The Green Party in Slovakia believes that the treaty should be concluded between the republics. Regarding the Gabcikovo dam project, P. Sabo said that if the Hungarian Government is talking about abrogating the international treaty of 1977, then it is showing that it is "making a political problem" out of the Gabcikovo project.

The Party of Slovak National Unity:

We Will Conclude a Pact Even with the Devil

J. Panis, chairman of the Party of Slovak National Unity, said, among other things, that, in the name of independent Slovakia, he would be willing to conclude a pact with the devil. If this happens, and Slovakia is ruled by Slovaks, he will leave politics. [passage omitted]

Ministries Assess Course of Coupon Privatization

LD1402115992 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] The representatives of both republics' ministries for the administration of national property and the Coupon Privatization Center said that about 10,000 privatization projects were proposed in the Czech Republic by 31 January, three-quarters of which are projects in competition with each other. About 200 projects amounting to 60 billion korunas have been approved for coupon privatization. Further property should be approved in the coming two weeks, amounting to another 60 billion korunas.

In Slovakia, out of 1400 to 1500 projects, eight have been approved and 929 assessed. In 479 cases these are primary [zakladni] projects. The Slovak ministry envisages the endorsement of a further 50 to 60 projects for coupon privatization this week amounting to 30 billion korunas. The aim of the ministry will be to accummulate property totalling a value of 80 to 90 billion korunas.

Both ministries agree that not all projects can be described as promising. This also applies to those with only enterpreneurial intentions. The descriptions of enterpreneurial intentions often contain mere promises, for example, that the enterprise will increase labor productivity.

The number of registered people achieved by 31 January is 5.777 million in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia 2.501 million. In the whole CSFR 8.278 million citizens are registered. There have been hundreds of cases of multiple registration. They are being investigated. The propaganda campaign has cost 34 million korunas. The list of all registered investment privatization funds is quoted in the second issue of the journal COUPON PRIVATIZATION, the distribution of which started today.

Extent of Projects Noted

LD1402115892 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Calculations on the value of property that a Czechoslovak citizen could acquire under coupon privatization are misleading, since the real price of shares will be decided by their market value. This was stressed at today's news conference in Prague by representatives of the Czech Ministry for Administration of National Property and Privatization, their colleagues from the corresponding Slovak ministry, and representatives of the Coupon Privatization Center.

They said that to date privatization projects worth approximately 60 billion koruna have been approved for coupon privatization in the Czech Republic. Privatization projects for property worth roughly the same amount are expected to be approved during the next two weeks.

In the Slovak Republic, 929 projects have been assessed. [as heard] This week another 60 are expected to be approved. The total value of the property earmarked for coupon privatization in Slovakia is estimated at about 30 billion koruna.

Poll Shows Increased Support

LD1302130292 Prague CTK in English 1137 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 13 (CSTK)—Asked about their opinion on the coupon privatization, 55.2 per cent of respondents backed it in late January against 38 per cent in November, says a survey, published in the economic daily HOSPODARSKE NOVINY today. The survey, carried out by the market research institute "GFK-CSFR" between January 17 and February 3, asked 1,000 respondents over 18 throughout Czechoslovakia.

In the coupon privatisation, thousands of state-owned companies will be turned into private joint-stock ones partially by selling off of coupons each worth 1,000 crowns ($33), to individuals over 18 years of age who, after registration, may trade their coupons for company shares.

According to the survey, disapproval of the coupon privatisation came from nearly 10 per cent of respondents against 15.2 in November. The number of those decided to take part rose from 25.4 per cent in November to 74.1 in January. On the contrary, only 20.7 per cent do not want to take part now against 47.3 in November.

Decided to invest their coupons via an investment privatisation fund (IPF) are 38 per cent in comparison with 15 per cent in November. 16 per cent intend to trade their coupons directly for company shares (45.4 in November), 13 per cent will make use of both options (nearly 12 per cent in November) and 33 per cent are undecided yet (28.1 in November).

The number of those decided for a concrete company has not changed considerably and floats around 26 per cent. The rest of respondents do not know yet. As much as half of respondents have already chosen "their" IPF (11.5 per cent in November). 10 per cent are decided to buy shares of the company where they work (25.4 in November), 71 per cent of respondents do not want to buy these shares (60 per cent in November).

The registration of coupon booklets began November 1, 1991 and will end February 29, 1992. Citizens can send their coupons to IPFs in a preliminary round starting February 17, the first round for ordering of company shares by individuals will start in March.

Dobrovsky Defends Army Deployment in Slovakia

AU1302144892 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with CSFR Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky by Karel Smetak; place and date not given: "Slovakia Is Not Defenseless"]

[Text] Jan Slota, Federal Assembly deputy for the Slovak National Party, said recently that only 6 percent of the total combat air force—which is the most powerful part of the Army—is deployed in Slovakia. None of the politicians really care about the fact that Slovakia is virtually defenseless. In this connection, we asked CSFR Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky:

[Smetak] Minister, is Slovakia really defenseless?

[Dobrovsky] This is a statement by a man who is not informed and has no idea about what the Czechoslovak Army has prepared in the interests of the CSFR's defense as a whole. A few days ago at the meeting of the General Staff, we made the president of the republic and the prime ministers of the national governments familiar with the Czechoslovak Army's operational plan. It ensues unequivocally from this plan that CSFR territory is one strategic whole, and, as such, it must be protected against a possible attack.

[Smetak] What is the situation in Slovakia then?

[Dobrovsky] The territory of the Military Command East—extending over the entire territory of the Slovak Republic—is sufficiently prepared, on the basis of the redeployment and transformation of the Czechoslovak Army, for the implementation of the operational plan. The number of airplanes on Slovak Republic territory is really insufficient at present. The concept for the development of the Czechoslovak Army includes precise dates on which we will be deploying a certain number of military planes, interceptors, and combat planes in Slovakia.

[Smetak] Do the capacity and logistics of our airports correspond to our intentions?

[Dobrovsky] Airports on the Slovak Republic's territory today are not able to accept a larger number of planes. Nevertheless, the defense of this part of the CSFR is sufficiently secured. Any combat task would be fulfilled within 20 minutes after the takeoff of a plane from the territory of the Military Command Center, that is from Moravia. According to the situation, the plane would either return to its home airport or it would land at some Slovak airport. After refueling and completing the basic loading of ammunition, the plane would be able to take off again. I repeat, the air space over the Slovak Republic is sufficiently protected by the Czechoslovak Air Force.

[Smetak] Deputy Slota also argued, among other things, that the number of combat helicopters is insufficient....

[Dobrovsky] By October this year, 20 combat helicopters will be transferred to Slovakia to increase its defense capability. We are also considering a possibility that does not have any military significance, but does have a political significance. A certain number of SU-22 combat planes would be transferred to one Slovak airport—only to show our goodwill. From the military point of view, this transfer will yield a minimal military result, since it will shorten the time needed for putting the planes into action by four to five minutes.

'Slovak Liberation Army' Allegedly Created

LD1402091792 Prague CSTK in English 0843 GMT 14 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 14 (CSTK)—A letter speaking about the alleged creation of a Slovak Liberation Army (SOA) which should ensure independence for Slovakia was on Thursday brought to the federal parliament by Miloslav Krizenecky, Czechoslovakia's chief military prosecutor. Krizenecky handed the letter to Ladislav Lis, chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the parliament's House of Nations. The deputies voted to discuss the letter, which Krizenecky said was of a secret character, behind closed doors.

Eleonora Sandorova, deputy for the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN), was surprised by this decision saying she had received more letters of a similar character.

Referring to well informed sources, CSTK said that according to the letter, the SOA was founded on January 1, 1992, as an armed force of the Slovak nation with the aim of pushing through Slovakia's independence (meaning secession from the Czechoslovak Federation). The letter calls on Slovak citizens to accumulate weapons and ammunition, on Slovak officers and soldiers in the Czechoslovak Army to be ready to start combat operations which should be launched if the Slovak regional parliament fails to declare complete independence and sovereignty of the Slovak Republic by the end of 1992. Lis said it cannot be ruled out that the letter is a provocation.

The letter came at a time when a joint commission of the Czech and Slovak regional parliaments has found a mutually acceptable formula for the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks in a common state. Though the formula was rejected by the Slovak parliament's Presidium, it will be discussed by the federal parliament on February 20.

Goncz Discusses Future Organization of Europe

AU1302160792 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 12 Feb 92 p 7

[Interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz by Karel Smetak; place and date not given: "My Vision Is a Europe of Regions"]

[Text] Hungary, having allowed the transit of citizens of the former German Democratic Republic through its territory to the West, helped to a great extent to destroy the Iron Curtain in 1989. For its attitude—unique in the countries of the Eastern Block—Hungary outran Czechoslovakia by the famous step [povestny krok] in signing the new international treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany.

[Smetak] Mr. President, what does the signing of the Hungarian-German treaty mean to your country?

[Goncz] The treaty has been topical for a long time, since Germany is the greatest political and economic power in Europe, and no Central European country, no matter how much wants to, can bypass Germany. The offer of friendship, which forms the essence of the treaty, must be welcome. It fixes the status quo that in fact has already existed. In the treaty, I can see a starting point for the future. It is a basis that makes it possible for Hungary to stand more firmly on its feet politically and economically.

[Smetak] The influx of German capital is watched with concern in Czechoslovakia. What is the situation in your country?

[Goncz] For the time being, German capital has not reached such an extent in our country. Moreover, the largest part of capital coming to Hungary is American. So, we would like to see more German capital.

[Smetak] There is no doubt that the Federal Republic of Germany is gaining a dominant position the process of European unification. What is your vision the old continent's future in this connection?

[Goncz] I am convinced that the future is in Europe's integrated setup. It will be a Europe of regions, certainly. From this it ensues that Czechoslovakia and Poland are our natural partners. For these three countries it is necessary to walk the same road. If for no other reason then for the fact that in Europe, to which Czechoslovakia is yearning so much to belong, it is precisely Germany who is the strongest.

[Smetak] In the foreseeable future, a new Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty is to be signed. However, we have the impression that problems surrounding the completion of the dam project on the Danube River could become an obstacle....

[Goncz] I would say that the problem you mentioned is an example of how the road to a market economy and new relations can be full of bumps. However, we can do nothing but follow it until we reach our goal. I see a solution to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project in getting rid of our political, national, or ethnic viewpoints.

Participation in Commonwealth Aid Program Pending

LD1302170892 Budapest MTI in English 1529 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 13 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Despite efforts by Hungary's Ministry of International Economic Relations, it is still uncertain whether Hungarian companies can participate in Western aid programmes to the successor states to the Soviet Union, senior ministry official Peter Balas said in an interview with MTI today.

Balas referred to earlier reports which suggested that Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia could supply goods to the value of several hundred million US dollars to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] financed by industrial countries. Balas said that the EC had made it known that it wanted a considerable part of the aid to come from the Central European countries, but hard Western economic interests seem to be against this political will.

The Ministry of International Economic Relations is now to send a delegation to Brussels to consult with EC bodies about Hungarian export possibilities to the CIS.

Christian Democrats Meet Croatian Counterparts

LD1402111192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Report by correspondent Vilmos Kovacs on talks between the Hungarian Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the Croatian Christian Democratic Party in Budapest on 12 February]

[Excerpt] The KDNP received Croatian guests led by Vladimir Mesaric, deputy chairman of the Croatian Christian Democratic Party. He briefed the KDNP leadership on the situation in his country and on the UN observers' arrival. Mesaric explained that while there is no war in Croatia, there is no peace either. He outlined his party's opinion that the peacekeeping forces should be lined up on the prewar Croatian borders. Mesaric also told Radio Hungary the following about the Vance plan:

[Begin Mesaric recording in Serbo-Croatian, fading into Hungarian translation] Mr. Vance is a greatly respected politician, although I believe he is the extended arm of the U.S. State Department. We highly value his initiatives if they really serve to strengthen peace. However, I feel that the points of the peace plan which have not been clearly outlined can be explained in several ways. U.S. politics have a serious influence in the United Nations; unfortunately, they hinder a fast and satisfactory solution to the crisis. [end recording]

KDNP Chairman Laszlo Surjan received the delegation in the afternoon and discussed the Croatian situation.

Vladimir Mesaric explained that the Croatian Christian Democratic Party hopes to attract Christian Democrats scattered throughout various parties. In particular, he mentioned the right wing of the Croatian Democratic community, which was defeated by the left wing of the Party—that is, the former communists. KDNP Chairman Laszlo Surjan stressed the importance of cooperation with the neighboring countries' political parties which uphold similar principles. [passage omitted]

Serbia's Draskovic Visits, Urges Minority Rights

LD1302233692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] The leader of the biggest Serbian opposition party, Vuk Draskovic, is holding talks in Hungary. Vilmos V. Kovacs has the following summary.

[Kovacs] In the framework of his visit to Budapest, Vuk Draskovic, leader of the opposition Movement for Serbian Renewal, in the morning held discussions with representatives of the Serbs in Hungary, and in the afternoon he visited the prime minister's office where he was the guest of the Minorities and Ethnic Secretariat. Not much before our broadcast, he laid a wreath in Buda at the bust of Vuk Karadzic, Serbian educator of the last century. He then gave an interview to Hungarian Radio.

On the Serbian minority situation, he said the following:

[Begin Draskovic recording in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed Hungarian translation] In the Milosevic regime not one minority is as endangered as the Serbian democratic opposition. We are the victim of the regime.... In few European states are those in a minority given the national rights which the minorities have in the Serbia of Milosevic. Of course, the rights have been slightly impaired at the periphery, and we are watching over this.

At the same time, we demand maximum rights for the Serbian minority, for example in Hungary too. By this, I mean self-government based on the personal principle [szemelyi elven alapulo oenkormanyzat]. There can be no discussion of regional autonomy here, because of the small number of Serbs. [end recording]

Yugoslav Military Denies Airspace Violation

LD1302193692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] This morning, Yugoslav aircraft violated Hungarian air space on two occasions, and several times they flew into the neutral airspace zone. After the Border Guard report, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry has confirmed the report. Owing to the airspace violations, three fighter aircraft and two helicopters took off from the Hungarian Army's airbase in Kecskemet, and for three hours they patrolled in the region of Kiskunhalas, Baja, and Szeged. The Yugoslav military air control has denied the border violation. They explained the vigorous air activity as the execution of training tasks. Yugoslavia's military attache in Budapest was summoned to the Hungarian Army Command in order to clarify the affair.

Economic Relations Ministry Releases Trade Figures

LD1302185192 Budapest MTI in English 1420 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 12 (MTI)—Hungary's convertible exports grew 41 per cent and amounted to 10.2 billion USD in 1991, while hard-currency imports went up by 83 per cent to 11.7 billion USD, the Ministry of International Economic Relations announced here today.

Hungary's trade balance based on customs clearance figures showed a deficit of 1.5 billion USD in 1991, but taking into account items not involving monetary transfers and thus not included in the balance of payments, the deficit was 400 million USD. This dramatic growth in convertible exports and imports reflects the switch-over to convertible trade with the former socialist countries.

Rouble trade figures, basically limited to the first quarter of last year, were 600 million roubles for exports and over 800 million roubles for imports. Hungary's exports to the industrial world amounted to 7.2 billion USD in 1991, a 32-per cent increase. Hungary exported a total of 4.9 billion USD to EC markets, a dynamic, 48-per-cent increase over 1990. The EC share in Hungary's exports was also 48 per cent last year.

Hungarian products showed an extremely strong expansion on the German market, with total exports to Germany amounting to 2.8 billion USD, a 61-per-cent growth. Exports to EFTA countries made up 1.5 billion USD, a 29-per cent increase. The export growth to the industrial countries and the Third World could only offset half the fall-back on the East European market.

Hungary's exports to Eastern Europe decreased by 60 per cent last year, and the region's share ebbed to 19 per cent. Imports from industrial and developing countries together made up 9.2 billion USD last year, and Hungary spent 1.6 billion USD on products from the Soviet Union. Imports from the EC grew by 87 per cent, the Ministry of International Economic Relations report reveals.

Illegal Radio Station Begins Operation in Pecs

LD1302185792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Another illegal radio station has started its operation, this time in Pecs. According to NEPSZABADSAG, in its first program the editorial staff bearing the name "Subjective Radio" urged the making of the media law as soon as possible and the lifting of the frequency moratorium. Lazar (?Gui), member of the presidium of the European Association of Free Radios, also spoke during the program

Walesa Calls For Responsibility Among Journalists

LD1202213692 Warsaw PAP in English 1931 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 12—At his first ever meeting with representation of information sections of Polish Radio and TV here Wednesday [12 February], President Lech Walesa called for what seems saving parliament, the government and the president from unfair criticism in mass media.

While stressing the significance of the media, the president said Polish journalism still has not defined its profile. Although the old style has disappeared, no new one has been created, he said and emphasized that a press report often boils down to seeking sensation or even gossiping.

He called on journalists: "Take care all of you about the most important things. It is important that parliament, government and the president should not be defamed by everybody, or all of us will have to suffer for this. This must not be done for the sake of the future. Let us not do such things towards the government and parliament as we make ourselves ridiculous. That is why we were murdered in Katyn so that we could lose our head. This was politics. I would like to often hold meetings to convince you whether we can reach agreement on some topics. And these topics unite all of us. If you have doubts, please shout: What are you doing, what did you mean? If you want to give me or anybody else thrashing, so do this if he deserves this. And if not, so at least please do not harm if you cannot help," Walesa said.

Interior Minister Outlines Current Tasks

AU1302201592 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with Polish Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz by Zbigniew Lentowicz; place and date not given: "To Reveal as Much as Necessary"]

[Text] [Lentowicz] Let us talk about concrete matters. You have spent the first few weeks in your new post patching up the biggest holes—financial ones, as you said at your hearing in front of the Sejm Administration, Internal Affairs, and Justice Committees. Now you are going to implement the provisional budget, which also affects your ministry. This hardly permits a breakthrough inside the Interior Ministry.

[Macierewicz] I am by nature an optimist. When I took up this post I assumed things would be bad, and I was right. However, I have managed to patch up a few of the holes, and that is a success.

[Lentowicz] But of the 100 billion zlotys [Z] that the ministry expected to receive, the Budget Committee has arranged only Z30 billion for the ministry. What will this money be spent on?

[Macierewicz] No doubt the money will go to the border defense forces to reinforce the southeastern border. In any case it all depends on when the ministry will actually obtain this money. Remember that all the money has to be spent this quarter.

[Lentowicz] Until now we have been dependent on Soviet defense systems and on total protection from that direction.

[Macierewicz] Let us not exaggerate this dependence. Our own information systems worked quite efficiently, but, needless to say, our possibilities of physical reaction were much worse. Yet the danger to Poland from the east is likely to increase. Today the border between Romania and Moldova and between Moldova and the Ukraine is virtually open, and already last year we had serious problems with Romanian refugees on our western border.

Soon I will transfer some of the helicopters currently at the disposal of the Vistula Defense Units to the southeastern border. During a period of instability and drastic changes in the east, we must demonstrate our concern for the security of Poland's borders.

Because the management plan for the eastern border was already completed when I assumed office, and its implementation was meant to cost Z105 billion over the year, we can be certain that major parts of this plan will be implemented if we only spend Z30 billion this quarter. But on the other hand, Z30 billion is not enough to solve other problems completely.

[Lentowicz] Lech Kaczynski, chairman of the committee we mentioned before, has warned the new ministry leadership against becoming too optimistic. He mentioned features such as demoralizatiom and corruption among the police and their general reluctance to work. Following the loud Dybowski affair, one may also accuse the police of neglecting the law. Do you have any measure of hope that all this can be changed?

[Macierewicz] The police are not as bad as that. The main thing right now is to appoint a commander in chief. The frequent changes of incumbent at this post have caused a lot of confusion. It is time to stop experimenting. The maintenance of discipline among the police is a priority matter. Soon after I became interior minister I encountered a difficult problem that was described in the press as the Dybowski affair. The affair was deemed to be more than just a simple violation of official duties; it was deemed to have political undertones, too. We have clarified the matter, and it seems we have definitely ruled out any political element. My reaction against those who violated service discipline may serve as an example of how I will react to any suggestions that the police are abusing their powers. The problem is that incidents like the apprehension of Mr. Dybowski create a pretext for further accusations.

[Lentowicz] The police claim that the relentless reforms are splitting the police force apart, upsetting policemen, and making them fear a purge.

[Macierewicz] It is not quite like that. Police commanders at voivodship level have been asking me to carry out the same structural changes that have been carried out at the national command level. These changes do not involve personnel reductions, but I very much fear that various rumors, not to mention press reports, will make it look as if personnel reductions are involved. I wish to make it clear that I see no need to carry out any kind of general cadres review. Individual employees might be affected, but that is normal in any service.

[Lentowicz] You said at your news conference that society should accord greater respect and recognition to police officers. In view of the negative past in this sphere and the present critical situation, have you thought of a method to quickly achieve something that took centuries to achieve in England?

[Macierewicz] No special method is required. My predecessors have already achieved a lot in this sphere. Although I am not obsessed with the accuracy of the results of opinion polls, for some time now the results of these polls have in fact indicated increased respect toward the police. That proves something. No doubt such a large complement of policemen and soldiers reflects expectations rather than the actual situation, but it is these expectations and parliament's changed attitude toward public security, that create a good climate for suitable regulations that would make the work of the police more effective. For it is true that many rules issued over the past year or so have led to a very bad stage of affairs that is now having a direct effect on society. That is why amendments to the criminal code and to procedures to be followed in the case of petty offenses are essential. The justice minister and I will cooperate with each other in this direction.

[Lentowicz] You have said in public that there are some phenomena that require a special approach.

[Macierewicz] I had in mind a system of preventing scandals. Some articles of the criminal code have already been deleted on the assumption that state property would disappear and that the problem of protecting public property would resolve itself. Well, this has not happened. Right now the Justice Ministry is working on suitable legal regulations.

[Lentowicz] Following the hasty closure of the police departments responsible for economic crime, experts who formerly worked in these departments have already found themselves new jobs, often in business.

[Macierewicz] That is a very complex matter. The economic departments functioned within a separate system and were designed for other needs, therefore they were impossible to use properly. It is bad that many experienced officers have quit. Perhaps some of them can be encouraged to return. The K-17 units are to a certain extent a substitute. I have said many times that I will try to expand this force.

[Lentowicz] The fashionable slogan of taking policemen away from their desks has made a comeback.

[Macierewicz] It is quite true that police officers gave been burdened with excessive duties in the preparation of cases and, to put it bluntly, overwhelmed with red tape. Everything indicates that it is possible to reduce this quagmire, especially because there are signs of closer cooperation between the justice and interior ministries, and we will develop all possibilities of cooperation.

[Lentowicz] What about the dispute between the police and the Office of the Protection of the State [UOP] concerning the division of responsibilities between them?

[Macierewicz] There must be cooperation between the police and the UOP, especially nowadays, with all the economic scandals that are cropping up. According to the law, the UOP should be involved in these matters only on an exceptional basis. Unfortunately, we still do not have a normal fiscal control service adapted to a free-market country.

[Lentowicz] Following the experience of Czechoslovakia and Germany, do you fear that releasing files on former Security Service agents might have an effect on social calm?

[Macierewicz] I know that even from this ministry, material used to leak out to the press as if from a bucket with a hole, and this material often consisted of state secrets. I am still confronted with attempts to leak out information. It is no longer a secret that in the past, some parliamentarians were given access to files and information that constituted a state secret, while other parliamentarians, especially those not belonging to a given "setup," were denied this access. That is the only reason I can think of for your question. I will prevent such a situation to the best of my ability.

I do not appreciate the way in which the problem of files in the former GDR has been resolved, because the problem there is somewhat similar to the problem in Poland. To a certain extent, there was also an uncontrolled leakage of information there. I do not consider it right to grant universal access to files. I think data should be released only after an appropriate decision by the Sejm and under suitable control by a Sejm body or other impartial body. Under these conditions, and after the passing of a suitable amount of time since the Sejm's decision, six months for example, high- ranking officials in the executive, judiciary, and legislature who collaborated with the Security Service should be given the chance to resign from public office. Those who refuse to do so would be made to appear before a special commission, which would make public the details of their collaboration, but this would be a last resort. I intend to submit a draft of this plan of action to the Sejm within

the space of three months. I realize that in a delicate matter such as this, it will not be possible to avoid complications entirely. In any case, it has not been possible to do so until now. After all, we have already had a situation where some politicians accused others of collaborating with the Security Service. If my plan is accepted, I am sure the gain will be greater than the loss. The most important result will be the final purification of the climate of public life in Poland. It will also finally be apparent that the people governing Poland have severed the umbilical cord joining them to the communist system.

[Lentowicz] I understand your plan involves a desire to create a permanent institution that would screen candidates for state posts.

[Macierewicz] Yes, though that is a completely different matter. There would be a special commission to protect the new state administration against an influx of unsuitable people. The intention behind these activities is not just to achieve a certain psychological-political effect but also to implement the tasks my ministry is committed to implement, i.e. safeguard state security and eliminate all traces of blackmail, instability, and infiltration, all the things that give public institutions such a feeling of insecurity.

[Lentowicz] What exactly does the concept of state secrets involve?

[Macierewicz] People occupying state positions behave as if that concept were embarrassing or a relic of the communist system. They suggest that the concept of state secrets should no longer exist. The situation here is very bad because a state that is democratic and open is subject to greater infiltration, and those carrying out this infiltration have no connection with the ridiculous image of the spy in a trenchcoat.

There is a dramatic problem that is closely related to this—the condition of the state, construed as the condition of the public administration. There are many reasons for this problem, but one of the chief ones is the exceedingly low status of officials. That is one of the leftovers of communism. As a result, this milieu is not very resilient to corruption.

The protection of state secrets and a commission to screen state employees are merely parts of a comprehensive reform of the public administration, due to be prepared by a newly appointed team chaired by Minister Wojciech Wlodarczyk.

[Lentowicz] These are long-term plans and objectives. Right now everyone wants to hear the new interior minister tell them when they will finally feel safe in Poland.

[Macierewicz] I prefer to give an answer in three month's time. Right now I can only speak in general terms. Even though crime has fallen slightly since last year, it is still at a staggering level. However, it is financial scandals, such as those involving the Foreign Debt Servicing Fund and the "Art-B" company, that are most dangerous of all, because they strike at the very heart and soul of our financial system. My colleagues and I have carried out a survey of these matters, and on this basis I have pledged to carry out within three months the tasks that the Interior Ministry is obliged to carry out in such cases. This is possible, especially because my predecessors have already done a lot of work in this area.

[Lentowicz] We understand that there are plans to create a unit to protect policemen. That is a new idea.

[Macierewicz] I will not even mention by name a tradition that possesses such an evil history. Nevertheless, we are seeking methods of steady and more penetrating internal control. We will also continue what Commander in Chief Hula started, in other words the severance of links between the police on the one hand and private security forms, and similar institutions on the other.

I think that, in a policeman's case, holding two jobs at the same time is impermissible. Such an arrangement gives rise to unhealthy and unnatural situations.

[Lentowicz] Finally, I would like to ask if there is still room for optimism inside the ministry.

[Macierewicz] I draw my optimism from two sources, the first of which is society's need and desire to cooperate with its own police. There is a great demand for justice, but also for discipline, in this matter. That is a very positive feature. The attitude of Sejm committees is also encouraging. The deputies realize that there are spheres in which we should be more open and not create artificial secrets, and that there are other spheres in which the time has come for more determined and consistent action, especially where the state's security and public order require it.

The second source of optimism is the fact that it is my honor to belong to a government that places these matters high up on the agenda of its activity. In a nutshell, there is at last a clear political desire to resolve these issues.

Ministers To 'Probably' Adopt Status Report

AU1202102692 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Feb 92 p 1

[Ewa K. Czaczkoqska report: "An Analysis of Openness"]

[Text] On Tuesday [4 February] the Council of Ministers will probably adopt a report on the state of the nation, otherwise known as an analysis of openness. This document, which records the situation in Poland in late 1991 and early 1992, is not a response to a similar document prepared by the previous government of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. The present report, produced by Jan Olszewski's government, is a reflection of life in Poland at the

time of this government's formation. It does not analyze the entire administration, but merely the sociolegal system.

According to unofficial sources, the report is 16 pages long, with seven chapters. It dwells on negative features and phenomena, but first of all it describes the positive achievements of the past two years, such as building the institutional foundations of democracy and a market economy, eradicating hyperinflation, and establishing links with international financial institutions. However, it says that the results of the reforms are more modest than originally expected, and the social costs of these reforms are higher than expected. However, the report continues, the positive results are seriously threatened by the negative phenomena. Identifying them enables one to choose appropriate methods of rescuing the country. However, efforts by the authorities are not enough, says the report. The whole of society must be mobilized. Only after the initiation of rescue activity to halt the recession can the government proceed to implement plans to repair the damage. But before that happens, society must be a little patient and refrain from making demands whose implementation would cost more money than the sums required to keep the state functioning at a bare minimum level.

According to the report, the economy is in a state of collapse, which is getting worse. Over the past two years, the gross national product has fallen by 20 percent, and industrial output has fallen by 32 percent. As far as the recession in the housing construction industry is concerned, 1991 was a record.

In agriculture, there is an unfavorable relationship between the prices of production resources and the procurement prices of agricultural produce. Last year the price index in relation to 1990 was 75 percent.

The payment capability of enterprises and farms has deteriorated markedly. In 1991, almost 40 percent of all enterprises had lost their credit rating. Presently, over half of state farms have also lost their credit rating. It is estimated that state enterprises owe a total of 70 trillion zlotys, and farms owe a total of 10 billion zlotys.

A disturbing phenomenon in 1991 was the drop in exports, something unheard of since 1981. Its main cause was a 42 percent cut in exports to former CEMA countries. The over 20 percent increase in exports to the EEC countries has been unable to make up for this loss.

The influx of foreign capital to Poland is described by the report as modest, considering the country's capital and investment needs.

In 1991, the number of companies based on foreign capital increased threefold, but the value of the invested capital amounted to only $70 million.

The report also considers ownership changes in the economy to be too sluggish, and privatization is not considered a sufficient guarantee that the best decisions for the national economy will be made. Income generated by privatization last year amounted to 3 trillion zlotys instead of the planned 15 trillion.

In 1991 a major crisis in public finances occurred. While the budget deficit grew, arrears in payments also increased. The budget deficit was made greater by unreceived payments of income tax and social security contributions.

According to the report, major disparities have appeared in social life over the past two years. Wage differentials occur not only between various socioprofessional groups, but also within each group. This is illustrated on the one hand by growing balances in the bank savings accounts of individuals and, on the other hand, increased spending by most families on basic goods and services. Working families spend up to 90 percent of their income on the necessities of life, and pensioner families spend up to 98 percent. At the same time, in 1991, the increase in nominal wages was somewhat greater than the rise in prices. Real incomes rose by 3 percent, whereby the average monthly salary rose by 2 percent.

The report criticizes the changes in the government administration's structure and methods of action over the past two years, considering them superficial and not suited to a democratic state and free market. Although the nomenklatura system has been discontinued and political bias in cadre selection has been abolished, no system that would guarantee professionalism and objectivism has been created yet.

The report says that the law is incoherent and vague, and little suited to the new political system and socioeconomic reality. Loopholes and contradictions in the law encourage economic wrongdoing such as tax evasion, corruption, and economic scandals. Legislative changes are required in all spheres, but most of all in the spheres of the economy, social policy, and the functioning of the administration. The length and complexity of the legislative process curbs the effectiveness of the government's anticrisis activity.

The draft report contains another two chapters—domestic security and the mass media.

Government Spokesman Backs Report

LD1202053692 Warsaw PAP in English 2110 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Reacting to press criticism that the government's state of the nation report merely reiterated generally known facts, the government spokesman, Marcin Gugulski, stated that the present government was the first which had recognised its duty to present society with its "opening balance".

"We wanted to inform the public of the state Poland is in, what is the situation with the law, administration, the state of national security", explained Gugulski.

"The document is acccused of presenting everything painted black. There are indeed many dark colours, because that is how the Polish picture looks. However we also talked about the good that had been done".

Deputies Submit Bill on Local Government Reform

LD1102235892 Warsaw PAP in English 1405 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Eighty-five deputies of various parliamentary floor groups submitted a bill on district self-government, claiming that embarking on a work on the draft, "will force an overall streamlining of the process of reforming local self-governments". They argue that the work on the reform reached Stalemate.

Ex-Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Donald Tusk, Aleksander Hall, Henryk Wujec, Zbigniew Bujak, Aleksander Malachowski, Krzysztof Krol and Jacek Maziarski, who are among the signatories of the bill, think that at least three formerly enacted acts have to be amended.

They mean the 1990 law on local self-government, the law on regional bodies of the government administration and the competence act.

The deputies stress that the current division of the government and self-government responsibilities as well as the form of financing local governments are commonly criticised.

Regulations in Pensions Law Ruled Unconstitutional

LD1102234892 Warsaw PAP in English 1151 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—A considerable part of the regulations contained in the pensions law is incompatible with the Constitution, says the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal announced on Tuesday [11 February].

This is true in particular of the regulations which have reduced the amount of old age and disability pensions, and those which ban from work persons compelled to retire earlier due to the liquidation of enterprises employing them.

Meanwhile former Labour Minister Michal Boni who co-authored the controversial law while still in office charged the tribunals decision as being "political rather than legal."

He claimed that the law was designed as a legal act correcting several mistakes made by the Polish legislation still in the 1980's and insisted that "law must change in the name of rationality." He also said that without this law it would be impossible to proceed with the reform of the social security system.

Boni bitterly commented that after such a decision of the Tribunal hardly anyone in Poland will be willing to work on the reform of the social security system because "everyone will fear he may break some rule."

Three major trade union councils: Solidarity, Solidarity-80 and OPZZ [All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions], on the other hand, voiced their approval for the Tuesday ruling of the Tribunal which declared most of the provisions of the law on pensions unconstitutional.

Government spokesman Marcin Gugulski, asked for comment, only recalled that possible consequences of upholding the Tribunals decision by the Sejm (lower house) would be disastrous for the state budget.

The Constitutional Tribunal also decided on Tuesday to rule on February 25 whether another controversial law, this time the one on the return of property lost by the trade unions (as a result of martial law-ed), is constitutional.

The law was appealed against by the OPZZ and the Federation of Trade Unions of Miners.

Ministers Protest Screening Candidates for Office

LD1202054192 Warsaw PAP in English 2112 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Plans were revealed here Tuesday [11 February] saying Poland's interior minister intends to work out a package on vetting all candidates for public posts in this country. Though a senior Interior Ministry official said Minister Antoni Macierewicz would submit his project to parliament for approval, two MPs [member of parliament] strongly concerned over the news today filed a letter to the prime minister demanding his stance on the issue. According to Piotr Szczypinski of the Interior Ministry, the package provides for screening the past record of people seeking public posts.

MPs Zbigniew Bujak of Democratic-Social Movement and Aleksander Malachowski of the Solidarity of Labour wrote in their letter to Jan Olszewski that "no one aside from parliamentary bodies or those appointed by parliament should be vested with such powers".

Also, the fact that Macierewicz is "a politician with clearly cut political preferences does not secure the kind of impartiality such vetting procedures require," the two said, adding caustically: "And who is going to vet the minister himself?" Macierewicz is vice president of the ZCHN Christian-National Union.

Solidarity Negotiating Team Considering Strike

LD1202035392 Warsaw PAP in English 1533 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Gdansk, Feb. 11—Solidarity's team which took part in fruitless negotiations with government representatives on the problem of hikes of prices for electricity and central heating told the union's national commission on Tuesday [11 February] that the team started the negotiations with good will and readiness for compromise whereas the government took an inflexible stand, contradicting the very idea of negotiations.

Solidarity offered a number of variants how to solve the problem but the government side failed even to justify its negative stand on them. By negotiating the government played for time but the position of Solidarity has been weakened, they said.

The commission is considering the proclamation of a general strike as a possible reaction to the government's stand.

Government spokesman Marcin Gugulski on Tuesday morning warned that "Solidarity Union should be aware that a decision to announce a general strike would mean taking over responsibility for the country."

Gugulski: Strike 'Responsibility for Country'

LD1102172292 Warsaw PAP in English 1136 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—"Solidarity Union should be aware that a decision to announce a general strike would mean taking over responsibility for the country", government spokesman Marcin Gugulski told the Warsaw radio "Zet" Tuesday [11 February].

"It is true that during the negotiations, the representatives of 'Solidarity' left the debate room. They recognized they could not agree with a stand put forward by the government working team and needed time to reconsider it. There was nothing dramatic in that. Let us wait and see", he added.

Asked whether the government of Jan Olszewski would continue the hitherto economic and social policy, Gugulski explained that the basic difference between the policy pursued so far and a new one that is being worked out by Jan Olszewski's government consisited in the present government's eagerness to combat recession.

Spokesman Refuses Comment on Solidarity Meeting

LD1102194592 Warsaw PAP in English 1803 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Government spokesman Marcin Gugulski, asked about government's stand towards expectations of Solidarity's national commission, holding a meeting in Gdnask and waiting for a reaction of the Council of Ministers before deciding whether to call a general strike, said that the agenda of today's meeting did not include such an item.

The spokesman had nothing to say about reports on an alleged afternoon phone talks between Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski.

Peasant Party Favors Privatization, Equality

LD1102234692 Warsaw PAP in Engish 1543 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) is in favour of state enterprises' privatisation on condition that the principle of equal treatment of all forms of ownership will be introduced, Roman Jagielinski of PSL told PAP on Tuesday [11 February].

PSL's council stated that social acceptance of privatisation was a necessary condition for its success. A privatisation programme should also take into account the interest of the state treasury, the interest of privatised enterprises' workers and the possibilities for the acceleration of the enterprises' development.

According to PSL it is necessary to define the principles of reprivatisation and decide which state enterprises should not be included in the privatisation programme. Moreover, a strategic council for privatisation should be called into being to coordinate the ownership transformation process.

Poll: 43 Percent Say Sejm Should Play Key Role

LD1202222992 Warsaw PAP in English 1905 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 12—An opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion Polling Centre (CBOS) on January 3-10 among a group of 1,000 adult Poles chosen at random showed that 43 percent of them thought that the Sejm should play the key role in the country. Another 24 percent claimed that the role should rather be played by the government, while 23 percent said that the president should have the greatest say.

According to 50 percent of the polled, the government had too little influence on the country's affairs, while six percent were of the opposite opinion. 32 percent of respondents stated that the government's present influence was adequate.

43 percent of the polled expressed belief that Jan Olszewski's government would be largely dependent on the president, while 35 percent said that it would be only slightly dependent. Seven percent thought it would be totally independent.

Meanwhile, 29 percent of respondents admitted that the influence which an average citizen could have on the country's affairs shrank during the last two years. 46 percent thought their potential influence did not change, and 16 percent felt that it increased.

Counties Announce 'Latest Election Returns'

Dolj, Vrancea, Mehedinti

AU1302163592

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 1400 GMT on 13 February carries a four-minute report by Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission in Bucharest on "latest election returns" received from three counties. In Dolj County "votes were cast in 99 constituencies." In 55 of these constituencies, "a second poll will be organized, while elections will take place in three constituencies." A total of "45 mayors have been elected, of which 38 belong to the National Salvation Front [FSN], two to the Democratic Convention, two to the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania [PDAR], and three are independent."

A total of "632 FSN candidates, 359 candidates of the Democratic Convention, 159 of PDAR, 22 of the National Liberal Party (Young Wing), 47 independents, 36 belonging to the Leftist Democratic Union, and so forth up to 1,266 have taken up the mandate of councillors" in Dolj County.

"Official results have also been received from Vrancea County where votes were cast in 64 constituencies, of which 36 will organize a second poll, while in one constituency new elections will be held." Spirache adds that "26 mayors were elected, of which 18 belong to the FSN, three to the PDAR, three are independent, three represent the Democratic Convention, and one belongs to the Ecologist Convention." He says that "in 63 constituencies local councillor mandates went to 853 candidates, the majority of which represent the FSN—383; Democratic Convention—206; PDAR—158; independents—55; and so forth up to 853."

He continues by reporting election returns from "Mehedinti County, where votes were cast in 64 constituencies; local councillors were elected in 61 of these constituencies" as follows: 289 mandates went to the FSN; 206 to the Democratic Convention; 121 to PDAR; 65 are independents; 26 went to the National Liberal Party; 10 to Romania Mare Party; and so forth up to the total of 743 local councillors who were elected. Three constituencies in Mehedinti County have to hold new elections, while 28 have to organize a second poll." He adds that "following the 9 February ballot, 33 mayors were elected here" as follows: "12 belong to the FSN; eight are independent; six represent the Democratic Convention; six belong to PDAR; and one represent the National Liberal Party."

Mures

AU1402060292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1900 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 13/2/1992—The centralized data of the Central Electoral Commission regarding the local elections in Mures County show that of the 97 constituencies in the county, local councillors were elected in 96 constituencies and mayors in 65 constituencies. The second round is to be held in 32 constituencies for the election of mayors and in one constituency for the election of councillors.

By political formations, the elected councillors belong as follows: To the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarian in Romania]—484, to the Romanian National Unity Party—394 , to the FSN [National Salvation Front]—168, to the Democratic Convention—61, to the Agrarian Democratic Party—37, Indcpendents—59. The other political formations got a smaller number. As for the mayors, 19 belong to the Romanian National Unity Party, 15 to the Democratic Convention, 13 are independents and 8—FSN.

Cluj

AU1402100692

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 0500 GMT on 14 February carries a four-minute report by Tudor Stanciu from the Central Electoral Commission in Bucharest on the "latest electoral returns" received from Cluj County. Here "of the 80 constituencies of this county, mayors were elected in 31," of which "12 are members of the National Salvation Front [FSN], seven belong to the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], six to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], two to the Democratic Convention, one to the Republican Party, one to the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR] and 2 independents." The reporter mentions that there will be a runoff on February 23 in the other 49 jconstituencies.

Tudor Stanciu also mentions that the Central Electoral Commission expects to receive election returns today from "the other 17 counties and the municipality of Bucharest", adding that according to current overall information "aside from four county capitals—Sfintu-Gheorghe in Covasna County, Miercurea-Ciuc in Harghita County, Tirgu-Mures in Mures County and Timisoara in Timis County—there will be a runoff organized" in all other county capitals. In such cases, the contest for the position of mayor will be between the candidates in first and second place. But, Spirache adds, "things will be different in Oradea Municipality [in Bihor County]", where—according to information sent by the UDMR to the Central Electoral Commission, the candidate of this party, "who is in first place, wishes to stand down, in which case the candidates occupying places two and three—one from the FSN and one from the Democratic Convention—remain in the competition."

Spokesman Holds News Conference on Elections

AU1302185592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1724 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 13/2/1992—In her weekly news conference, the government spokeswoman Mrs.

Iolanda Staniloiu, referred to the local polls held on February 9 saying that according to partial data the distribution of mayor's mandates by political parties was the following: the National Salvation Front—595; the Democratic Convention—85; the Hungarian Democratic Union—82; the Agrarian Democratic Party—62; the Romanians' National Unity Party—31; and independents—110.

Iolanda Staniloiu, government spokeswoman, told her weekly news conference that meetings for the setting up of the newly elected councils and for the appointment of deputy mayors would be held until February 29, and that after all local councils were set up elections would be called for county councils in 30 days. A 20-day period will follow when these councils are to be set up and the chairman, deputy chairmen and the standing delegation are to be elected. As soon as the county council is set up the present prefecture ceases its activity being replaced by the county council. At the same date the prefect and subprefect are to be appointed by government decision and the prefecture and its apparatus are to be organized, Mrs. Staniloiu stressed.

The spokeswoman also referred to the meetings Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and members of the executive had with the IMF delegation when important conclusions were reached on the future negotiations due to start soon to the end of concluding another stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund for 1992. This accord will ensure external financing for the ongoing year.

One of the main conclusions reached during the meeting was that the process of compensating payments in the economy was a procedure that does not fall within IMF practices Romania being the only country—of those included in IMF programmes—that initiated such a process with consequences for the economy of which the main would be a great inflationist threat, and the impossibility of preventing the formation of new elements that could lead in a short time to the same blockage of funds. The talks conducted evinced the conclusion that legislative measures should be adopted to prevent the two threats, measures that must be taken after the monetary surplus created by this compensation had been established.

Deputies Elects Standing Bureau Members

AU1402060492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1936 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 13/2/1992—On February 13 the Chamber of Deputies elected the members of the Standing Bureau made up, besides the chairman, of four vice-chairmen, four secretaries and two questers. According to the functioning rules of the Chamber of Deputies, the composition of the Standing Bureau should reflect the share of each parliamentary group in the chamber. Consequently, six candidates represent the FSN [National Salvation Front] and one candidate the PNL [National Liberal Party], UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarian in Romania], PUNR [Romanians' National Unity Party], ecologist and social democrats, respectively. Because some candidates had not got the necessary number of votes, a second ballot had to be held.

Security Chief Magureanu on Intelligence Service

Part Two

AU1302151392 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 6 Feb 92 pp 1, 4

[Second installment of interview with Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "Invectives Can Be No Substitute for Arguments"]

[Text] [Filip] You are a disputed figure who has been criticized and accused. Is this due to the institution you are heading, your position, or other reasons?

[Magureanu] I think this also needs an explanation. When I took over this office I was very optimistic, on the one hand, about the requirement for such an institution and, on the other, about the need for it to function on the basis of new principles, with its personnel being carefully sifted. Later things developed the way you know. Although at the beginning nobody contested my appointment because there was actually no reason to since I was not among those who profited from the former regime, I, myself, became the target of attacks. Thus more and more publications at home and abroad focused on my person for the simple reason that the black past of the Securitate, with which we do not have anything in common, reflected on us. I personally began to be "blessed" with numerous slanders and invectives, and because I hold this position I was charged with a number of negative characteristics! I am sure that any other person in my position would have experienced the same thing.

[Filip] Have you been a Securitate officer?

[Magureanu] No. This was one of the slanders about me that were systematically manipulated in our domestic and in the foreign press.

[Filip] Nevertheless, certain publications carried memoires of some of your former colleagues. Senator Gelu Voican said that when he dealt with the Mazilu file he found yours as well; it proved that you had been a Securitate officer for six months.

[Magureanu] First, Mr. Gelu Voican was not entitled to take files from where they were stored. He was not entitled to do so and that was an abuse. As you may know, he has been guilty of other violations as well. True, he also had my file and he generously sent me a copy of it, as if he were the legal custodian of those files. However, nothing in that file demonstrates that I had been a Securitate officer. As a matter of fact, this can be proved.

[Filip] It is often said that you are "Iliescu's man...."

[Magureanu] I am not hiding anything. For years and years I was among the people close to the current president. But it is a long way from that point to speculations that have circled and continue to circle—in the sense that the president was influencing me and dictating what I should do or, conversely, that I was the one to decisively influence Mr. Iliescu's options. None of it is true. The president, like ourselves, has to respect the basic principles of democracy that is being built in Romania.

Once again I want to emphasize that I harbor very friendly sentiments toward the current president, although, when we have differences in connection with our development process, I do not refrain from expressing my opinion, just as Mr. Iliescu does not refrain from expressing his.

[Filip] Is there any connection between the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] and the four incursions by the miners?

[Magureanu] Our institution has never been involved in such practices and I reject any allegation in this respect.

[Filip] Both Mr. Petre Roman and other party leaders have requested your resignation. Why?

[Magureanu] I would like to clarify something. I personally have never had any conflict with political groups, or with party factions or certain people. I have never contributed to the escalation of any conflict in relations with those you mentioned. I have and will not have any kind of adverse relations. When there are differences in opinion about ensuring concrete substantial equipment for our national security, then they have to be publicized. If, for instance, our point of view on the strategy our country should follow is more reasonable than that of the other side, I think that this has to be publicized. However, the other side has to explain its own opinions, without resorting to invectives, which can be no substitute for arguments. I have been described as conservative, neocommunist, and so forth, because at one point I did not agree with a certain line to pursue and I did not agree with excesses, especially those that had taken place.

[Filip] In this context, what explanations can you offer about the "troika"—"Iliescu-Barladeanu-Magureanu"—so often cited in the press, and not only there?

[Magureanu] I do not believe that differences of opinion are enough to divide the trends of thought in our society, namely reformist and conservative. I have never felt and do not feel close to the camp of the past and the term conservative that has ostentatiously and repeatedly been used against me has nothing in common with my past or with what we are trying to achieve at this time. I think that such labeling is reminiscent of former ideological patterns whereby people who did not approve of the ideas of those in power were viewed as "class enemies." I cannot help resorting to such an analogy....

Part Three

AU1302152692 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 7 Feb 922 pp 1, 4

[Third installment of interview with Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "The Terrorists Existed"]

[Text] [Filip] What can you tell us about a possible trial of communism?

[Magureanu] As you know, the trial of communism has become a reality and we are making a direct and specific contribution to it. Without this trial there can be no moral rebirth for our nation. Without clearly showing the level of guilt of the people involved in the abusive acts of the totalitarian past, we cannot redeem ourselves from a moral viewpoint. We will supply the necessary information about the crimes, abuses, and excesses of the former regime and about the level of responsibility of certain people in the former Securitate and even certain dignitaries.

[Filip] Some people claim that, after 22 December 1989, the country was invaded by spies....

[Magureanu] One should look at problems from several angles. First, one can say that people who were ill-disposed toward Romania took advantage of the general relaxed atmosphere, including at our borders, in order to infiltrate themselves. However, we should not develop a spy phobia and blow up this issue out of proportion. Right now, having sized up the true nature of the problem, one can say that there have really been and still are such attempts, which we hope to be able to keep in check.

[Filip] Do you enjoy power?

[Magureanu] One is well advised to draw a clear line between two aspects here. Power may be used as an instrument for societal change, in which case it is, as it were, a useful means for balancing and guiding social processes. On the other hand, power can also be an end in itself, when somebody wants to grab it and turn it to his own advantage, or the benefit of a limited group of people. I would like to believe that your question refers to the first aspect, that is, power as an instrument for changing society. Without really craving for power, I look upon it as an instrument that can ensure Romania's future balance. As far as I am concerned, I have never clung to any special social status and I do not believe that any such practices have found their way in my career to date.

[Filip] Do you believe that the events of 22 December 1989 were exclusively the work of Romanians?

[Magureanu] There is no doubt that the course of events was determined, to a large degree, by the spontaneous effect of the popular uprising against Ceausescu. Therefore, we can say that 22 December 1989 will go down in

history under this token. There are clear indications that, at the periphery of this revolt, there were also certain phenomena directed from abroad, some of which were definitely hostile to Romanian interests. In this respect, we will have to make our stand known in the not too distant future.

[Filip] Some people, both at home and abroad, claim that Ceausescu could not have been removed without foreign support. What do you think of that?

[Magureanu] His fall was inevitable, due to the generalized revolt against communist totalitarianism and the camarilla around the Ceausescu family.

[Filip] At the beginning, we were all convinced of the existence of terrorists. Later, things began to look different. Today, almost nobody believes anymore in the existence of terrorists. It seems that the former Securitate is not quite as guilty as we all thought and the role of the Army has become increasingly more suspect. In the end, the belief has spread that the fighting after 22 December was staged to cover up a coup d'etat.

[Magureanu] Without unduly exaggerating the importance of that phenomenon, it is clear that the terrorists did exist and we are going to throw light in this intricate affair. Along with the spontaneous revolt of the masses, several scenarios were also unfolding at the same time, some of them even overlapping. However, one should not make global accusations against one or another institution. Moreover, one cannot hold just one person responsible for what happened then. Let us not forget that, aside from certain scenarios that were knowingly being implemented, many mistakes and errors were also made, the end result of which was innocent victims not only among those who played the part of the terrorists, but also from certain institutions implicated in those events. One cannot point an accusing finger at the entire Army for possible errors committed by certain officers; likewise, one cannot blame the Securitate for the thoughtless actions of certain individuals from the former State Security Department [Securitate]. Anyhow, what happened then could not have been and cannot be termed a scenario or a coup d'etat; there is no evidence of that.

[Filip] Are you a nationalist?

[Magureanu] If by nationalist you mean the sentiment of devotion and belonging to the nation I am part of, yes, I can be considered a nationalist. However, there is no way in which I can be identified with people of chauvinist, fanatic, and extremist leanings. Such attitudes are alien to me, as they should be to anybody else.

Natase, Belarus Counterpart Discuss Relations

AU1302194792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1910 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Excerpts] Bucharest ROMPRES 13/2/1992—In a statement he made upon his arrival in Romania on February 13 the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Belarus Petr Kravchenko stressed his visit to Romania had a well defined goal—to set up the framework of bilateral relations. After bilateral talks we will sign an appropriate document. The visit had been scheduled long time ago and despite the fact that the meeting of the heads of states of the Commonwealth of Independent States begins in Minsk tomorrow we considered it was not the case to postpone it, in consideration of the economic contacts we intend to have and of the need to revive traditional commercial structures between our two countries, of the prospects our cooperation, more particularly in oil industry, has. Willy-nilly we will for a long time be linked through our economic and commercial ties. I note with satisfaction that Romania's relations with Belarus have not been affected by any contradiction and we must foster direct economic ties avoiding Moscow and the centre, Mr. Kravchenko said.

In his turn Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase said: Starting from the fact that there are no litigations between the two states we must first of all establish diplomatic relations, and subsequently set up the legal framework of our future cooperation. I think that the document we are going to sign during this visit concerning the mechanism of consultations between the two foreign ministries will contribute to the development of this institutional framework which will allow for a beginning in our political, economic and cultural relations. We must identify the areas of complementarity and build a new, direct base, without any mediation, a system of relations beneficial to both countries. [passage omitted]

The two ministers are expected to sign tomorrow the document leading to the official establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states, as well as an accord on periodical consultations between the foreign ministries of Romania and of the Republic of Belarus.

Interrepublic

Serbia, Montengreo Ban Exports to Republics

LD1302221792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2003 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] Titograd, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—The Montenegro Government discussed and adopted today the agreement between representatives of the Montenegrin and Serbian Governments on the implementation of the decrees of these two republics banning the selling of certain products to other republics, the republican Secretariat for Information announced tonight. On the basis of that agreement, the produce of the Republic of Serbia—wheat, flour, oil, and sugar—will be supplied to the Republic of Montenegro on the basis of its monthly requirements. The Republic of Montenegro will supply Serbia with aluminium, steel, and salt according to its requirements. The flow of other goods between Serbia and Montenegro will be free, obliging both republics to prevent their re-export. All goods, which have been agreed for sale and have been paid for prior to agreement, will be delivered.

Tudjman's Statements on Bosnia Viewed

92BA0457A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Seada Vranic: "The Pretzel Given a Natural Shape"]

[Text] At a time when the attention of the Croatian public has been appreciably directed toward Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], the arrival of Irfan Ajanovic in Zagreb could not be considered ordinary in the least, or, a courtesy visit for congratulation because of international recognition of the "young democracy."

Nothing accidental occurs in politics anyway: Ajanovic did not just take a notion of trying out the role of lecturer to the people of Zagreb on the topic of what is happening in B-H, nor is it any accident that an interest in the same topic has been shown by Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, generally thought to be Tudjman's most serious rival, who used this occasion to say that Bosnia and Hercegovina must remain unchanged and that Croatia should recognize its sovereignty and independence as soon as possible. A message with the identical content was also sent from the same spot by Dr. Marko Veselica, leader of the Croatian Democratic Party [HDS], in the last two or three days, and a majority of the other political parties over the range from left to right have been expressing the same opinion.

Of course, this is no new discovery for either Ajanovic or the B-H leadership, just as they were not unaware that changes in Croatian policy are not determined by the opposition, but by YOU KNOW WHO, so that messages from the speaker's platform of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and applause for the guest from Sarajevo are a clear signal directed toward the villa by the name "Zagorje" on Pantovcak, which two weeks ago—on the eve of proclamation of the so-called Serbian Republic of B-H, was visited in strict discretion by unusual "wedding guests," which caused a real political alert in Sarajevo.

Even for the Croatian public, however, Dr. Tudjman's conversation with Nikola Koljevic and, it is said, Milorad Ekmecic, is no mere news item from the diplomatic calendar; presumably to neutralize the shock, the media made it public seven days late. The publication date was timed for the nationwide celebration because of the international recognition of Croatia, which is no accident at all: The item was to pass through with as little notice as possible so as not to arouse unpleasant reactions of the public, which is not informed of the role these two protagonists in international politics have had in the Croatian tragedy.

The objective of not disturbing in any way the good mood of Croats who have lived to see achievement of the "millennial dream" would almost have succeeded if five Sarajevo intellectuals, Croats, had not sent an open letter to Tudjman which VJESNIK published with an eight-day delay so that the presidential adviser, Dr. Zvonko Lerotic, would have enough time to reach the public simultaneously with his reply. That was then followed by a reply to the reply, because, in the opinion of the open letter's authors, Lerotic had poured on their heads "the boiling slander of ethnic distortion and shame," instead of his boss answering the fundamental question: What does it mean that Tudjman's views on Bosnia-Hercegovina are all of a sudden completely identical with those of Milosevic and Karadzic, which were and still are Serbian hegemony and expansionism at the expense of the other South Slav peoples and lands?

Such questions would be proclaimed pointless in Croatia, even provocative, if anyone attempted to use them to cast doubt on the consensus throughout Croatia on the phrase "not a foot of Croatian land to the enemy," yet still the issue is relevant, and Tudjman has personally given it political reality with his statement just before New Year's on the topic of cooling off passions and establishing normal Croat-Serb relations.

According to what SLOBODNA DALMACIJA wrote, Dr. Tudjman said this: "This can be achieved in such a way that the national goals of Serbia would be achieved and it would no longer have reasons for expansion, and at the same time Croatia would have its territories, because the present Croatian pretzel is unnatural." Tudjman's additional explanations confirm that this was not a lapse pointlessly picked up by those in B-H: "It is in the Croatian interest for this problem to be resolved in a natural way (i.e., presumably for the unnatural pretzel to take a natural shape), in the way in which the banovina was arranged. That would leave a portion of the 'land' of Bosnia where the Muslims would be in the majority, and that state of Bosnia could be a buffer between Croatia and Serbia. At the same time, the colonial creation of Bosnia-Hercegovina would come into being" [as published].

There was no need for the Croatian president to provide more explicit confirmation that the 1939 Cvetkovic-Macek agreement is a constant obsession of his and that a number of similar statements on the topic of division of Bosnia and Hercegovina were not accidental slips.

It is interesting that Tudjman's obvious sidestep concerning Bosnia-Hercegovina occurred at a moment when some of the media, mainly under the eye of the regime, were persistently reproaching the leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina because Croatia was being destroyed from the territory of that republic, and the Muslims were being called to account ever more frequently for not having done anything to protect the Croats. Here again, of course, it is not a question of mere coincidence, but of programmed media support with a dual objective: First, should it be necessary, a potential out is created "because 750,000 Croats in B-H cannot be left without a solution." Second, if it turns out that world political factors in Europe fail to react to Tudjman's plan (which is hard to believe, but nothing is impossible in politics), it is already being suggested to the public in advance that the Muslims have in fact deserved only "the little land" of Bosnia, that is, the fate Tudjman has intended for them. That is why it is no surprise that the regime's media did not direct the magnifying glass of their criticism to the New Year's Eve statement nor to Tudjman's chat on the "transformation" of Bosnia-Hercegovina with Nikola Koljevic, who was accompanied by Franjo Boras, both of them certainly without the knowledge of either Izetbegovic or S. Kljuic.

Nevertheless, in that segment of the media whose editors do not rush to please the supreme authority and are not excessively concerned about the vigilance of those on duty who are committed to patriotism, Tudjman's "initiative" is challenged indirectly, i.e., without its author being named. Thus, recently there have been a number of serious articles closely analyzing the possible consequences that would result from an attempt to divide the central republic, making it known unambiguously to potential aspirants that partitioning of the "tiger skin" is a business that is not only dishonorable, it is also dangerous. A war that would not remain within the limits of the Bosnia-Hercegovina triangle is certainly the most likely consequence. But the Croatian president is certainly rather upset as well by the possibility that ethnic demarcation would also signify nibbling into Croatia, and if resettlements prove impossible, his border with the Serbian state would be longer than it is now.

We still have not noticed in the press that anyone has been concerned in any detail with that portion of Tudjman's statement in which normalization of Croat-Serb relations presupposes "realization of Serbia's national goals," so that the latter would have no reasons for expansion. If we are to believe that the satisfaction of Serbian national interests (in Tudjman's option) is foreseen to the detriment of the other republics of former Yugoslavia, then such an offer (which motivated Koljevic to pay him a visit) reflects political hypocrisy. Both if what is involved is a variant less favorable to Croatia, i.e., amputation of a portion of the occupied Croatian territories (with the same or a somewhat larger area furnished from Herceg-Bosnia), the Croats, especially those who survived the Calvary of Vukovar, Kijevo, or Dalj, certainly will not fail to go beyond words, which will be sarcastic.

It seems that following the triumph because of Croatia's international recognition (in which even Tudjman's personal contribution was recognized) the Croatian president and his policy could experience an unpleasant return to earth precisely in connection with Bosnia and Hercegovina. The sympathies of the world public, which because of the aggression have been undividedly on the Croatian side (which, aside from the main objective of halting the war, also had an influence on European statesmen), will evaporate very quickly. If the Supreme Command should propagate a policy similar to the Serbian policy that led to the (still unfinished) war, Croatia might find itself before the world in the situation Vietnam was in at one time, when its appetites toward Cambodia increased. Incidentally, the Serbian example has shown that European and world policy at the end of the 20th century has not the slightest sympathy for leaders projected on the myths of past centuries. Even the "leader" of all the Croats would not receive a better reception.

Federal

Convention on Yugoslavia Under Way in Belgrade

AU1302172792 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] A meeting of the signatories of the convention on Yugoslavia is under way in the Palace of the Federation in Belgrade at which the draft law on the right of nations to self-determination is being discussed. Since 3 January, the convention has been signed by 111 parties, movements, and associations. On behalf of the SFRY Presidency, the meeting was addressed by Jugoslav Kostic. Olivija Rusovac has a report:

[Begin recording] [Rusovac] The Presidency supports the question of the self-determination of peoples and the association of those who want to remain in Yugoslavia being resolved in a constitutional way, Jugoslav Kostic said. The agreement between the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro and the signatories of the convention on Yugoslavia guarantee the existence of Yugoslavia, which the world will recognize and which will open the door to others, but not to those who would take up arms after 10 or 20 years and cause a fratricidal war. Kostic then added:

[Kostic] The republics, that is to say the highest representatives of these two republics [Serbia and Montenegro], have actively agreed that in the next month they will formulate a draft constitution of the new joint state. Both assemblies would then verify this draft and submit

it to the Federal Assembly, which they totally recognize in the present composition, so that it can promulgate it and schedule multiparty elections. It will also elect a president who will select a prime minister, who will select a government, and when a new assembly is set up we will have the new organs of Yugoslavia. Everything will continue without any kind of interruption, and Yugoslavia will remain.

Along with this Yugoslavia.... [applause] Along with this Yugoslavia, which, it is more than certain, will be made up of these two nations, we will see the outcome of the conference on Bosnia- Hercegovina.... [Kostic changes thought] All these nations will, with their goodwill, as envisaged, be able to decide on a life together or on some link through their referendums.

After the political solution after the arrival of the peacekeeping forces and the political solution and orientation of the nation in the Serbian Republic of Krajina, we are 99 percent certain that this nation will also continue to [word indistinct] and in fact rise up to protect itself and to protect the right to remain in Yugoslavia.

[Rusovac] We have an exceptionally clear concept of the continuity of Yugoslavia, Jugoslav Kostic said, saying among other things to the Macedonian people that they should think carefully about whether their leadership is leading them into a better life or into extinction.

The participants in the meeting paid their respects with a minute's silence to Aleksandar Sepic, representative of the United Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, from Jajce, who died on his way back from Belgrade on 3 January.

A book of more than 250 pages has also been published with the speeches and photographs of the signatories of the convention on Yugoslavia on 3 January in Belgrade. [end recording]

SFRY Inflation Figures Reported

LD1302125992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1227 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 12 (TANJUG)—The Federal Bureau for Statistics has announced that retail prices in the Yugoslav republics in January rose 26.1 percent compared to December last year. Compared to January last year retail prices rose 302 percent.

Retail prices in Bosnia-Hercegovina went up most—30.9 percent. Slovenia recorded the slightest growth—10.2 percent. Inflation in January in Montenegro was 29.3 percent, in Croatia—28.8, in Serbia 27.7 and in Macedonia 26.2 percent.

The figures for Croatia are an estimate, while for Slovenia were taken over by the Slovene Institute for Statistics. The cost of living were the highest in Bosnia-Hercegovina rose in January, as compared to December, 35.9 percent, in Montenegro 32.4, in Croatia—29.3, in Macedonia 27.2 and Serbia 26.2.

Retail prices in Yugoslavia in December last year were 18.2 percent higher than in the previous month, while for the entire 1991 it was 235.2 percent higher.

Plight of Federal Workers Considered

92BA0485A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by "V.V." and "D.V.": "From SFRY Assembly: On Providing a Livelihood for Federal Workers Unsuitable for Republican Posts: Total Self-Reliance"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The Yugoslav Presidency has recommended that all federal workers from republics "that do not recognize Yugoslavia" provide for their further "employment" either on their own or with the help of their republics.

Belgrade—The question of how to reevaluate the personal commitment of individual federal workers to Yugoslavia, and of who will do so, remains an open one. It is known, however, that 10 days ago the SFRY Presidency (comprising four members, of course) sent a circular letter to the secretary general of the Yugoslav Assembly (and perhaps to other competent officials as well) recommending that all federal workers (in the Assembly, the FEC [Federal Executive Council], and other federal agencies) who came to those positions from "republics that do not recognize Yugoslavia and that are not fulfilling obligations towards its institutions" be left to their own fate, or rather that of their republics. Meaning that "they deal with the question of further employment on their own or with the help of their republics," as the letter states.

The instructions from Kostic's Presidency were signed by the secretary general of that body, Andjelko Maslic. The explanation states that it is necessary to reduce the number of employees in the federal administration in order to cut back on costs, but also "because of the future structure of the country." Specifically, it is noted that there is a large number of high-ranking officials in the federation who were sent to these positions from republics based on the parity system or some other sort of quota. Such a system was the practice, and such was also the former political structure of Yugoslavia. If all of this is translated from officialese into everyday language, then the following question arises: Will those people be able to cope who are suitable neither to the federation for which they have worked thus far, nor to their own republic, to which they did not return when said republic demanded that they do so? It is also unclear what to do with individuals who are suitable in terms of their nation, but not in terms of their republic. For example, Serbs from Croatia, if they originally came to Belgrade as personnel "from that side."

Although this memorandum has not yet been officially disclosed, the news has leaked out in certain circles and naturally provoked anxiety. Especially since—as we have learned unofficially—lists of the names of federal government workers to which the recommendation will

apply have already been completed, meaning that it is already known exactly who came from where and who is located where right now.

Yesterday, however, we were unable to learn the full truth about the actual state of affairs in the federal government and federal agencies for the simple reason that the person responsible for personnel, who allegedly has all the files at his disposal, Milos Gavrilovic, was already "busy with an interview with several journalists." All other competent officials, from the secretary general to the vice president to the federal secretaries for justice, information, and so on, were either in meetings or away from Belgrade.

Likewise, there was no one at the FEC or the federal parliament who could provide credible information on who all will be affected by the announced personnel cutbacks. It is only known that according to official records, there are 406 people working for the Assembly, of which 44 hold the status of high-ranking official.

According to data from March 1990, and thus from the era of the old political structure (the new one is just now coming together), people who were appointed based on the republican-provincial quota amounted to 14 from Serbia, 10 from Bosnia-Hercegovina, five from Macedonia, four each from Montenegro and Vojvodina, three from Slovenia, and two each from Croatia and Kosovo. Some of these officials were named to these posts for the first time, but for some their four-year mandates had been extended as many as four times.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Appeal Sent to EC for Medical, Food Aid

LD1302182292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1600 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] The Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina launched an appeal to the EC and the international public at its session, presided over by Alija Izetbegovic, asking for food and medical aid. It also put forward a request to the EC to exert political pressure on those who have been blocking bridges and other road communications. The appeal states that Bosnia-Hercegovina, due to the blockade of roads, especially on its borders, was facing an exceptionally difficult situation because its entire economy was on the point of collapsing.

Food Reserves Dwindle

92BA0465F Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 29 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by (nm): "Cabbage and Paprika for the Naive Bosnians"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 29 Jan—The market of the former Yugoslavia has collapsed, Serbia's economic blockade is continuing, there is less and less buying power, and in some republics, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, shortages and hunger are already knocking on the door. Bosnia-Hercegovina is also in an extremely bad position because within the framework of the so-called Yugoslav division of labor, it developed heavy industry and the energy industry for decades, but neglected food production. It was agreed that Vojvodina's agricultural economy and the Slavonian grain fields would be responsible for it.

Consequently, for years Bosnia-Hercegovina invested in the Vojvodina agricultural industry in particular, in order to ensure enough food for itself, but now it scarcely has enough reserves for another month and a half.

It used to receive about 85 percent of its sugar and oil and about 20 percent of its meat from the Croats and Vojvodina before the collapse of the state. Because of the war, the Croats are no longer sending the amounts of food already agreed upon to the Bosnians, because they simply do not have it or need it for themselves. Serbia, with its embargo on food, is also putting political pressure upon the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to soften them up for joining a federation. Even worse is the fact that Bosnia-Hercegovina's flour and baking industry has already paid for 24,000 tons of wheat in Serbia and Vojvodina, but the authorities there are not allowing it to be shipped.

Bosanka, in Brcki, has about 60 railcars of its own wheat in Ada, but it cannot transport it to Bosnia-Hercegovina by any means. The Serbs say that the Bosnians are only allowed to sell pickled cabbage and red paprika. In this regard, they are readily forgetting how much money enterprises from Tuzla, Zvornik, and Bijeljina invested in Vojvodina's agriculture in recent years in order to ensure themselves sugar, oil, flour, and meat. Only the northeastern part of the republic, where Tuzla's salt, detergents, and coal are readily exchanged for food from Vojvodina and Belgrade, is in a somewhat better position.

People in Bosnia-Hercegovina are quite aware of the difficult situation, and are stockpiling food (those, of course, who still have that much money).

In the last few months, the prices of basic food products, especially butter and milk, have increased by several hundred percent.

It is also necessary to recall that the number of inhabitants has increased considerably in that republic in recent months. It is estimated that about 120,000 officers have come to Bosnia-Hercegovina with their families, and in addition to them there are also about 80,000 Croatian refugees in that republic.

Ruling National Parties Meet in Sarajevo

LD1302234392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1026 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—A conference on [the future of] Bosnia-Hercegovina is under way in the

Villa Konak in Sarajevo in the presence of representatives of the EC. The conference is seen as an opportunity to converge the stands of the leading national parties on the republic's status and its internal order.

The three leading national parties are represented by three-member delegations. The Party of Democratic Action is represented by Alija Izetbegovic, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and Naim Kadic. On the Serbian Democratic Party side the talks are being attended by Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, and Momcilo Krajisnik. The Croatian Democratic Community is represented by Mate Boban, Ivica Stanic, and Miro Lasic.

The three-member delegation of the EC is headed by Jose Cutileiro, coordinator of the Conference on Yugoslavia; Soares, an executive secretary of the conference, and Darwin, member of the delegation. [sentence as received] Journalists were told that today's conference, which is being held behind closed doors, is also being attended by domestic experts Kasim Trnka, Darko Trlin, and Radomir Lukic.

The conference will be joined tomorrow by one representative from each of the parliamentary opposition parties. It has also been announced that a press conference will be held tomorrow to inform the public about the results of the conference.

Leaders Comment on Conference

AU1302213692 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Statements by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and leader of the Party of Democratic Action; Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia-Hercegovina; and Mate Boban of the Croatian Democratic Community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, after the first round of the conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina on 13 February in Sarajevo—recorded]

[Text] [Izetbegovic] There will be no compromises on certain matters. The independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, its civil character, I think, that on these issues... [Izetbegovic is interrupted by an unidentified reporter]

[Reporter] What about the sovereignty of the nations being included in the referendum question?

[Izetbegovic] No. Bosnia-Hercegovina is sovereign. There is sovereignty of the Bosnia-Hercegovina citizens, but no sovereignty of the individual nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This is our view.

[Unidentified reporter] Do you stand by the demands that you have been putting forward so far?

[Karadzic] We do have another option—to remain in Yugoslavia in the present form, perhaps with regionalization based on the economic principle. As we all know, however, the Croats do not accept such a Yugoslavia, and we must respect this. The Muslims do not accept a Yugoslavia in which in their opinion, Serbia, that is to say, the Serbian nation, would be domineering, and we also have to respect this. We do not accept the concept of greater Croatia, and this must be respected. The Muslims probably do not accept greater Croatia, and this must also be respected. Serbs and Croats together do not accept greater Bosnia-Hercegovina, and this must also be respected.

[Boban] For us the Croatian issue [passage indistinct] the proposal for the talks and I do not see much chances [word indistinct] and a lot of dragging on.

SDA Rejects HDZ Change in Referendum Question

AU1202181592 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] The demand by the Bosnia-Hercegovina HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for the question asked in the referendum to be changed is leading to the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina and is therefore unacceptable. This was said at the regular news conference at the headquarters of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], which continues to insist on the sovereignty of the citizen and not the nation. Ljubomir Nikolic has a report from Sarajevo:

[Begin Nikolic recording] SDA spokesman Irfan Ajanovic told reporters today that the HDZ demand for a change in the referendum question does not effect the referendum in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and he expressed the belief that the majority of citizens of this republic will go to the polls on 29 February and 1 March regardless of the stands of the HDZ and SDA.

The so-called Livno question, which is leading to the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, calls on citizens to cast their vote in favor of something that does not exist. We are sticking to the stand that they should vote only on whether they are in favor of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, Ajanovic said.

He called those who formulated the changed referendum question infantile local politicians who are manipulating the interests of the Croatian nation. He claimed that all Bosnia-Hercegovina nations are already sovereign and that the question adopted by the deputies in the republican Assembly from the ranks of the SDA and HDZ on 25 January is quite sufficient and in line with the demands of Europe.

In reply to a question from your reporter on how he views the express demand of the HDZ for the sovereignty of the nation, Irfan Ajanovic said that as far as the SDA is concerned, the sovereignty of the citizen has priority over the sovereignty of nations. As he said, there can be no talk about the cantonization of Bosnia- Hercegovina at any price. These would not be cantons but

grazing pastures [katun], Ajanovic said, and added that only regionalization on primarily economic principles can be discussed.

It was said in the SDA headquarters today that the ballot papers are already being printed with the question adopted on 25 January and that there could be no talk about postponing the referendum, which is something that has been sought by some other political parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina besides the HDZ.

Regarding the talks between parties on the future of this republic, which start tomorrow, it was said in the SDA that they will be held behind closed doors because, as Ajanovic said, the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament is its own kind of sideshow, and these talks would have then been doomed to failure.

Regarding the stands of the Government of Serbia, which link the lifting of the embargo on the export of food to Bosnia-Hercegovina with the future structure and status of this republic and the possible introduction of Bosnia-Hercegovina currency, Irfan Ajanovic said that they represent an act of recognizing the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina. After Bulgaria and Turkey, we think that Serbia has also recognized us because the borders (?on the Drina River) are now stronger than any state border, Ajanovic claimed. [end recording]

Croatian Leader on Sovereignty of Ethnic Groups

LD1202231292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—The general secretary of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina (HDZ BiH), Ivan Markesic, said today in Sarajevo that this party, by proposing the new wording of the question for the referendum to be held on 19 February and 1 March—as opposed to the wording accepted in the Bosnia-Hercegovinan Assembly, which the HDZ deputies admittedly voted for—wanted to stress the sovereignty of all the three nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Croats, Serbs, and Muslims.

At a news conference, he also said he believed that the three ruling national parties would reach an agreement on this issue before the referendum, and that such wording of the referendum question would be accepted in the republican parliament. Markesic stressed that his party wants Croats to be sovereign throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina, and not only in the areas where they are in majority.

Concerning the mentioning of cantons in the referendum question, the president of the HDZ deputy club in the republican parliament, Dr. Vlado Pandzic and a member of the party's presidency, Zdenko Cosic explained that this is a matter of internal constitution of Bosnia-Hercegovina and that it does not imply the postponing of the referendum at all, but that this issue could be discussed later. The HDZ BiH leadership denied the opinion that the new wording of the question for the Bosnia-Hercegovina's referendum arrived from Zagreb.

In connection with the protest of reporters working for Sarajevo Radio-Television, HDZ officials called this institution "anti- Croatian", and again called upon citizens not to pay radio- television subscription as a sign of protest. Mentioning actual names, Markesic said that Croatian reporters had been "banished" from Sarajevo Radio-Television.

In connection with the recent request that Croats from Bosnia- Herzegovina be given a possibility to obtain the citizenship of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Pandzic said that most young people of Croatian nationality from Bosnia-Herzegovina go to college in Croatia and thousands of Bosnia-Herzegovina workers work there. Unless they obtain Croatian citizenship, they fear that as foreign citizens they will incur large expenses.

Silajdzic Optimistic on Bosnia's Independence

92BA0485B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Feb 92 pp 28-29

[Interview with Dr. Haris Silajdzic, minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by Fahrudin Radoncic at the Hotel Evropa in Sarajevo; date not given: "Islam Is No Threat"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] The minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina on how Bosnia belongs to Europe, about Islamic penetration by way of that republic and imputations of that sort, about a Balkan conspiracy and Milosevic's visit to Turkey....

These days, the eyes of the domestic and international public are focused on turbulent Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. Emerging tensions and the danger of ethnic conflict are coming to a head together with expectations that that republic will gain internationally recognized independence and sovereignty before long. The impending referendum in which the fate of that state will be decided coincides with an initiative by Bosnian diplomatic circles and international political factors. We spoke with Haris Silajdzic, the B-H minister of foreign affairs, at the Hotel Evropa in Sarajevo. This was also the occasion for his remark about how "Bosnia has always been part of Europe and a separate political entity. During the Middle Ages," Silajdzic says, "it was a state, while during Turkish rule it was a special autonomous unit that enjoyed special rights, and during Austro-Hungarian rule it was a corpus separatum, with internationally recognized external borders; it has been a sovereign state since the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, through the Treaty of St. Germain, and all the way up to the days of ZAVNOBIH [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia-Hercegovina] and AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia], or rather the present-day Constitution."

[Radoncic] Mr. Silajdzic, this seems a little like political education. However, the most influential figures in Serbia, and now and then serious politicians in Croatia as well, talk about Bosnia-Hercegovina as if the AVNOJ state is a surrogate.

[Silajdzic] I think that regardless of their political stature and the seriousness that you mention, they are engaging in a somewhat tasteless joke when they talk about Bosnia-Hercegovina in this way. They know quite well, as does any person with any education at all, that Bosnia-Hercegovina has its own historical continuity, politically, culturally, and economically, and that it has its own separate identity, at least as much as other states do. The proof of this is that Bosnia-Hercegovina has never been under the rule of any other Balkan country. Never.

[Radoncic] In setting up roadblocks to recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovian independence, an important role is played by the so-called danger of the Islamic line. There is a great deal of open suspicion that the Islamic world wants to use this republic, as the Serbian media have said, to "infiltrate the heart of Europe."

[Silajdzic] That was best defined by Mr. Dumas during our visit to Paris, when Mr. Izetbegovic and I held talks with French President Mitterrand. At that time, Dumas told us literally that a campaign is being waged against us, but that they are not persuaded by it.

[Radoncic] And what is your opinion about that?

[Silajdzic] Just like in other forms of fighting, one does not choose the means and types of punches in political struggle either. Because no type of extremism whatsoever can be attributed to Muslims, because they cannot be blamed for initiating the breakup of Yugoslavia, and because chauvinism cannot be attributed to them, something else had to be found and concocted.

The thing that was supposed to be most resonant and that was supposed to close Europe's ears to us is alleged Islamic fundamentalism. However, one fact that requires no proof is that the very people who are accusing us of alleged fundamentalism are the ones who are insisting on the creation of an Islamic state.

Concretely speaking, this is being demanded by the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], for example. For months now, they have been proposing that Bosnia-Hercegovina be partitioned into Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim areas. Thus, on the one hand they are accusing us of ostensibly aiming to create an Islamic state, while on the other hand they are stubbornly imposing such a state on us. However, we have always emphasized that we want a democratic, secular, parliamentary, modern state with a market economy, a multiparty system, and full human rights.

[Radoncic] What is the source of this mistrust of the Muslim leadership in Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Silajdzic] Since there is nothing controversial about what we are doing and saying publicly, what we actually think remains controversial and debatable to some people. In a democratic community, to which we all aspire, people are not accused for their opinions. I can say in all sincerity that I believe, and the same is true of the people who created the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], that we all want a democratic, secular state based on modern democracy in the European sense. Bosnia can be only that.

[Radoncic] That is clear, but there is no lack of suspicion that you want to promote the Islamic option in Bosnia-Hercegovina precisely through the radical wing of the Party of Democratic Action.

[Silajdzic] Ever since we came into being, we have been subjected to close scrutiny in a persistent effort to find extremes and extremism. There is no radical wing of the SDA in that sense, nor have I ever observed any attempt whatsoever to have Islamic fundamentalism penetrate Europe through anyone in the SDA. These are sheer fabrications. It appears that after all the changes in the world that have occurred recently, many people miss the former bipolar system and balance, and that they want to replace it with some sort of fictitious bipolarism—i.e., conflict—between Christianity and Islam.

[Radoncic] Could it be said in this regard that this type of speculation has been urged on by Bosnia-Hercegovian diplomatic efforts, with the interest shown in Islamic countries? Several high-level visits have been made in a relatively short period of time.

[Silajdzic] I would respond to that question with a counterquestion: Why do the others go? Of the 25 missions to Teheran from Yugoslavia, only one has been from Bosnia-Hercegovina. But no one asks the others why they go there.

[Radoncic] This is a matter of politics and diplomatic goals?

[Silajdzic] That is your assessment, and clearly not mine. The first visit by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic to Libya resulted in a loan of $50 million. I have visited oil-producing countries as a priority. We are in a situation where we must find work for our construction teams, export the goods that we have, get loans.... We made a good beginning, but the war got in our way. But we will continue at the same pace, regardless of various malicious commentaries and this sort of suspicion. For example, my next visit is to Saudi Arabia, where we aim to open up doors to our economy.

[Radoncic] Has not the very fact that Islamic countries are showing a willingness to help Bosnia-Hercegovina played a part in shaping the perception that this constitutes special interest in Muslims in Yugoslavia and a desire for Islamic penetration into Europe?

[Silajdzic] No, in the economic realm, these countries have given much more to Serbia or Croatia. How should we

interpret this? In concrete terms, companies from Serbia have gotten much more in Libya than those from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Were we supposed to ask someone from Belgrade, Zagreb, or Skopje to go to Iran or Libya and do business on our behalf because of inaccurate suspicions? Naturally, such a thing would not occur to us.

[Radoncic] Arab countries did not recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina immediately. Why not?

[Silajdzic] Because they feel that this is primarily a European question, and the interest of those countries in events in this region is overrated anyway. Moreover, one should not forget that all of those countries have many problems of their own.

[Radoncic] Let us return to the subject of diplomacy in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. What is your interpretation of and feeling about mass recognition of Croatia and Slovenia?

[Silajdzic] We are delighted by it. From the very outset we have advocated the position that all republics who want recognition should get it, while at the same time working on an agreement on association, most of all economic association. Europe took another road by recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. I congratulate both Slovenia and Croatia with all my heart and hope for prosperity for both nations. We do not doubt that Bosnia-Hercegovina will be recognized as well. First, because we are sovereign under the current Constitution; second, because we have long-term continuity as a state and borders established by a number of international treaties; and finally, because that is what the parliamentarily and democratically expressed majority wants.

[Radoncic] Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia involved a number of political intrigues. According to some people, Mr. Izetbegovic, out of fear that Bosnia-Hercegovina would be left out, advocated postponing Croatian and Slovene recognition. On the other hand, however, it is being charged that Mr. Tudjman has allegedly intervened in influential places to prevent recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state. Do you know anything about this?

[Silajdzic] As far as Mr. Tudjman's actions are concerned, I cannot say anything about that. Frankly, I have my doubts about that sort of thing. First of all, that would not be to the advantage of Croatia, in the same way that certain statements about the purposefulness of a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina is not to its advantage. As far as Mr. Izetbegovic's alleged obstructions to the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia are concerned, that is not disinformation, but rather an out-and-out lie. The difference between disinformation and lies is that disinformation is a slightly more subtle lie, while this is primitive disinformation which smacks of famous Balkan hanky-panky.

[Radoncic] When you mention the Balkans, what is interesting is the role of Turkish diplomacy and commentaries about that. What is intriguing in this context is Milosevic's visit to Ankara and the interpretation by the Serbian press of how, through his influence, he allegedly postponed Turkish recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Silajdzic] It is not true that Milosevic is in a position to change Turkish diplomacy—much stronger force and much stronger arguments are needed for that—nor did the Turks say that he would be able to move them in this regard. As all the world knows, Turkish diplomacy is among the best. Diplomats there do not issue indiscrete statements that must be corrected later on.

They will recognize the former Yugoslav republics as soon as this is, first of all, in Turkey's interest. During my latest meeting with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, he told me just that: When the time comes, we will recognize all the Yugoslav states, whereby it is in Turkey's interest that a lively, unfettered economic region is preserved, as well as peace, of course.

[Radoncic] Do you mean to say that there was no so-called underground diplomacy at play here?

[Silajdzic] This egocentrism of ours is childish. At this very moment, we are hearing theories about an intensified conspiracy campaign, about some sort of Teheran-Bonn-Vatican-Washington conspiracy and plot. It is as if the whole world cannot sleep because it is conspiring against countries in the Balkans, which, however, are clearly not factors of worldly importance.

[Radoncic] Yes, but one undisputed factor of worldly importance—the United States of America—has stood in defense of Bosnia-Hercegovian integrity. It is noticeable that the precise U.S. positions on this question are seen in Bosnia-Hercegovina as some sort of critical support in preserving territorial integrity and independence.

[Silajdzic] After my visit to the State Department, an official statement was issued that included, among other things, the explicit warning that the United States will condemn any attempt by any side to use force or fear to threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That was done on the basis of good information.

[Radoncic] It is not advisable to equate the positions of Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina, nor is it realistic. But could you also make the mistake of relying too heavily on declared U.S. support, as has been the case with the Kosovo Albanians in achieving their rights?

[Silajdzic] First of all, I think that you have exaggerated the reliance on U.S. policy. We rely primarily on the tradition of tolerant coexistence between various cultures and nations, and then on reason, the intellect, decency, and people's desire to live in peace.

[Radoncic] Without wanting to generalize, is this base of support not debatable, given the behavior of a significant number of Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Silajdzic] Yes, that seems to be the case, but there is consolation in the fact that the idea of partition is not shared by the entire Serbian nation. That idea is anachronistic in terms of both form and content, and in its essence it is utterly un-Bosnian. Like all of the problems in our common existence, it was imported from outside.

[Radoncic] The leaders of the SDS are convinced that anti-Serbian policy and conspiracies are at play here.

[Silajdzic] I am certain that the Serbian nation has no enemies. These are political platitudes for sake of mobilization, homogenization, and indoctrination. Only an indoctrinated nation can start a war, even if it does not know against whom and why it is fighting. This is the problem. The Serbian nation has no enemies, but the policy of certain protagonists who speak on behalf of the Serbian nation meets with incomprehension and resistance. This is an enormous and essential difference.

[Radoncic] You seem to be optimistic with regard to the outcome of the referendum on the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Silajdzic] Absolutely. You have seen the results of the YUTEL poll, where those in favor of a sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina were eight times more numerous. I am convinced that right now, at the time of this interview, that ratio would be 10:1 instead of 8:1 in favor of an independent and sovereign B-H.

Croatia

Former East German Army Supplies Arrive

LD1302130692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1104 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 13 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily BORBA writes on Thursday that the arms from the arsenal of former East German army were arriving to Croatia with Bonn's knowledge, despite a U.N. arms embargo to all warring sides in Yugoslavia.

Recalling commander of the Croatian Air Force Milan Macek recently as stating that Croatia would "in a few days have its own air force," the paper cites the statement of a German arms dealer that "Germany has promised that in the event of renewed conflicts in Yugoslavia it would deliver to Croatia MiG-21 planes of the former East German air force.'

The text adds that the united Germany was ridding itself of a surplus of (east) German arsenal through arms deliveries to Croatia, an arsenal which is partly outdated and partly failed to fit into the unification of German arms in accordance with the NATO military concept.

"BORBA also cites, invoking a statement of a Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) major, that officers of the disbanded East German Army, too, were joining the armed forces of Croatia in the more recent months. "Many East German officers who were left jobless,'· the paper notes, "were through certain military channels offered a position in the Croatian Army."

The Yugoslav Government in early January this year informed the U.N. Security Council that Hungary, Germany, Austria and some other countries "indirectly or directly made possible the supply of Croatia with most diverse arms and military equipment." In a memorandum to the Security Council, the Yugoslav Government gave precise information about the type of arms and equipment involved, as well as the names of the foreign companies through which the deliveries to Croatia were carried out.

Minister Calls for EFTA-Type Trade Agreement

LD1202193192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1607 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb Feb 12 (TANJUG)—Croatian Vice-Premier Jurica Pavelic has said that Croatia proposes to Slovenia and other republics to conclude a payments and trade agreement based on the model of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Speaking at a regular press conference in Zagreb today, Pavelic said Croatia was also willing to talk with "parts of former Yugoslavia" about a customs union, "without prejudging any political settlement."

Before receiving international recognition from the European Community early this year, Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally decided to secede from Yugoslavia.

Noting that the war has hit the Croatian economy the hardest, Pavelic said that Croatia's economic woes were caused, among other things, by "the loss of markets in former Yugoslavia...and the collapse of the market in the former Soviet Union."

Serbian Deputies Urged to Attend Assembly

LD1202091192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1454 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb, 11 Feb (Tanjug)—There is no reason why Serbian deputies (in the Croatian Assembly) should not come to the Croatian Assembly and attend its sessions, Dr. Zarko Domljan, president of the Croatian Assembly, stated today. In reply to a question at a regular news conference in Zagreb Domljan said that all Serbian deputies "who have not lost their mandate and who still maintain their deputy rights and obligations can take part in the work of the Assembly".

He went on to stress that this referred to the Serbian deputies who had forzen their mandate in the Assembly. However, Domljan says, they can attend Assembly sessions "providing they are not under court investigation or their deputy immunity has not be taken away from them". "We are yet to receive such a request; attitudes, emotions and moods are a different matter", he stressed and went on to warn that he was speaking about the "formal-legal aspect of the issue".

The journalist's question was prompted by a recent statement by Dusan Zelenbaba, an Assembly deputy from Knin, who said that he was prepared to go to the Assembly. Asked if any of the Serbian deputies had violated the law, Domljan said that "the Assembly has no relevant documents nor is it in the process of collecting them" and that "there are only rumors about it".

Evidence of Croatian Offensive in Slavonia Warned

LD1302181792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1719 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Erdut, Yugoslavia, Feb 13 (TANJUG)—Rade Leskovac, deputy information minister of the Serb region of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, says that paramilitary formations of the Yugoslav breakaway Republic of Croatia are evidently preparing a large-scale offensive on the eastern Slavonian battlefront.

In a statement given to TANJUG today, Leskovac specifies that the situation in that part of the Republic of Serb Krajina, which is situated within the administrative borders of Croatia, is growing more tense every day. He goes on to say that reports are being received daily in Erdut, the temporary capital of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, that Croatian paramilitary formations are using new tactics—short-lasting but fierce attacks which as a rule start immediately after an E.C. or UN team leaves the area.

In substantiation, Leskovac lists the example of yesterday's attack on the village of Sodolovci, when a tank and an armoured personnel carrier were hit. Casualties were also reported, he says. In an artillery attack on Markusica, two young villagers were killed. One person was killed and four other injured in an attack on Darda. Other villages deep in Serbian territory have also been attacked.

Leskovac also says he believes that the explosions heard between Osijek and Tenja and between Vinkovci and Mirkovci are part of a mine-sweeping operation launched by the Croatian side as part of preparations for an all-out attack.

Two Killed by 'Ustashas' in Eastern Slavonia

AU1302172392 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Prvoslav Vukovic report from Erdut]

[Excerpt] On the eastern Slavonian part of the front, the Sarajevo truce is no longer valid. It is futile to advocate peace, because there are new casualties during the times of peace as Ustasha forces change their minds and the methods of struggle. The new method consists of brief and constant attacks along almost the entire front line. New directions of struggle are opening up, and fire is opened from new positions. Unlike the previous cases, fire is now opened even at the central areas of the Serbian region.

The so-called telephone hotlines are only an instrument to deceive the peace forces. This is best shown by the fact that negotiations over them have achieved no results, at least for the time being.

Enemy forces have already made it their usual practice to open fire at the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defense immediately after the representatives of the peace-keeping forces leave. The latest example of this was registered in Sodolovci yesterday at about 1530 [1430 GMT]. The departure of the EC mission representatives from the village was immediately followed by a veritable artillery cannonade. The fire was directed toward Sodolovci, Markusica, and Ostrovo. Two 20-year old men, members of the village defense, Niko Lukic and Ranko Eric were killed in Markusica.

Ustasha forces have also opened new positions, that is, begun shooting from places from which they did not do so before. This is a new front line toward Djakovo. Fire is opened from the villages of Kesinci, Mrzovic, (?Ceretinci), and the (?Durgutovica) Forest.

The situation in the Vinkovci region is almost identical. Fire has been opened from this town and from Nustar at Bobota and Pacetin again. After a longer lull, fire was opened from Osijek again at Bijelo Brdo. It is very interesting that fire was also opened yesterday at Vukovar, that is, the legendary Petrova Gora where the Ustashas have never set foot.

As we already reported yesterday, the removal of mine fields is continuing from Osijek toward Tenja and from Vinkovci toward Mirkovci. This is assumed to be a reliable indication that a wide-scale offensive is being prepared—an effort to clear the way for infantry forces. [passage omitted]

Opposition Criticism of Tudjman Viewed

AU1002195192 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] As we have heard, another group of UN liaison officers is to arrive in Zagreb tomorrow as a preliminary force to the peace keeping forces in Croatia. In this regard, and also because the Croatian Government has unconditionally agreed to the arrival of the blue helmets, protests by the opposition are becoming increasingly loud. Nada Al-isa has a report from Zagreb:

[Begin Al-isa recording] The opposition has never before so sharply criticized the government. Some old sins are even being emphasized. The government is criticized because a third of Croatia is still occupied. The radical section of the opposition would liberate Knin with force. President Tudjman is mostly reproached for agreeing to the unconditional arrival of the blue helmets.

The very influential Croatian Peoples Party of Savka Dabcevic- Kucar dates the first sin from the time when Croatia had not been internationally recognized and when the government agreed to the arrival of the blue helmets to speed up recognition. They say that the UN peace plan was inappropriate for Croatia. The demand for the formation of a tripartite government of representatives of the Croatian Government, Serbs, and the UN forces in the occupied areas was not even accepted. In the meantime, Croatia was recognized and as such it rejected the already adopted plan. However, as the opposition recalls, there was a new twist after a few days: Croatia unconditionally accepted the already-rejected plan.

For the opposition this amounts to a catastrophe. The government is trying to justify itself with the claim and promise that nothing is lost by this because the arrival of the blue helmets means that the Yugoslav Army and other armed formations will leave the occupied areas. The opposition says that this is a story for young children because, as Kresimir Dzeba, vice president of the Croatian Peoples Party, says, if this plan had been so good and easy to put into practice, President Tudjman would not have finally agreed to it only at the express demand of Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The opposition claims that the arrival of the blue helmets changes nothing. The occupying authorities will remain in the occupied areas. While this is the case there will be no elections, which are in fact what the opposition most wants, besides the liberation of the occupied territories.

However, one must understand the Croatian Government and even congratulate it for not wanting to use force to, for example, liberate Knin while even the smallest hope exists for a peaceful solution. It is better nevertheless to suffer the criticism of the opposition than to deliberately cause new casualties. [end recording]

Party of Rights Confirms Crime Against Serbs

LD1302123892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1135 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—Official of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) for the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina Davor Perinovic has confirmed that 78 Serbs have been liquidated in the Croatia-controlled town of Gospic. The ultra-right HSP is an opposition party in the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia and it has its branch in the neighbouring Bosnia-Hercegovina, a republic populated by Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.

"Yes, we have discovered this horrible crime against 78 most prominent Serbs in Gospic. They caught them and massacred them one night," Perinovic said in an interview published in the Belgrade daily BORBA today. We are the only Croatian party which has officially requested of the Croatian Parliament to investigate and publicly raise the issue of crimes against Serbs in Croatia," Perinovic set out.

Both the Zagreb and Belgrade press have written about the crime against the Serbs in Gospic, but no official report has been presented by Croatian authorities. The Helsinki WATCH last week presented a report on the liquidation of Serbs in Gospic. Gospic, located in the Serbian region of Lika in Croatia, is not the only town in that secessionist Yugoslav republic where Serbs, mostly prominent ones, have perished without a trace.

The Yugoslav Government sent a memorandum on the crime of genocide against Serbs in Croatia to the United Nations in late January. It listed in the document figures about the arrests and subsequent liquidation of Serbs in Vukovar, Gospic, Daruvar, Ogulin, Pakracka Poljana, Zadar, and Zagreb.

Macedonia

Representatives Quit SFRY Assembly

LD1202090592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1422 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—Macedonia will no longer take part in the work of the Assembly of Yugoslavia and the state Presidency. The leadership of the Federal Assembly was officially informed of this decision by the Macedonian Assembly in a special message which was presented to journalists today. The decision, it is stated, was adopted at a session of the (Macedonian) Assembly on 22 January this year. [passage omitted]

Removal of Army Communications Gear Prevented

LD1302213192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1623 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Skopje, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—Members of the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs today prevented a military transporter carrying communications equipment from leaving the barracks in Kicevo toward Serbia. According to the announcement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will also not allow the dismantling of repeaters [repetitori] and radar equipment from the airfield at Petrovac near Skopje. Their possible removal from Macedonia will depend on the agreement between the Macedonian authorities and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, the announcement says.

Opposition Parties Criticize Titograd Agreement

AU1302202092 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Dino Ramovic report]

[Text] After yesterday's talks at the highest level between delegations of Montenegro and Serbia and last night's

publication of the bases for the organization and functioning of the joint state, the first reactions were received today from the political parties.

The Democratic Party thinks that this document is an attempt by the present leaderships in Montenegro and Serbia to remain in power for as long as possible. Instead of a democratic federation, which they advocate, a still-undefined confederation is proposed, as well as a fait accompli.

Party leader Dr. Slobodan Vujosovic told a news conference that the proposed bases were the result of the reconciliation between the Serbian and Montenegrin leaderships, since their relations had cooled at one point. He said that the authorities in these republics are making random moves because they do not yet have a comprehensive solution to the overall crisis in the country.

The committee of the Liberal Alliance in Budva thinks that for the second time this century Montenegro is being offered its own disappearance from the political and historical scene in an extremely perfidious way, and on behalf of some kind of community its and that [word indistinct] its national and state identity. The party called on its members and the citizens of Montenegro to oppose the intentions of the ruling party, and not allow the Montenegrin state and its future to be compensation for all of the Milosevic policy failures.

Serbia

NRS Calls For Milosevic's Resignation

LD1202182992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1305 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—The National Radical Party [Narodna Radikalna Stranka—NRS] supports fully the initiative of the Democratic Party [Demokratska Stranka—DS] that the Serbian authorities call for immediate elections for a constitutive assembly and for the resignation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, NRS Chairman Janko Ducic told a news conference held today. The NRS has submitted a demand to the Serbian Assembly that Finance Minister Jovan Zebic resign over the scandal with foreign currency saving accounts, Ducic said.

The NRS support Vance's plan because it wants to prevent the bloodletting of the Serbian people. The party, however, holds that the plan has certain shortcomings: it does not specify who would elect the bodies of power and which money would be used in Krajina. According to the party leaders, the blue helmets ought to placed on the demarcation line between the warring parties.

It was also said at the news conference that the party opposed the initiative of the Yugoslav Presidency to form a rump Yugoslavia because it would cost Serbia dearly to finance federal bodies and the Yugoslav People's Army. The party is asking how the Serbian authorities could urge a federation with Montenegro, when neither Serbs nor Montenegrins expressed their views about this. [passage omitted]

SPS Official Defends Milosevic

AU1202103892 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Dragan Marjanovic report]

[Text] Afraid of the increasingly improved standing and position that Serbia and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, have recently been acquiring in the world, some opposition parties and leaders in Serbia would do anything with a view to replacing the authorities and the president of the republic. This is what Petar Skundric, secretary general of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], said in Boljevac addressing leaders of the SPS communal committees in Timok region.

Speaking about the Democratic Party's initiative to replace the president of the republic, Petar Skundric said the following:

[Begin Skundric recording] Objectively speaking, taking into account the confidence our president enjoys, the overall results achieved in unifying the Republic of Serbia into an integral state entity, the fact that under the leadership of our president, spirituality and integrity has been given back to the Serbian people, and the fact that in a consistent and principled way he has been advocating a just solution to the Yugoslav crisis, as well as a just fulfillment of the Serbian people's historical and vital interest to remain living in one state, I think that this initiative is more than ridiculous, quite apart from the fact that it could create certain political problems. [end recording]

It is now most important for Serbia and the Serbian people in the Krajinas to accept the peace plan and establish peace in the crisis regions; so the people themselves should withdraw their support from belligerent and ambitious leaders, Petar Skundric said in Boljevac where he spoke about current problems in solving the Yugoslav crisis.

Radical Party Leader Seselj Interviewed

92BA0453B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 92 pp 18-21

[Interview with Dr. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, by Milivoje Glisic; place and date not given: "They Cannot Just Get Rid of Me!"]

[Text] Dr. Vojislav Seselj, temperamental leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] and people's deputy, is mainly in second or third place in the (political) popularity polls. Most frequently in second place, after Slobodan Milosevic, who is still unchallenged. The reasons? First of all, Seselj is provocative and direct. He states

problems and situations in simple terms; finally, he is consistent in his views insofar as anyone can be consistent in politics.

[Glisic] Recently, you have not been very much in evidence in public, in the press. Is this related to your quarrel with Captain Dragan in Knin?

[Seselj] I played my role in Knin Krajina and effectively drove out Captain Dragan. He came to Knin to overthrow Milan Babic, to cause bloodshed, put simply; he tried to raise the fighters from the front in rebellion against the legal and legitimate government of the Serbian Krajina, and he also tried to organize demonstrations. I even had a personal duel with him in front of the fighters, and then over the radio in Knin. The Krajina does not even know Captain Dragan. Captain Dragan was created by the Belgrade press. On whose order I do not know, I only know that a great deal was made out of nothing, and when something is greatly inflated, it takes only one pin prick and it pops, falls apart, and disappears as though it had never even been. One can nicely paraphrase that maxim of Branko Copic here: Captain Dragan stepped out of a fairy tale, which is to say, from nowhere, and he is stepping back into the fairy tale, again nowhere.

What remains is to ascertain how his fund operates, where all the money being wasted on personal and group luxury was amassed from. According to certain information, we are talking about 35,000 billion dinars, and I submitted a delegate's question in this connection in the Serbian Assembly to which I have not received a reply.

[Glisic] It is hard to imagine that Captain Dragan is a franc-tireur [sharpshooter].

[Seselj] I do not know if he is a franc-tireur, but since my duel with Captain Dragan, as you have seen, everyone has begun to give him a wide berth, even the regime. Studio B offered TV a duel between Captain Dragan and me, I accepted, he refused. In that duel, he would have nothing to go on. All those imagined victories, all that glorious fighting of his, it is all empty, there is nothing behind it. He trained a group of special police in the Krajina, he probably trained them well, but his soldier's knowledge is at the sergeant level. He knows how to carry out terrorist and commando operations, he knows a trick or two with weapons, a few acrobatic turns, and that is all. As for his rank, even that was invented. He is not a captain at all. He never graduated from a military school. And he never obtained that rank anywhere.

[Glisic] Let us continue with a question that is almost unavoidable at this moment: What do you think about the dispute between Slobodan Milosevic and Milan Babic?

[Seselj] I consider what happened to be mainly a misunderstanding. The decision of the European Community recognizing Slovenia and Croatia was a good occasion to clear up that misunderstanding, because many things became clearer. I feel, however, that all of that is nevertheless a misfortune for the Serbian people, that a common language should be found as soon as possible, and that we should overcome the impossible state of noncommunication between the leaderships of the two Serbian federal units. I do not believe it is possible for Slobodan Milosevic to bring down Milan Babic, just as I do not believe it is possible for Milan Babic to bring down Slobodan Milosevic. If, then, we exclude those extremes, there is nothing they can do but find a common language, cooperate, sit down at the table.

[Glisic] On whose side are your sympathies in this dispute?

[Seselj] My sympathies are on the side of the Serbian people. I am resolved not to commit myself in the actual conflict, because I think there is no reason whatsoever to make a commitment, no occasion or any interest. The Serbian Radical Party is at the moment the strongest and most numerous opposition party in the Republic of Serbia, but also on the territory of the Serbian Republic Krajina. It is in our interest as a party for these two regimes, because we are in the opposition to both of them, to exhaust themselves in a mutual conflict, because that would be beneficial to us. However, we are not operating out of narrow party interests, but look to the interests of the Serbian people, and we think that in this crisis situation it is in the interest of the Serbian people for the regime in Serbia and the regime in the Serbian Krajina not to exhaust themselves in settling accounts with one another.

[Glisic] Do you have an understanding, then, for the tone of Milosevic's letter to Babic?

[Seselj] I do not countenance either the tone in Slobodan Milosevic's letter nor the statements of Milan Babic concerning Slobodan Milosevic.

[Glisic] The Krajina and the blue helmets—which solution do you favor?

[Seselj] The Serbian Radical Party has always favored deploying the blue helmets exclusively on the cease-fire line. However, we will go along with any solution that is acceptable to the Serbian people and to Serbian Krajina. As for our volunteers, they will share the destiny of the Serbian people there. If the Serbian people there accept the Vance plan, then we will pull out our volunteers and disarm them, if it does not, our volunteers will remain there to fight to the end.

[Glisic] Does it not seem to you that the version which Slobodan Milosevic signed was the only possible one at that moment?

[Seselj] I understand the reasons of both sides, and I think that what Slobodan Milosevic signed was devised by very clever diplomats. If all the Serbs unanimously accepted that, even that would not automatically mean that the blue helmets are coming. A certain time is still needed to bring all that about. And I think that in that

case Tudjman would certainly reject such a solution, because that solution is not good for the Croats either. Now that the European Community has recognized Croatia, the Vance plan that we have had up to now is out of place. Work should be done on a new agreement whose objective would be to separate the forces on the line of demarcation.

[Glisic] Which means that the debate between Babic and Milosevic could in that sense even be useful to the Serbian people?

[Seselj] It could be very useful, provided that it ends now and does not go deeper.

[Glisic] What might be the consequences of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia?

[Seselj] I think that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia works in our favor, because this has given concern to many powerful factors in the world; it has now given America concern, it has given Russia concern, and it disturbed China long ago. This could be of use to the Serbian people and its interests.

[Glisic] How do you interpret the fact that Macedonia has been recognized only by Bulgaria, in spite of the recommendation of the EC Arbitration Commission that Macedonia's sovereignty also be recognized?

[Seselj] We ought to give credit for that to Greece, which is really our sincere and devoted friend; we must remember the role it has played and possibly in some decisive and serious historical situation return the favor in equal measure. It is also good that the European Community trampled on the arguments and proposals of its own Arbitration Commission, because this also provides us with a precedent to be used in the future—when we can also reject everything in the position of the commission which does not suit us.

As for the consequences of the Bulgarian recognition of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], I think that diplomatic relations should immediately be broken off with Bulgaria in order to put an end to that as a precedent.

[Glisic] We have already broken off many relations with Europe, and Europe with us, would it be a good thing to continue breaking them off?

[Seselj] We must conduct a much more offensive and effective diplomatic strategy. They broke off with us when it suited them. So now we will break off when it suits us. If we were to tolerate everything, then they would literally do with us whatever occurred to them. It must all be answered in equal measure, on the principle of reciprocity and on the principle of retortion. Those two principles are quite legal in international law.

[Glisic] But Serbia is isolated in Europe.

[Seselj] Serbia is not as isolated today as it was this summer. The situation is already different now. A pang of conscience is being felt in French political circles, in those of England, and in some other places; certain other tones are also coming from even German and Italian diplomats. I believe that that isolation will be less and less. At this point, we must exploit the favorable consequences of the European Community's move in the right way. And the fact that the EC has recognized Slovenia and Croatia does not mean that they have also gained international recognition. International recognition is gained by being accepted into the United Nations or when a majority of the states in the world recognize a newly created state. Those are the two basic proofs of international recognition of a newly formed state.

[Glisic] You yourself are frequently mentioned, because of your radical views, as a problem in communication with Europe.

[Seselj] I do not know what kind of a problem I am for communication with Europe....

[Glisic] For example, that joke about putting out a contract on De Michelis.

[Seselj] There was never any contract, nor any attempt at assassination. De Michelis demanded my elimination from public and political life, and I responded immediately, advocating his elimination. In order to achieve his objective, he called for certain allies—in order to achieve my objective, I promised that I would seek certain allies there, and I suggested the possibility of an agreement and understanding with the Sicilian separatists. I did not speak about any kind of assassination.

[Glisic] Perhaps they do not understand that kind of humor.

[Seselj] If they do not understand our humor, they ought to understand their own arrogance. Perhaps someone has tolerated that arrogance of theirs, but I never will.

[Glisic] There is also the principle of the threat of force; let us not forget that many are stronger than we are.

[Seselj] There does exist, of course, the principle of the threat of force, but it is others who have used the threat of force; we, unfortunately, have not. We could have finished all this business last summer if the Army had not been headed by a treasonous General Veljko Kadijevic.

[Glisic] A policy of absolute reciprocity between the small and the great is not always realistic and cannot be applied.

[Seselj] It can be applied, because even the great must give thought to their strategic interests. If they oppress anyone small, they arouse suspicion of a hundred other small ones in the world, and they suffer a convincing loss in that political endeavor. If America were to strangle Serbia, if it were to press down on the remainder of Yugoslavia, America would cease to be convincing in many other points of the world.

[Glisic] Which, however, does not diminish the need for a more adaptable policy.

[Seselj] No, it does not. Anyone who finds himself in a situation of defending himself must display a certain flexibility. For instance, the Kingdom of Serbia showed great flexibility on the eve of World War I. It accepted all the Austro-Hungarian demands except one. But Austro-Hungary did not show even the minimum of flexibility, but resorted to the most naked use of force and thereby lost both in political terms and later in military terms as well. Power does not ask God for permission, but God can crush power. No one in history to date has held exclusively to an argument of force and been successful in the final outcome.

[Glisic] But over the last year, has official Serbian policy shown sufficient flexibility toward Europe?

[Seselj] I think it showed more than it should have. Serbian policy was burdened with a mortgage from the past imposed on it by Europe, but also by certain domestic traitors, like, for instance, the leadership of the Serbian Deception Movement ["obnova" (renewal) replaced by "obmana" (deception) in the party's name, a play on words—translator's note], people like Nikola Milosevic, Zoran Djindjic, and their ilk, people who until yesterday were the worst possible Communists, who overnight became anti-Communists and who did not prove their anticommunism through open and fierce struggle against the regime at a time when the regime was strong, but have uninterruptedly worked to pin communist labels on the regime in Serbia. The moment the multiparty elections were held, and even the opposition recognized them as legitimate by the very fact that it consented to take part in them, communism in Serbia fell as of that moment. At that point, we all should have been trying to prove to the entire world that there is no longer any communism here. Instead, these traitors have been competing with one another uninterruptedly to prove that communism is still operating in Serbia. We who fought communism in our time, while it was still strong and dangerous, know best of all that it does not exist today. It does, of course, exist, but it does not exist in the form of the regime, in the form of the social system, it exists in our heads, more in some, less in others. And if there is a need to wage an anticommunist struggle, then each of us ought to wage it, above all, within himself.

[Glisic] If the regime is not communist, what, then, is it? Democratic?

[Seselj] I believe that the system in Serbia is democratic. But now, whether all the moves of the regime are democratic or not, that is another question. The regime has an opportunity to behave haughtily and arrogantly, because the people showed confidence in it in the elections. The regime has four-fifths of the deputies in the National Assembly, and the reason is that the majority election principle has been instituted in Serbia. That made possible the balance of power in the Assembly as compared to the balance of power in the Serbian people. The opposition, however, is to blame more than anyone else for application of that electoral principle. Recall that in 1990 the opposition presented several nonsensical and pointless demands in the form of an ultimatum, threatening to boycott the election. It should have presented just one and only one demand—the demand for the proportional electoral principle, and the balance of power in the National Assembly would have been much, much different.

[Glisic] What has been the mistake, then, of Serbian policy?

[Seselj] The mistake is that we ever accepted the intervention of the European Community. All summer, if you recall, I was against that, because what we accepted was a violation of the law even on our part. The law was violated in that we allowed those three ministerial adventurers from the European Community to attend a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency and to allow Stipe Mesic to be elected president under their pressure. We are not members of the European Community, and it has nothing to do with us. That is the key mistake. If we had immediately involved the United Nations, everything would have been different, because the United Nations is guided by principles of law and fairness, but the European Community exclusively by the principle of interests. The interests of the United Nations are maintaining peace in the world, fairness, human rights and freedoms, while in the EC hegemonistic interests are operative.

[Glisic] Our vital interests, however, are also bound up with the EC, and we cannot ignore them....

[Seselj] They should not have been ignored, but we should have told them that we are a sovereign state and that they cannot intervene in our internal affairs. This summer it was possible even to carry out a coup d'etat in our country if we had had brave people in the Yugoslav Presidency and an honorable and honest man heading the Army. The separatistic rebellion in both Slovenia and Croatia could have been ended, and no one would have been able to reproach us very seriously on that account.

[Glisic] Would that not have led more speedily to civil war?

[Seselj] There would have been no civil war if that action had been taken at the time. Nevertheless, it is fortunate and a good thing for another reason that that was not done—we would have remained in the same state with Slovenia and Croatia, which for us Serbs is the worst alternative. And that is why I perceive the recognition of Slovenia by the European Community as a certain relief. I am certain that Slovenia will never want to return to Yugoslavia, and that is worth something.

[Glisic] Yet the war is continuing in one way or another; who is interested in prolonging the war in Yugoslavia?

[Seselj] Above all, the Croats, because they do not want to reconcile themselves to what they call the loss of their territories, the loss of the territory of the Serbian Krajina. Tudjman's regime cannot reconcile itself to that, because that would signify its fall from power.

[Glisic] And what is to be done now?

[Seselj] Now, the European Community is giving us an opportunity to resolve everything. You see, independent Slovenia is being recognized, the independence of Croatia is being recognized, but they are still saying: Up to that line and beyond that there are still disputed territories. For instance, Split and environs, certain Adriatic islands, certain parts of Slavonia, this is still in dispute and we can talk about that. Because Croatia has left Yugoslavia, the tenure of the president of the Presidency from Croatia has ceased, and he himself has submitted his resignation, his place is automatically taken by the vice president of the Presidency, who becomes the president. Because Croatia has seceded, the territory which was part of Croatia, the Serbian Krajina, has the right to institute itself as a new federal unit and immediately, automatically, one member of the Presidency is co-opted from that new federal unit. All of that is possible, we just have to screw up our courage.

[Glisic] Isn't what you mention backing and filling: So long as the president of the Presidency is from Croatia, that does not suit us, but when he is not, that suits us?

[Seselj] Politics is entirely based on backing and filling, it is just a question of who is better at it....

[Glisic] But when it suits us, you apply the principle of legality, and when it does not suit us, you invoke politics.

[Seselj] That is what Europe does, that is what everyone in the world does.

[Glisic] What will happen with Macedonia; is the departure of the Army being announced?

[Seselj] We are against the Army's leaving Macedonia; in any case, this still is not actual withdrawal of the Army, because only storage facilities and certain noncombat units are being withdrawn. Perhaps the Army intends to withdraw, but we are opposed. I personally think that Macedonia can be preserved in any alternative. Macedonia was a part of Serbia before the creation of Yugoslavia, and that is internationally recognized Serbian territory.

[Glisic] Yes, but we see that today they are not honoring that kind of international status.

[Seselj] Well, some honor them, some not, but no one is going to respect you if you do not have enough strength and determination to defend your own interests and hold on to what is yours.

[Glisic] The situation is becoming more strained in Bosnia as well—can war be avoided?

[Seselj] I think it can, because the Muslims still do not want to wage war. The Muslims are the majority population in Bosnia, but they live on only 18 percent of the territory, mainly along the Bosna River, and that is all they can count on if they want to form a Dzamahirija. I do not believe, however, that they really want that. They have a fanatical leadership now headed by Izetbegovic, who is guided by higher irrational motives that are not founded on real life, and that fanaticism could create great problems. The Muslims from the Sandzak also have an important role; they have traditionally been poisoned with hatred toward the Serbs, but as for the Muslim population of B-H, I think it is mostly not against living with the Serbs.

[Glisic] After this war, poverty lies ahead for all of us. Won't that tend to worsen conditions in the remainder of Yugoslavia?

[Seselj] We will be living with the conditions of a very grave economic crisis for at least some 10 years. However, if we have a capable and vigorous government, it will be possible to get out of the crisis sooner, for example, through an orientation toward certain expansive world economies like the Japanese, the South Korean, the Singapore economy.... It is just that our government has not fully stated what it wants, it is undefined concerning basic economic objectives, the government in Serbia still inclines toward domination of economic entities instead of giving them maximum freedom.

[Glisic] Orienting our economy toward South Korea or Japan, instead, say, of Italy, already amounts to government involvement in that matter. This makes production more expensive and trade more complicated.

[Seselj] It does not make production more expensive. You did not understand what I said. We are not going to export goods from here to South Korea or Japan, that would be crazy. We must free ourselves of outdated economic concepts to the effect that we have to export something and sell. No. Why not turn all of Serbia into a duty-free zone, why not offer our factories to the Japanese for a song?

[Glisic] There is a political danger of establishing ties with the Japanese or with South Korea. Incidentally, why would Korea be interested in buying our foreign debt rather than Germany, for example?

[Seselj] Because it suits us that it be someone geographically distant from us, who will not dominate and who will not claim our territory. Do you expect the Japanese Navy to arrive, to disembark, and to occupy us?

[Glisic] Wouldn't we be an appendage of Japan?

[Seselj] What does it mean to be an appendage of Japan? It is, of course, in the interest of our government to adapt to Japan, assuming, of course, that we have very close political relations as well, but wherever necessary we will follow their

foreign policy. Why not? But we will not have cultural assimilation and we will not have occupation.

[Glisic] Let us get back to politics: Can Yugoslavia hold the Macedonians, Albanians, and Muslims by force in the new borders?

[Seselj] It will not be able to hold the Macedonians by force, because the present Macedonian state leadership deceived its own people in the referendum in September. The way the question was phrased, the result was known in advance. But if someone today were to put to the inhabitants the question of whether they favored an independent Macedonian state or Yugoslavia, I personally am convinced that the majority would favor Yugoslavia. As for the Skipetars in Kosovo, you see, the police is doing quite a good job of keeping them in subjection. I do not think it is possible for them to rise up, I do not believe in the so-called "southern front." The police merely maintain public peace and order and nothing more. The Albanians are getting along. If they do not want to go to school, they do not have to.

[Glisic] And how does the economy function under such circumstances?

[Seselj] What do we care how the economy functions? They should be told, if you need an economy, work it out yourselves, earn it.

[Glisic] A somewhat more personal question: You say, "if we come to power." There is a story going around that the Socialists, worried because of your popularity, will soon settle accounts with you in short order, when they no longer need you and your volunteers in this war.

[Seselj] In my life, I have become so accustomed to trouble that nothing can surprise me. Second, if someone attempts a showdown which does not comply with parliamentary and democratic rules of the game and rules of behavior, it will give him plenty of trouble. I am prepared for all possibilities. The Serbian Radical Party will never bring down the present regime by force, it will never cause violence in the streets; we are opponents of 9 March, we are opponents of armed conflicts among Serbs, we consistently insist on the democratic and freedom-loving way. If we should prepare some showdown, that settlement of accounts must be played out before the eyes of the public, and we have affirmed ourselves in the Serbian public today to such an extent that that will not be so simple for them to do.

[Glisic] The world public equates you with Paraga in the sense of extremism.

[Seselj] We have never behaved like Paraga in Croatia. We have always had a cooperative relationship when it came to protecting the basic national interests of the Serbs, and we have not weakened in any way Serbian war efforts, nor have we jeopardized anything that contributes to the aspirations of the people. As for the world press, I pay no attention. All kinds of things are attributed to me. It is said that I am a criminal, that I am an alcoholic, that I am crazy, they say of me that I am a Red leader, that I am paid by the regime, that I am a homosexual. If I were to deny all that, I would spend my entire life issuing denials. Why should I?

[Glisic] Finally, has any of your volunteers deserved to become vojvoda in this war?

[Seselj] Several have. In agreement with Vojvoda Djujic, we are not making any proclamations and promotions now. We will do this after the war, because if we did that now, if we promoted someone, and did not promote someone else, there would be rivalry. After the war, when we settle up all the accounts, there will be promotions. But, as I say, there are already at least 10 people among the volunteers who have earned the title of vojvoda.

[Box, p 18]

Why They Are Trying Vuk

The regime became worried because of the increasing popularity of the Serbian Radical Party and its growing strength with the Serbian people. This is also confirmed by the fact that the regime has lodged an indictment against Vuk Draskovic because it wanted opposition leaders like Vuk Draskovic, who is always talking nonsense, but in crucial showdown moments he offers a change of regime and an opposition in elections, and in such tests of strength he is the easiest to defeat, because he defeats himself. In 1990, the regime pushed him as the main opposition leader attacking him with ideological arguments, and those opposition parties whose seriousness it feared, it simply silenced and declared them illegal, and in that way eliminated them from the highest spheres of political life.

Tensions in Vojvodina With Ethnic Hungarians

LD1402113392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 14 Feb 92

[Text] The chairman of the Serbian National Renaissance Party has raised the prospect of a showdown [leszamolas] with the Magyars seeking autonomy in Vojvodina. Mirko Jovic stated at a meeting in Novi Sad, that his party's units stationed on the far side of the Danube are able at any moment to create order in the province. The politician, renowned for his extremist views, emphasized that Serbian patriots will not allow the creation of a Magyar Bacska.

Leader of Vojvodina Hungarians Against War

92BA0457C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 92 p 11

[Article including interview with Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, by Zuzana Serences; place and date not given: "There Is No Problem That Has To Be Settled by War"]

[Text] The critics of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM] have not been exactly "gentle" at any time since it was established, and particularly not this past year, after the well-known affair of the kalashnikovs. Nevertheless, it seems that in recent days a real "offensive" of criticism and an avalanche of accusations of that political organization have been initiated from the political platforms of the ruling party as well as from certain others in Vojvodina opstinas. It and its leader are being portrayed as separatists, secessionists who are in collusion with certain forces from abroad, that they want to make of Serbia a "powder keg," to weaken and shatter it, to use one nationality in mistreating another nationality, that they wish to disrupt good interethnic relations and weaken Serbia in that way....

That was the reason why BORBA turned to Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, and asked him for his assessments, first of all about what caused that avalanche.

The War Option Has Been Defeated

[Agoston] I put all the attacks in a broader context, one that is related to the new situation that has come about through adoption of the Vance Plan and the cease-fire. In this situation, it is clear, the ideological basis of the war option in politics is breaking down, and it is becoming evident that there is no problem which has to be settled by war. It is logical, then, that political regrouping and scrambling for safety has begun, and that at the same time means ascertaining who bears what blame for the war. And in that context the DZVM has several 'sins': above all, it became a legitimate political entity, a true organization representing the interests of Vojvodina Hungarians. It has affirmed itself on both the domestic scene and externally because of its basic positions against war on the basis of the Paris Declaration and its views backing up the Hague document, especially that part of it concerning the rights of ethnic minorities. Probably, people have been particularly bothered by its position of noninterference in the historical debate of the South Slav peoples and also its specific position against the illegal mobilization during the war. Finally, there is also its demand that the Hungarians in Vojvodina not be mobilized forcibly and that they be sent back from the battlefield. Those are by and large the reasons why the war propaganda has come pouring down on the DZVM and its leaders.

[Serences] You are especially reproached for calling upon Hungarians to desert and for speaking about the threat to Hungarians.

[Agoston] There is no basis for asserting that the DZVM called upon Hungarians to desert. That is not accurate. We never called upon anyone to do anything. That cannot be found in a single document or statement of ours. It is impossible anyway. After all, if I call on someone to do something, I must—if I am a moral person—offer him certain protection should he be in danger because of that act. We do not have the strength to protect those who would obey us in that sense, and accordingly we have not been calling upon them to commit acts which could bring any penalty. And let me add: People often ask in what respect we are threatened? I think that the facts speak sufficiently for themselves, it is just that the facts are not seen in the same way by everyone. To me, the very fact that 25,000 people have fled already indicates a certain feeling of threat felt by those Hungarians.

[Serences] Many people are saying these days that you have secessionist and separatistic intentions, along with your Hungarian neighbors. Do you really favor a change of borders?

It Is Not Our Fault

[Agoston] They are accusing us of separatism, but nowhere, in no document or statement, have we said that, nor is that our thinking. We are not thinking of changing borders, but we will do everything for us all to enter Europe together. Incidentally, if you bear in mind our very correct cooperation with government authorities in Croatia, it should be said that we think that the Hungarian authorities and agencies do not have such pretensions either, and this can, of course, be proven by the facts. Which is that a treaty was concluded between Hungary and Ukraine recognizing those borders which might in view of certain historical facts be in dispute. Also the fact that Hungary, along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, belongs to an alliance in which they are jointly helping the Soviet Union, with Western material aid, of course. Accordingly, here again borders are not being posed as a problem, and finally, by recognizing Slovenia and Croatia Hungary has legitimately recognized those borders. Accordingly, I do not know why only with Serbia would the problem of borders be something about which there should be a dispute. It is well known that Hungary wants to enter the European Community as soon as possible, and it is clear that it would be absolutely illogical to raise such problems, when they would certainly slow down its arrival in Europe.

[Serences] Does this mean that the DZVM does not see the Vojvodina Hungarians in some future Hungary either in its wishes or its thoughts?

[Agoston] All the contacts which we have with government authorities in Hungary pertain to consultations concerning our demands which we have made here in the country as an independent political entity, and in that connection we also have overt political support. I am sorry that we have been unable to establish the same dialogue and the same consultation with authorities in Serbia. I think this is not our fault, because in a number of cases we have initiated conversations and dialogue, but this still has not come about.

[Serences] You also say that it would certainly be more peaceful if the "blue helmets" also came to Vojvodina. Along with that statement of yours, you mention that

you think that when the volunteers return from the battlefield in Croatia, the Hungarians in Vojvodina will be threatened, that then "their turn will come." Can you clarify that?

[Agoston] I think that the objective situation is this: If the Vance Plan is carried out, that territory must be abandoned, and in the present situation in which we find ourselves, any arrival of semimilitary formations on this territory would certainly intensify the fear of Hungarians, which is very much present even now in view of the fact that we are presumably the only ones in the country who are not armed, and we do not intend to arm ourselves.

[Serences] Do you think that Hungarians have reason to be afraid, and can you explain in specific terms why—as you say—they are afraid even now?

[Agoston] I do not know if they have reason, but I know that they are afraid. One can look for those reasons in the overall situation in which we find ourselves. I think there is no need to cite specific examples of this.

A Commitment Appropriate to Europe

[Serences] You in the DZVM emphasize the specific datum that 25,000 Hungarians, according to what you have learned, have fled from Vojvodina abroad to avoid forcible mobilization. We have also seen that there are differing views concerning the return of these and other people. What is your view of how this issue should be resolved and their return assured?

[Agoston] Back last year, in mid-December, we sent a letter to the president of the Serbian Assembly and called for a decision to be adopted in the Serbian Assembly which would call them back. I am referring, of course, to all citizens of Serbia, not just the Hungarians who have left. To make it possible for them, in view of the situation, to come back without fear that they will be punished, and also to do away with the mandatory mobilization. I think that an Assembly decision like that would also be the most appropriate, and in view of the situation in which we find ourselves, I am convinced that it would have a very favorable response in international public opinion.

[Serences] Does that proposal also mean that you are specifically convinced that those 25,000 Hungarians, say, along with others—want to come back to their homeland?

[Agoston] I think that the immense majority want to come back.

[Serences] One often hears in public these days that the DZVM and you personally desire through your commitment to destabilize and weaken Serbia from within and that you want to disrupt good interethnic relations in Vojvodina and the republic. What is your comment on that?

[Agoston] As for our political activity, it is the same as it has been from the beginning. Accordingly, I would have nothing to add, I would only say that the media do not take that political activity for what it is, but are looking to certain other ideological and propaganda objectives. What is more, if they are referring to certain activities which are not permitted, which are prohibited by law, I think that in this respect we are absolutely blameless. If there were such things, I think that there would already have been penalties, criminal or otherwise.

[Serences] Do you believe that the activity of the DZVM can objectively cause a deterioration of interethnic relations, above all, between Serbs and Hungarians?

[Agoston] Both the goals and methods which we are using, I think, have been absolutely accepted by Hungarians and by people abroad. I certainly could not have contacts at the level that I do if they thought differently there. I think that our commitment fits into the pattern that is applied to political work in Europe.

[Serences] The assessment of the party in power is that interethnic relations in Vojvodina are still good and stable. What is your position on this?

[Agoston] Regardless of the fear that evidently exists in Vojvodina Hungarians, I think that everyday and concrete human relations are basically unchanged and that in the broadest strata of the population there is a desire for a normal life together. Accordingly, I feel that a greater responsibility is born by those who are disrupting those relations with political methods which are not objectively accepted from a European standpoint.

[Box, p 11]

"Blue Helmets" in Vojvodina

[Serences] It seems that the criticism of and attacks on the DZVM nevertheless occurred after your recent trip to Paris and Brussels and that there was a particular response here to what one heard about your demand that "blue helmets" also be sent to Vojvodina.

[Agoston] I desire, above all, peace and normal life for all citizens in Vojvodina. And for Vojvodina Hungarians, of course, a life without fear. In our demands and statements to foreign political factors, we have been talking in those terms for a long time now. Most frequently in the recent past with Lord Carrington and the Presidium of the Peace Conference. Even I am not entirely familiar with that statement about the "blue helmets" in Vojvodina, which appeared in the French press, because I did not obtain the text in the original, but I can tell you what happened. In a conversation with newsmen, precisely because of this situation in which a large number of Hungarians are leaving the country because of war propaganda and the forcible mobilization, they asked me what we were doing in that connection? I said that we were appealing to the right place—the Peace Conference, and that we have already requested that observers of the European Community

come to Vojvodina to see this situation, but we did not receive an answer, nor did anyone come. I was then asked whether I would have more peace of mind if the "blue helmets" came onto the territory of Vojvodina? I said that I certainly would have more peace of mind, and I must say that I think that even now. Although I am aware that this is utterly unrealistic, because we know quite well who can call for the "blue helmets" to come and who makes the decision on this.

Micunovic on Meeting With Babic, Karadzic

92BA0471C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 92 p 7

[Interview with Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, leader of the Democratic Party in Serbia, by Milan Becejic; place and date not given—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] "Blue helmets" should stay as long as all parties consider it necessary; people in the Krajinas have the right to make their own decisions, it is not for others to give them assurances that everything is going to be all right; Babic and Karadzic should have been addressed in a manner different than the one used by Mr. Milosevic.

The recent meeting between Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, leader of the Democratic Party, with Dr. Milan Babic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic caused additional suspicion and shock in an already chaotic political life. The meeting was discerned by many as leading to a possible continuation of the war, the forestalling of Cyrus Vance's peace plan to which even Slobodan Milosevic had agreed, but others perceived it as a way to give Milosevic a slap on the hand for his war policy and thus shake up his position. In his interview with BORBA, Micunovic explains reasons for this meeting as well as some of the Democratic Party's views regarding Vance's peace plan, and some further steps towards the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

[Micunovic] In principle, the Democratic Party accepts Vance's plan, naturally as a vehicle for preventing war, but this does not mean that there isn't a certain want for precision in it, so it is very good that Marrack Goulding came to clear this up. We were proven right when we said that there should be no lack of clarity in prejudicing political solutions. Vance's plan, in principle, should ensure peace and create a normal situation for political talks. For those who are at least moderate politically, the function of Vance's plan has never come into question, and certainly not by the Democratic Party, which opposed the war from the very beginning and which openly protested against the bombing of Dubrovnik and Osijek.

Talking and Not Letter Sending

[Micunovic] So, it is not possible for anyone to accuse us of not being concerned about peace. Those who make such accusations put their own moral integrity at stake. But, it is an entirely different matter when one analyzes this plan for its possible political consequences, which means can the plan, and in what way with its vague terms prejudice political solutions, which is what it should not do. This is the question for which the people from Krajina rightfully demanded a clear answer. After all, it's their skin that is at stake. And, they proved to be right, which is why Marrack Goulding came to discuss and to precisely state the additional guarantees. This is the only way for the people to finally accept the plan as one possible resolution. Most important at this moment is that having peacekeeping forces in Krajina does not mean leaving Krajina entirely to arbitrary solutions made by the Croatian government. This, I believe, would not be acceptable to any democratic party regardless of its national makeup, because that would be identical to accepting discrimination. That, indeed, was the motive for analyzing the possible consequences of some of the terms of the plan. First of all, this refers to the period after the "blue helmets" withdraw, how long will they stay, if they stay, who makes this decision, and at the same time, who decides what further solutions are feasible?

If the UN is excluded, the decision is then left to the EC. Then, these two things have to be separated. Namely, it should be stated that the "blue helmets" should stay as long as all sides deem it necessary. This is one term that can still somehow be accomplished by means of an additional resolution by the Security Council. Then, there would be a strong impression created that all is in sync, and then naturally, everything in Brussels is going to be confirmed in the same manner that they used till now, that is, creating six independent republics. And, then there is the question of the political status of the Serbs—what will be its scope and who will guarantee it? This is precisely what the people in Krajina were interested in and excited about, and I think it was perfectly normal that they wanted precise answers. It is their right, this is all about them and they have the right to make decisions concerning themselves, it is not for others to give them assurances that everything is going to be done in the best possible way.

[Becejic] How much did your view, in fact, serve as a theme for the meeting?

[Micunovic] The meeting was very spontaneous, they wanted to meet with us and exchange views and opinions because so far their only contacts were with one political party, the Socialist Party. They believe they should hear other political figures from Serbia. We talked about everything, including Vance's plan, and they expressed some reservations regarding certain formulations and guarantees and we assured them that we understood their reservations. But, there was no reason to make any big speculations about it. There is no doubt that with these people we should talk in a manner very different from the manner used by Milosevic. I think that it was his letter that caused huge political damage to the Serbian people in general, and especially to those in Krajinas that are left without any international support, in particular without EC support.

Scattered Illusions

[Micunovic] From this a much bigger issue comes—the solution of the Yugoslav crisis. Milosevic's initial insisting on solving the problem by keeping Yugoslavia intact, that the separation of the two republics be called secession, which is to be condemned and later punished, in becoming involved with the military, and issuing statements that talked about creating an eroded Yugoslavia or creating some new Yugoslavia—all this gave people in Krajina and Bosnia big illusions, and suddenly these illusions were shattered. This caused a great political and psychological shock, and it is of utmost importance that now a more sober consideration of the situation be established, so that others can see what these people have admitted themselves, that is that they very naively fell into the Badenter commission trap. If you remember well, when the EC offered the first document, when they talked about the Arbitrary Commission, we pointed out that the authority given to the commission was huge and that Serbia agreed to it too easily. It was immediately clear that complete sovereignty should not have been given to the international institutions and international organizations, or to Europe, especially since there is no influence there, or a lobby so that we could count on support. On the contrary. Thus, we could expect a total lack of sympathy due to the regime in Serbia as well as to the favoring of the strong lobbies that others have there. All of this brought us into a situation in which Serbia will probably have difficulties in getting recognition as a state within its own present administrative borders. This is the downfall of such a policy. One has to be fair and say that this is the responsibility of the regime in Serbia, which was inflexible and provocative in its rigidness and incompetent to reform itself democratically, all of which made Europe rightfully suspicious towards this regime. On the other hand, the "prejudice of Europe," which submitted itself to the influence of some countries which had special interests in breaking up Yugoslavia, for the sake of peace in the European house, came quick and flippantly. Thus some disputes between America and Germany were settled at the time in a cheap way and at the expense of Yugoslavia. These two factors, for us very hampering, brought an inconceivable political solution, but the most defeating solution Serbia had to face.

[Becejic] In your contacts with Babic and Karadzic, have you detected, as of the moment, any substitute for these illusions, something that would not necessarily bring along with it the danger of continuing the war?

[Micunovic] Instead of illusions, Serbia, both the official and opposition Serbia, should insist to the very end on their right to self-determination. That same principle was also the basis for breaking up Yugoslavia, and the people of krajinas should also oppose such discrimination. All of this, it seems to me, is in accordance with international norms and with finding a peaceful solution. In other words, we should speed up the overcoming of the obstacles that still exist. I think that Babic and Goulding will reach a clarification of these conditions and that the "blue helmets" will come. We should see what else is controversial in these talks, what is it about, and then use that period for i..tensive negotiation between Serbia and Croatia, and in the end, between the representatives of Serbian Krajina and the Croatian authorities, because we must insist more on our inner agreements than on outside solutions, which are often imposed.

"Incorrect Misunderstanding"

[Becejic] Is there room or reason for anger among some peacemaking organizations here over comments addressed at you after your meeting with Babic and Karadzic?

[Micunovic] I don't think so; this is almost "incorrect misunderstanding." The fact that some documents are being discussed does not mean immediately that someone jeopardized the peace and who knows what else. That this is not true we can see from the fact that Hadzic has completed talks and talks with Babic are underway, and all of this is going on while peace is being maintained, and that peace, as a process, is unstoppable. In any case, I hope no one will take the responsibility for continuing the war; even Babic does not want that. On the other hand, peace is the biggest value, but by accepting peace one does not have to accept all the solutions brought with the peace. Within peace and peaceful solutions there are many choices. But that does not mean that the only possible choice is to "tie the horse where Agha tells you to." After all, there is something that's called one's own interests for every state community, and I do not see why we should respect the interests of Germany more than our own. A policy that would take into consideration only the different ways in which to satisfy others' interests, and not just one's own, can not have any support of its own people and, in the end, is totally senseless. We have to make sure that we make up for the things we haven't done so far; first, to start with our clear interests; second, to tell others that their interest is not in conflict with ours, thus creating cooperation with other countries, with other economies. It would be totally wrong for us to believe that we will be immediately rewarded only because we will completely forget or will not at all think about our own interests, but rather understand the other, foreign interests. We will not be rewarded. There are no rewards in the world today and I don't believe that somewhere out there is a jury, so that whoever wags his tail more beautifully will get the bigger piece of cake. In international relations this was never the case.

The President Tripped or Stopped

[Becejic] How, at this moment, should you defend yourself from the accusation that you are trying to be a bigger Serb than Milosevic? How to represent the thesis of an independent Serbian state and not be a nationalist?

[Micunovic] We, of course, never had any pretensions to be nationalists, and we never have been nationalists,

especially not with the intention to beat Milosevic in nationalism. If he is now lagging in showing concern for the complete Serbian national program, it means only that he has tripped or stopped, certainly it is not that we have speeded up our race in order to overtake him. I do not see that this now leads to nationalism. It would be nationalism if we insisted on some military means of acquiring territory that historically belonged to Serbia, etc. This is about respecting the democratic principle of national sovereignty and the rights of each citizen to express himself on his own state and, definitely, on the system and representatives. We insist at the moment on the creation of a Serbian state, and not on expressing nationalism, because Serbia is all that's left of Yugoslavia. I know it's senseless calling it Yugoslavia, and because of that, it is senseless that we are late in organizing our own state. Suffice it to say that we remain the prisoners of the federal political institutions that are completely depleted—from the federal government to the Army. Second, Serbia should simply try to organize itself so it can become the subject that can conclude contracts. Will Serbia later be forced to go to the window of the Badenter commission? I think this can be avoided because that is the cynicism and irony with which Europe treats Serbia, because after all Serbia has for a long time been a state, and if everyone else can declare statehood why shouldn't Serbia? And, who should she ask for this recognition?

Serbian Image Problem Analyzed

92BA0468A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 92 p 8

[Article by Nikola Zivkovic: "The Serbs in World Diplomacy"]

[Text] Berlin—Again the Germans have been the quickest. Today, in January 1992, just as in April 1941, they were the first to send their ambassador to the independent state of Croatia.

The wings of the theater are the same, only the actors have changed. Croatia has above all to pay its warmest gratitude for the support it received from Germany in achieving its "millennial dream." Poglavnik Ante Pavelic and President Franjo Tudjman were not sparing in their compliments. As the archive photos clearly show, the people of Zagreb greeted with flowers and tears of joy the German soldiers who entered Zagreb in the late afternoon hours of 10 April 1941; on 15 January 1992, the German media reported that there is no place in the world where it is so wonderful and flattering to "be a German" as today in Zagreb and Croatia. The first German ambassador in Zagreb, personal emissary of Chancellor Kohl, gloried in the attention with which his host surrounded him. In the speech he delivered on his arrival, he attacked Serbia and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and charged them with the principal responsibility for the war. The highest representatives of the Croatian state, led by President Tudjman, were overjoyed. The German camera then moved to the Zagreb Cathedral, where Cardinal Kuharic was celebrating a holy mass in honor of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] and giving thanks—just as his predecessor Stepinac did in 1941—for God's providence that allowed him and Croatia to live to see this day. BBC London and French Television also spoke extensively about diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, but, by contrast with Germany, they did not send their ambassadors to Zagreb. English television showed a heap of corpses, and a narrator told about several hundred thousand Serbs murdered during World War II in the NDH—which was created with the help of Nazi Germany. Because the present Croatian government has not offered sufficient guarantee for their safety, Great Britain still has no intention of sending its men to Zagreb.

The pictures that the BBC, English television, showed on 15 January 1992—a sea of Serbian corpses in Jasenovac—tell us the road that the Serbian political scene should take. In the fall of 1991, columns of Serbian refugees, just as there were 50 years ago, began to abandon Serbian villages in Bilogora, Papuk, Baranja.... The question that was posed for the Serbian people was this: What to do so that 1941 did not recur? How to protect the Serbs living within the borders of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Croatia?

Instead of alerting the world public to this basic problem, the Serbian leadership and Serbian opposition spent their strength in futile quarrels with one another. The forces of the Serbian opposition concentrated almost exclusively on getting Milosevic out of power, while the Serbian president and his party blundered into one mistake after another as they made the wrong moves, or they made the right moves but always too late. Serbian politicians, instead of speaking about the threatened human rights of the Serbs in Croatia—on this issue they could have gotten the support of the international public and diplomacy—turned into an enigmatic sphinx and fell silent. Milosevic rarely traveled; foreign newsmen chased him around Belgrade. Neither Milosevic nor Serbian diplomacy were in evidence. There was nothing foreign observers could do but to guess.

The general impression is that the main dispute lay in Croatia's demand for disassociation, because "Croatia is richer, pro-Western, and democratic, while Serbia is poorer, oriental, and Bolshevik." Stated in one sentence, that is what the world media think about the Yugoslav drama. Multiparty elections were first held in Slovenia and Croatia; here again Serbia brought up the rear. The Serbian media exhausted themselves in accusations of the policy of Germany, the Vatican, or Hungary. Who can challenge Germany or any other self-respecting state because it conducts a policy in the interest of its own country? Who have we to blame when we are constantly worried about others and not tending to our own affairs? What else is the world to think but that Croatia and

Slovenia are fighting for their freedom, while Serbia is trying convulsively to keep them in Yugoslavia against their will!

What did Milosevic do to distance himself from the JNA? Foreign journalists often saw him in the company of high-ranking JNA officers, so that they concluded that the Army is with Milosevic. Then came the debacle in Slovenia. Slovenia was portrayed as the victim, and the JNA as the aggressor. In diplomacy, justifications do no good. There is no makeup examination. Only success is held in esteem. In Slovenia, the JNA experienced a humiliation, a disaster, a defeat. Next came AVNOJ Croatia. Through the betrayal of mainly Serbian officers, Croatia grabbed up immense war booty in the garrisons of Varazdin, Bjelovar, Gospic, Daruvar (Doljani), Metkovic.... Foreign observers believe that the JNA is an instrument of a policy of Serbian expansionism. The officers and reservists are by and large Serbs. Dubrovnik is bombed. It takes the Army three months to liberate Vukovar. Bishop Atanasije of Banat, who visited western Slavonia between 5 and 8 December 1991, left us a most moving eyewitness account. The Serbian people of Podravska Slatina, Daruvar, and Grubisno Polje were left to fend for themselves against a more numerous and better armed enemy. They did not meet a single JNA soldier. The report ended this way: "This part of Slavonia is being emptied one way or another by bloody war or dirty politics, and there is a danger of Serbian MALA RASKA being definitively emptied of Serbs for the first time."

The accuracy of the report was also confirmed by numerous refugees from that area. The height of cynicism. Instead of the JNA blushing with shame because it failed to carry out its mission—and the mission which the Presidency of Yugoslavia assigned it was to protect the lives and property of Serbs in those areas—the JNA accused the peasants from that region of deserting their positions. Right. Milorad, a 22-year-old fighter from Batinjani, a Serbian village near Daruvar, told me that they defended the village with one cannon and 50 rifles. The Croatian forces were hitting them with 30 cannons and attacking with 400 soldiers. That siege lasted all of two months. No help from anywhere. The JNA nowhere near. Serbian villages were burning as in 1941. When more than half of their fighters had been killed, they had to decide: either to wait a bit longer, and then all of them to die, like Major Gavrilovic, or to withdraw toward Bosnia. Near Okucani, some officers asked them with cynical laughter why they were withdrawing and why they did not remain at their positions?

The leadership of Serbia, instead of setting itself apart from such an army, is still saying that this army is "Yugoslav" and that its task is to protect all the nationalities! The JNA has been besmirching the name of the Serbian people, and it has not been protecting it. The JNA and the Serbian leadership failed the test. They have accounts to render to the Serbian people. Croatia managed to mobilize its public behind this war against the Serbs in Krajina and for an ethnically pure Croatia. Tudjman managed to portray this criminal war to his own and the international public as a defensive and just war, because the battles were supposedly being fought on the territory of Croatia. Milosevic and the Serbian leadership were unable to motivate Serbia behind this defensive war. Serbian young people saw through them. Why fight for the Red Star? That symbol stands for the most horrible fratricidal war in the history of the Serbian people. Who is going to lead them? Those same officers who swore allegiance to Broz and the other Croatian Frankist-Communists that they will preserve the AVNOJ borders?

Events have shown that the state should be headed by a national salvation government that would include the most prestigious and able Serbs, regardless of the parties to which they belong.

Slovenia

Kucan Writes Delors, Soares on EC Association

LD1302221192 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] The information service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed the public media that President Kucan, Prime Minister Peterle and Foreign Minister Rupel have sent letters to the European Commission President Delors and the Portuguese President Soares, who is president of the Council of European Communities. President Kucan sent a request to President Soares for an early start to negotiations on the signing of the agreement on association, that is the so-called European Agreement. A similar letter was sent by Prime Minister Peterle to Delors. Foreign Minister Rupel sent a request to Delors to establish diplomatic relations between the EC and Slovenia at the level of ambassadors and to open an EC mission in Slovenia.

Prime Minister Designate Nominated at Assembly

AU1302170092 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] We have already reported in the headlines that the deputies of the Slovene Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution relating to a constructive vote of no confidence in a government, proposed a new prime minister designate at their joint session. He is Marko Voljc, former director of the Central America Section of the World Bank.

The deputies were told that Marko Voljc has agreed to his candidacy. The president of the Assembly therefore must call a session of the Parliament within 48 hours to discuss this proposal.

Austria Invests in Republic's Ecology

92BA0477B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
24 Jan 92 p 24

[Article by Alenka Vilfan: "Schillings for a Cleaner Environment"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] Slovenia will receive 45 million schillings from an Austrian ecological fund; along with the money, even better access to information and the transfer of knowledge are important.

Ljubljana, 24 Jan—Austrian Minister for the Environment Ruth Feldgrill-Zankel informed the public yesterday in Vienna that Austria had allocated 45 million schillings from its ecological fund to Slovenia for investments in the ecology. This delightful news was stated yesterday at a press conference by Franko Nemac, director of the Agency for Restructuring the Energy Industry.

Within the framework of the so-called Slovene-Styrian energy initiative, the Agency is preparing 10 projects, and Austria will invest 6.5 million Austrian schillings in the first five confirmed. It has provided 15 million schillings for the realization of all 10, and 30 million schillings for joint projects with two firms from Vienna.

In response to a question about whether this was a loan that would have to be repaid, Franko Nemac responded that it was a donation, but that Austria was intending its part of the funds for its own experts, who would work on joint projects with Slovenes. Their presence in Slovenia, however, means a definite advantage, if nowhere else, then as a source of information, so that this advantage can be exploited in international bidding for concrete jobs.

Austria also has certain direct interests in connection with Slovenia, among other things the closing of the nuclear power plant; it is therefore prepared to invest in a chain of electric power plants on the Sava and in other projects aimed at reducing energy consumption. In investing in purification equipment at the Sostanj thermoelectric power plant, the Austrians want to reduce the influence of sulfur dioxide, which is seriously polluting Carinthia. The remaining half of the money for the projects is to be provided by Slovenia—one fourth from the budget, and the rest by the interested parties. In addition to the money, the transfer of knowledge from the Austrian enterprises is perhaps even more important to Slovenia.

Slovene Pan-European Movement Founded

92BA0465D Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Joze Sircelj: "Slovene Pan-European Movement Founded"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Dr. France Bucar elected president against the dominance of technocracy and bureaucracy.

Bled, 27 Jan—In the presence of Dr. Otto Habsburg and his two sons, the Slovene Pan-European Movement was founded at noon in the Toplice Hotel. It was not established as a party, but rather as a society, so that it would also be accessible for those who do not want to commit themselves to a party. By a majority of 67 out of 74 votes taken, Dr. France Bucar, the president of the Slovene Assembly, was elected the first president of the Slovene Pan-European Movement. There are several well-known figures on the eight-member board of directors, including Dr. Peter Jambrek, president of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia, and Ivan Birjak, president of the Republic Assembly's Chamber of Opstinas.

The Pan-European Movement, according to its statute adopted in 1975, advocates that Europe should not be ruled by any superpower, and that Central Europe should become part of a united Europe based on humanity, the Christian tradition, and the diversity of peoples and cultures, as well as languages. The movement is against the domination of technocracy and the omnipotence of bureaucracy, and against anarchy and nihilism. It supports inalienable human rights, which can only be restricted for the sake of the common good. It supports individual and family enterprises, a solid farmer class, and improvement of the position of the working class.

Dr. Otto Habsburg spoke about the possibilities and challenges that await Slovenia upon its inclusion in the EC. The possibilities will also be easier because of the new EC Presidency. Of course, hard systematic work will also be necessary in order for the EC to realize what Slovenia's place in the community will be like and what the young state can contribute to it.

President Bucar, in the concluding speech, pointed out that for Slovenes, the former national defense policy had the consequence of isolating them. Now, it is necessary to open up, and in this regard the question of how to preserve our own identity arises.

Law Ensures Market Competition

92BA0465A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
29 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by Roza Erman: "For a Healthy Market and Discipline"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] The law on protecting competition would help to regulate the situation in the Slovene market, preventing unfair competition, prohibited market speculations, and imports at dumping prices.

Ljubljana, 29 Jan—With independence, ties with the international business market, and especially the aspiration to join the EC, the establishment of a normal market is extremely important for such a small economic area as

Slovenia. Whereas market relations have been regulated until now by the federal law on trade, Slovenia, in accordance with its constitutional possibilities, has decided to regulate the market by different laws. The law on protecting competition is also among the more important laws in this field, along with the laws on trade, consumer protection, and prices.

The Ministry of Trade, which has prepared a proposal for issuing a law on protecting competition, together with a draft law for discussion by the Republic Assembly, says that the law by itself cannot establish a "normal" market, because its existence depends upon numerous economic and political factors. With a relatively normal market, however, the law can contribute to consolidating order in the market.

The law is aimed at making possible and maintaining effective competition in the market, and is directed against actions that disrupt the desired competition. The law is antimonopolistic, and will be welcome in Slovenia, which is very much permeated with monopolies in spite of the smallness of its market. It will also take care of preventing unfair competition, prohibited market speculations, and dumping imports. For example, business conduct that does not abide by good business practices will be unfair and prohibited, and in the case of dumping and subsidized imports, additional payment could be used to equalize an unjustified advantage in selling goods. In short, the law is aimed at introducing the kind of market discipline known by economically developed states. By adopting the legal-regulation standards established in West Europe, the law comes closer to the regulation of this field in European states; this is important both for the operation of foreign enterprises in Slovenia and also for the activity of our enterprises abroad.

Following the European model, a special body is also to take care of market discipline in Slovenia. Foreign states with a developed competition law have special federal administrative bodies with great powers for the struggle against restrictions on competition. On one hand, the new Slovene law on protecting competition would preserve the former system for unfair competition (a suit in legal proceedings, and proceedings because of economic crimes), and for speculations (proceedings because of economic crimes), but a separate body, following the model of the developed states, would take care of restrictions on competition—an Office for Protecting Competition. It would also have a board of experts which would be composed of representatives from business and consumer organizations.

The rules of market behavior would apply both to enterprises, and to banks, financial, tourist, and other service industries, as well as to public enterprises, if not otherwise specified. Enterprises that are not registered in Slovenia, according to this law, will have to abide by our market legislation when doing business in the Slovene market. The association of enterprises will be possible under the law, but enterprises will only be able to operate in association if they do not hamper others or mutually divide up the market and conclude an agreement on prices. Their joint operation also must not interfere with research, innovation, and developmental activities.

A dominant position in the market will not be prohibited per se; only abuses of that position will be prohibited. According to the proposed law, an enterprise has a dominant position in the market if it conducts more than 40 percent of the sales or purchases in the Slovene market. Several enterprises dominate the market if their share exceeds 60 percent. If an association of enterprises had a dominant position, it would have to notify the Office for Protecting Competition about the association; the office could prohibit the association if it would mean a serious restriction on competition or a danger of misuse of the position gained in the market.

While the law would prevent the abuse of a dominant position in the market, it would also indirectly protect consumers as well. Although it is aimed at protecting competition, of course, on the other hand it should also contribute to the protection of consumers. Such protection is also indicated in the prohibition of actions under abnormal economic conditions, through the prohibition of impermissible speculations. Thus, for example, unsettled market situations, such as inflation and a shortage of goods, may not be used as a reason for raising prices or causing disruptions in supply.

The penalties provided according to the proposal for issuing the law start with 200,000 tolars for enterprises. The responsible individual who has committed a crime would also pay from 25,000 to 50,000 tolars.

Slovene People's Party Founded

92BA0465E Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
28 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Veso Stojanov: "A Completely New Political Party Is Coming to the Slovene Political Scene"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The program of the Slovene People's Party [SLS] only partly adopts the program of the former Peasants' Alliance; the Podobnik brothers are the ideologues; the plans for merging the SKZ-LS [Slovene Peasants' Alliance-People's Party] with Christian Democracy have been disrupted; in favor of the healthy conservativism of Slovenes.

Ljubljana, 27 Jan—On Saturday, 1 February, the first convention and presentation of the program of the Slovene People's Party, as the Slovene Peasants' Alliance-People's Party will henceforth be named, will take place in Maribor. The slow transformation of the Peasants' Alliance from a professional, union organization of farmers began back in the fall of 1990, when the addition "People's Party" was also attached to the former name "Slovene Peasants' Alliance" at a general assembly in Vrhnika.

At that time they also registered the name "Slovene People's Party," but according to Marjan Podobnik they did not want to use it, since at that time they still did not have a detailed program, except for the agricultural area, and consequently the use of a new program could even have had negative repercussions for the party, because it would have been "People's" in name only. That is why the leadership of the Peasants' Party decided back then that they would begin to formulate a suitable SLS program, which will be officially presented in Maribor on Saturday. Judging by the program, for which the Podobnik brothers were the main ideologues, a completely new political party will step onto the Slovene political scene in Maribor, whose program will only partly adopt the program of the Peasants' Alliance. Marjan Podobnik says that they even began to be aware quite a while ago that the SKZ [Slovene Peasants' Alliance], as a party that was relatively narrowly focused on a specific social sector, did not have a long-term future. Consequently, in the future the SLS will also focus its attention on other social strata, and the program modification of the party's documents is also appropriate for this.

In addition to the modifications to its program, the SLS will also change organizationally. Specifically, it will organize professional, vocational, and interest unions, such as farmers, workers, retirees, women's, youth, ecological, Christian unions, etc. For the time being, only the Peasants' Alliance will function under the auspices of the SLS, since by continuing the program orientation of the SKZ-LS it will continue to advocate farmers' interests. In spite of everything, the Peasants' Alliance will continue to be the mainstay of the SLS. Other unions will be organized depending on the interest in a given area prevailing among the membership.

With the final formation of the SLS, all the plans for a merger between the Peasants' Alliance and Christian Democracy have probably fallen apart. In fact, for some time there has been public discussion of this possibility, and recently the fairly coordinated activity by the two parties in parliament and in public has also blurred a clear distinction between them. Moreover, both parties have the cultural sphere of the Christian ethos as their ideological background. Regarding the future relationship between the two parties, which are aiming their party feelers at the same part of the Slovene population, Marjan Podobnik says, "Our decision to expand our program, and strengthen ourselves in terms of personnel and organization, is our legitimate right. We have cooperated and will continue to cooperate with related parties. I am convinced that Christian Democracy is one of the parties with which our cooperation will continue to be productive. After the collapse of Demos, every party is now seeking its own path. We have achieved a great deal with the assistance of Demos, and we also contributed a great deal to Demos's stability, as long as it still existed. Now that Demos no longer exists, we have begun to seek our own path. We see great possibilities in a populist orientation for the party, especially if we take into account the healthy conservativism of a considerable part of the Slovene population, along with the fact that people's parties in Europe also have peasants' alliances as one of their foundations. This gives us some certainty, and we are setting out on a solid path. We have succeeded without a great deal of pomp in creating a party that is a sort of combination of the prewar People's Party, the Austrian People's Party, and Italian Christian Democracy. In Europe, wherever they do not have a people's party, Christian Democracy covers that stratum of the population."

In spite of Saturday's presentation of the new party, personnel changes in the party's leadership are not yet being considered for now. It will be time for them at the first congress of the Slovene People's Party in April. Until then, it will be headed by Ivan Oman, Marjan Podobnik, and Franc Zagozen, i.e., the present leadership of the SKZ-LS. In fact, they expect that with the establishment of the SLS, they will also become stronger in terms of personnel, and perhaps even with certain delegates from other parties, whose names are the biggest secret for the time being.